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The link is non unique---securitization is a global trend and an ongoing process---no reason why the AFF is uniquely bad OR triggers the impact

Jinghan Zeng 21, Jinghan Zeng is a professor of China and International Studies, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 08/14/2021, \\pairie

The article also explores how the Chinese AI approach and its security logic are embedded in China’s historical, geopolitical, and domestic contexts. China’s desire for AI sits in the wider context of the country’s pursuit of modern technologies. China’s high anxiety over technology competition arises from the historical discourse that blames China’s “century of humiliation” on its past under-performances in global technology competition. In this regard, the historical experience of “humiliation”—not just in being militarily invaded, but also failing to keep pace with technical development, justifies the need for contemporary mobilization, thus to avoid history repeating itself. Geopolitically speaking, China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States– China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process. In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although the extent of its impact on targeted audiences, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However, it also generates unintended consequences. They are: (i) creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital; (ii) impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance; (iii) obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership; (iv) reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation; and (v) constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

Theoretically, this article echoes the call to develop a global Copenhagen School of security studies by expanding its non-Western politics agenda.

7 Emphasis added, Graham Webster et al., “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017),” New America, 1 August 2017, https://www.newamer ica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificialintelligence-development-plan-2017. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 419

Attendant difficulties notwithstanding, it shows that securitization has considerable explanatory power in the Chinese context. Empirically, this article develops a more accurate understanding of China’s AI politics, and also connotes an emerging research agenda for studying the relationship between AI and security. AI’s potential to transform our society has profound implications for security politics. As this article will discuss, the securitization of AI is not solely a Chinese practice, but rather a global trend. Nowadays, AI is often framed as a national— and international—security matter in both the United States and Europe. In this regard, securitization of AI, including, but not limited to China’s practices, merits more attention from the Copenhagen School and the wider security community.

Analytical Framework: Securitization

The concept of securitization in critical security studies is primarily associated with the so-called “Copenhagen School,” and the works of its leading scholars, including Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, who consider security as a “speech act”8 —“by saying, something is done.”9 Securitization refers to the discursive process whereby actors, usually elites and state actors, transform a particular issue into a security matter. During this process, actors will label a particular issue as a security threat and incorporate it into a security agenda to justify extraordinary countermeasures. Securitization is considered successful when the relevant audience accepts that the issue in question is a security threat, thus empowering emergency measures.

The securitization process involves a series of key terms, including “securitizing actor,” “securitizing move,” “referent object,” and “audience.”10 Securitizing actor refers to the person or actor who labels a matter as a security issue, an attempt that is a securitizing move. Referent object refers to that labeled as an object, which needs to be protected from the claimed security threat during the securitizing move. Audience is the group for whom this securitizing move is performed which must be convinced in order that the extraordinary measures to deal with the security threat are accepted.

Originating in the Western-centric Copenhagen School, most studies on securitization are based in a Western, or perhaps more accurately, European, democratic context. After all, securitization is a process whereby an actor shifts a particular matter beyond the “normal” state of affairs to an emergency national security agenda.11 This usually requires a liberal democratic society to represent the regular democratic polity from which such emergent national security politics 8 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Colchester: ECPR Press, 1983). 9 Jonna Nyman, “Securitization,” in Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, eds., Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 97–110. 10 Ibid. 11 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 420 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 can appear. As, however, this inevitably makes securitization theory less useful for understanding security in a non-liberal-democratic political order, it both limits the scope of the securitization agenda and fails to realize international relations. In the context of global power transition, wherein Western dominance is in decline, many, including Buzan, call for a more global understanding of international relations and securitization.12 This requires considerable attention to security politics in non-Western societies.

It goes without saying that this admirable non-Western politics agenda faces critical challenges, because security politics operates in a very different way within a non-democratic, often authoritarian, and illiberal setting. Nevertheless, early attempts have been made to apply securitization theory to explain security dynamics from the Middle East, including Egypt,13 Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain14; Africa15; Latin America, including Brazil and Mexico16; North America, including Cuba17; South Asia, including India18; to Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan.19 In the case of China, securitization has proven useful to understanding climate and energy politics.20 Vuori’s research, for example, shows its 12 Saloni Kapur and Simon Mabon, “The Copenhagen School Goes Global: Securitisation in the Non-West,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 1–4; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), pp. 287–312; Juha Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 65–99. 13 Maja Greenwood and Ole Wæver, “Copenhagen–Cairo on a Roundtrip: A Security Theory Meets the Revolution,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 44, No. 5–6 (2013), pp. 485–506. 14 Simon Mabon, “Existential Threats and Regulating Life: Securitization in the Contemporary Middle East,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 42–58. 15 Edwin Ezeokafor and Christian Kaunert, “Securitization Outside of the West: Conceptualizing the Securitization–Neo-Patrimonialism Nexus in Africa,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 83–99. 16 John Gledhill, “Securitization, Mafias and Violence in Brazil and Mexico,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 139–54. 17 Martin Holbraad and Morten Pedersen, “Revolutionary Securitization: An Anthropological Extension of Securitization Theory,” International Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2012), pp. 165–97. 18 Saloni Kapur, “From Copenhagen to Uri and across the Line of Control: India’s ‘Surgical Strikes’ as a Case of Securitisation in Two Acts,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 62–79. 19 Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2007), pp. 5–25. 20 Jonna Nyman and Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization in Chinese Climate and Energy Politics,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2016), pp. 301–13; Yan Bo, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 421 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 explanatory power in studying political crises in the eras of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin, suggesting that in the Chinese context the principal audience of the securitizing move is not the general public, but elites who have the power to shape the security agenda.21

