Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Vote negative to rethink security

Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia; Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 19-21

A final point is necessary on the relationship between security and ethics as we conceive it, by way of introduction to this book. To develop a cosmopolitan ethics of security is not simply a case of applying "cosmopolitanism" to a particular issue area in global politics (security), but rather, rethinking how we understand and practice security. What limits existing accounts of the relationship between ethics and security is the tendency to ignore or downplay the particular politic of security: its centrality to the political legitimacy of the key actors in global politics; its capacity to define the core values of communities, and the manner in which they might be protected or advanced; its capacity to mobilise particular political responses or the actors undertaking them. -Fins is particularly applicable to discourses of "human security'', for example, and to some extent, critical engagement with security grounded in concerns with emancipation (Booth 2007). It is for these reasons that security is often seen to belong to the realm of "high politics": the most important objective of states, wherein the naming and relationship of "security" and "threat" designates political priority and can trigger extraordinary (and frequently illiberal and antidemocratic) responses, such as the violation of human rights or international law. This political function of security makes an analysis of the ethics of security more urgent, in part because of what is at stake in debates about security (definitions of community and values, and responsibilities to the self and others, for example). But this politics of security also complicates the simple application of cosmopolitan thought. In our view, what is needed is sustained engagement with the "politics of security" that argues for moral progress, while taking seriously the dangers of securitization and the apparent constraints placed upon the articulation of radical security alternatives. When taking account of the politics of security here, we particularly focus on the 'function of representations or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling particular policy or legitimating particular actors as security providers' (Browning and McDonald 2013). Engagement with the politics of security in this way has tended to come from theorists ofs ecurity in the post-structural tradition. For such thinkers, representations of security define political community or integrate individuals into an abstract notion of political community or national values (Burke 2008a; Campbell 1998a; Weldes 1999). Security, in this sense, can become a form of governmentality that shapes and moulds individuals for political ends. David Campbell's (1992, 1998a) analysis of the function of Cold War discourses of the communist threat in the United States is perhaps the most obvious case here. For Campbell, national security discourses served to define American identity in a narrow and highly, politicised way. In the process of constructing external threats to which the state ( in this instance) positions itself as the actor capable of providing security, those with power can exclude dissenting voices and political alternatives, and shut down needed debates about policy. For the so-called Copenhagen (or "securitization") School, security can be understood as a social construction, brought into being through "speech acts" that define particular dynamics, actors or things as existential threats. In the process, these issues are elevated above the realm of "normal- politics and into the high politics arena of security, where they are dealt with through urgency and secrecy. While its proponents do not deny the possibility that such developments may be progressive, ultimately their preference is for desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. This is most frequently based on the claim that security has an illiberal logic, limiting the possibility for dialogue and locating responsibility for providing security to those with power. But such a sedimented view of the logic of security can also apply to its meaning. For Ole Wxver (1995), at the heart of the concept of security 'we still find something to do with defence and the state' ( see also Berki 1986; Neocleous 2008). These alternative conceptions of security will be examined in more detail in the Chapter 1. They suggest something distinct about the study of security that makes it qualitatively different from other issue areas or "promises" of government. In this, we would agree, and reaffirm the need to take seriously the politics of security. But if these critics have most explicitly engaged with the politics of security and its dangers, their proposed response to the dangers of securitization—resisting or escaping security and its logics is problematic (Dillon and Reid 2009; Dillon 1996; W;,ever 1995). For these scholars, security is something that should be resisted, escaped or challenged. We think such critics go too far. They are right to identify the dangers of an unthinking embrace of security as a site of progress, and right too in drawing attention to the ways in which the promise of security for some can all too easily be defined on the basis of the continued suffering and marginalization of others, both within a particular political community and beyond. Yet, in acknowledging the pathologies of a dominant security discourse, and in failing to articulate a progressive alternative, they mistake this discourse for the timeless essence of what security means and does, paradoxically reinforcing its centrality in international relations. In rejecting the possibility that a range of actors can and do enact progressive notions of security, they deprive marginal actors and communities of a site of contestation and change. This pessimism has been contested in a range of " positive. " critical accounts of security (Booth 2007; Burke 2013a; Floyd 2011; Nunes 2012; Hoogensen-Gjory 2012; McDonald 2014; Roe 2012). What is needed, then, is an approach that is at once attuned to the dangers of embracing security—given its history of contributing to exclusionary practices and the status quo—while refusing to give up on defining a cosmopolitan conception of security oriented towards an integrated global society, and the rights and needs of the least powerful and most vulnerable. In a related way, we are concerned to see global security as a major priority that can be addressed as a part of the normal (not exceptional) practice of government and civil society action that are democratically and internationally accountable. In part, this is because exceptionalist practices have tended to reinforce nationalism and alienation, privilege the security of the few and undermine it for the many, and gravely damage global cooperation and consciousness. When international organisations become involved in global security governance, it is imperative that their practices and objectives either reflect the global interests and international norms painstakingly developed over decades, or seek to improve them in the cause of a just global security order that supports human dignity and flourishing.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.