Vote neg to reject China securitization in favor of transforming our discourse and knowledge production
Rogelja and Tsimonis 2020 (Igor Rogelja, Fellow at European University Institute, and Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer at Lau China Institute “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true#199079137) //sethlee
The structure is thus complete. In this securitising narrative, China’s actions in Europe are wholly political, designed to sow dissent and discord and aided by a number of collaborators and sleeper agents. Yet as we have argued, the securitising discourse rests on rhetorical devices, de-contextualised cases, and a callous disregard for alternative, more convincing and falsifiable explanations which do not take CCP propaganda at face value. The resulting image of Chinese companies, associations, and individuals as the long arms of the Chinese state is a distortion, and one can easily identify many areas of overlap with the original version of the 1990s China Threat scenario in the USA.
What is missing in these reports is, first of all, a case-by-case examination of the deals, the agency and the degree of involvement of different actors, the behaviour of Chinese companies within existing regulatory frameworks, and a contextualisation through comparison with companies from other third countries. This would include fine-grain academic research on Chinese-financed projects, analysing their actual impact, and assessing their individual and collective implications without recourse to disparaging comparisons to so-called ‘banana republics’. An analytical approach that gives precedence to facts over perceptions would also contribute to a calmer assessment of the broader issues of EU–China trade reciprocity and market access which need to be resolved. In this regard, the ‘China Threat’ frame advocated by many think tanks, journalists, and politicians risks transforming these issues into a zero-sum game, thereby reducing the political space for negotiation and compromise.
Another common problem in these reports is that think tanks widely disregard areas of immediate concern to European citizens, such as the impact of Chinese SOEs on industrial relations, environmental standards, and local economies and societies. This bottom-up problematisation is missing in the top-down securitising narrative, possibly because the negative impact of Chinese investment in these areas is sometimes in accord with the dominant developmental paradigm of the EU and its member states. In addition, a more careful line of analysis would need to consider how current and prospective EU member states can best benefit from the availability of Chinese investment and financing at a time when austerity and economic stagnation put the European project in question. In this regard, the EU investment screening mechanism must not prioritise the interests of high-tech sectors of the wealthy North over the labour-intensive industries of economically weak countries, or risk further discord among member states.
Lastly, the securitising discourse ultimately reveals an underlying hegemonic assumption that a ‘core’ of one or two major European powers will decide the EU’s terms of engagement with China, according to their own economic interests and domestic political mood changes. This assumption runs the risk of entrenching divisions among EU states on an issue that does not represent a threat to European unity. In response, a balanced analysis of the challenges and opportunities that Chinese investment brings needs to emphasise the EU’s tested ability to synthesise different views and interests, which is a fundamental promise to its members.