The article expands this non-Western security politics agenda by studying AI in China. Previous security studies have explored the relations between securitization and technology.22 The work of Hansen and Nissenbaum, for example, uses securitization theory to analyze the concept of cyber security.23 Using Estonian digital structures in 2007 as a case study, it develops a framework to theorize cyber-security as a distinct sector on the security studies research agenda. This article draws the security studies community’s attention to how a top emerging technology, i.e. AI, has been securitized in the Chinese context.

Indeed, securitization of AI has progressively become a global movement. In the United States and Europe, for example, the AI advancements of geopolitical competitors, especially Russia and China, are often perceived as a potential threat to national and international security. The relevant speech act frames AI not as a normal technology, but as a national security matter that justifies the enablement of extraordinary actions from the state and society. In effect, it signifies the urgent need to deploy more resources and support, for example, in the US case, not only to the American AI-enabled military sector, but also the AI commercial industry.

Moreover, American AI policy discourses often label China as the United States “most serious strategic competitor”24 or “closest competitor.”25 It thus “Securitization and Chinese Climate Change Policy,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), pp. 94–112; Maria Trombetta, “Securitization of Climate Change in China: Implications for Global Climate Governance,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2019), pp. 97–116. 21 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization.”; Juha Vuori, How to do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China (Turku: University of Turku, 2011). Other notable works on securitization and China include Juha Vuori, Critical Security and Chinese Politics: the Anti-Falungong Campaign (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Liu Tianyang Liu and Yuan Zhenjie, “Making a Safer Space? Rethinking Space and Securitization in the Old Town Redevelopment Project of Kashgar, China,” Political Geography, Vol. 69 (2019), pp. 30–42; Cui Shunji and Li Jia, “(De)securitizing Frontier Security in China: Beyond the Positive and Negative Debate,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2011), pp. 144–65. 22 Myriam Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 1155–75. 23 Hansen and Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School.” 24 NSCAI, “The Interim Report of National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, p. 6, https://drive.google.com/ a/nscai.org/file/d/153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view?usp¼sharing. 25 Hoadley and Sayler, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, p. 21. 422 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 becomes an inevitable topic and useful reference point for American AI strategy. As a US Congress report on AI and National Security points out, “most analysts view China’s unified, whole-of-government effort to develop AI as having a distinct advantage over the United States’ AI efforts.”26 Thus, many are calling for a similar “national-concerted” and “whole-of-government” approach towards AI in the United States. Here, China’s ambitious AI plans are often labeled as a serious threat to the United States. To Webb, for example, “Beijing’s AI push is part of a coordinated attempt by President Xi Jinping to turn China into the world’s unchallenged AI hegemon,”27 “while market forces and consumerism are the primary drivers in America.”28 Thus, according to Webb,29 “the United States— working with its democratic partners—urgently needs to play catch-up and develop the strong, solid muscles it will need to win the AI race.” These analyses implicitly and explicitly frame China’s AI strategy as coherent, top-down, and geopolitically driven, which inevitably neglects the nuanced development of China’s domestic AI politics and thus exaggerates the geopolitical threat of China’s AI advancement and plans, as the article will discuss later. Nonetheless, regardless of whether those analyses reflect the reality, they have contributed to the anxieties of China’s near competitors.

For American tech giants, an exaggerated China threat is also helpful in fending off criticism of their monopoly by appealing to American national interests. Thus, market actors in the United States have taken advantage of this China threat to further their cause. For example, under pressure to break up Facebook, China is referenced in order to justify Facebook’s monopoly. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg once warned that Chinese tech companies would dominate if Facebook were dismantled. According to Zuckerberg:

if the (US) government here is worried about — whether it’s election interference or terrorism — I don’t think Chinese companies are going to want to cooperate as much and aid the national interest there.30

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