Desecuritization fails to protect vulnerable groups or prevent war, so legal methods are the best alternative --- they complement desecuritization while maintaining constitutionality by checking sovereign powers --- only the perm solves
Tine Hanrieder & Christian Kreuder-Sonnen 14, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Research group leader at WZB Berlin Social Science Center, and Research and teaching associate at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich & Research Fellow and Chair for Global Governance at the Geschwister-Scholl-Department for Political Science of LMU München, August 2014, “WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, p. 331-348 /lg
Given the spectre of exceptionalism that comes with security, research in the tradition of the Copenhagen School has focused mostly on averting securitizations that facilitate emergency measures (see Roe, 2008; Wæver, 2000: 253–254). It has been claimed that a securitizing move that shifts an issue from normal politics into the realm of the exception needs to be countered by an explicit desecuritizing move that shifts the issue back to the normal by discursively undermining the threat construction (Hansen, 2012: 542–545; Huysmans, 1995: 65–67; 1998; Roe, 2004: 285–287).8 Such a conception of securitization and desecuritization presents several ways back to normal politics. However, it also reproduces the categorical belief that there are only two possible political forms: ‘non-security’ (associated with normal politics) and ‘security’ (associated with the logic of war) (see Figure 1). This perspective is conceptually constraining because non-security is not always an option: on one hand, desecuritizing moves may simply not be successful because desecuritizers lack discursive authority or because their discursive strategies do not resonate with the relevant audiences (see Buzan et al., 1998: 26). On the other hand, non-security may be undesirable owing to the negative side-effects that desecuritization can produce – for example, by undermining legitimate claims to protect vulnerable groups (Roe, 2004). Without an alternative to desecuritization, this would mean letting the logic of war unfold.
The alternative we propose here is based on the assumption that there is little reason to accept that speaking about security concerns necessarily leads to the use of full emergency measures. Paul Roe (2004: 292–293) has argued convincingly that securitized issues can be managed. While the language of security remains present, its effects can be mitigated (see also Tjalve, 2011). As the debate on the state of exception among legal theorists shows, there are different ways of constitutionally dealing with emergencies that foresee particularly the taming of sovereign power through constitutional containment (see Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Gross, 2003; Scheuermann, 2006). For example, what has been termed the ‘accommodation model’ of exceptionalism is based on the understanding that it would be unrealistic to think that the existing constitutional order could remain completely untouched during times of crisis. Nevertheless, the basic pillars of the constitution need to be protected and the legal order should therefore have mechanisms ready to keep an emergency within these constitutional confines (Ackermann, 2004; Gross, 2003: 1043–1044; Tushnet, 2005). Thus, from a legal theory perspective, one important alternative and complement to desecuritization is constitutional accommodation (see Figure 1). It is an alternative insofar as it mitigates the effects of securitizations that cannot be avoided. However, it is also complementary to discursive desecuritization because it counteracts the tendencies of the emergency trap outlined earlier – in other words, it removes or mitigates a precondition for further securitizations (see also White, 2013: 14–15 for the inverse approach).
Such confines can be both ex ante and ex post constitutional checks on discretionary powers. Ex ante, both the initiation and the scope of emergency measures can be constrained. Regarding the initiation of emergency rule, Schmittian decisionism – according to which the sovereign themself determines the exception – can be countered by functionally separating the decision on the presence or absence of an emergency and the decision on the means to overcome it. This is seen as a fundamental precondition for keeping emergency rule ‘constitutional’ (Rossiter, 1948: 299–300). At the IO level, this could mean that a member-state body or other subcommittee is entitled to formally invoke the state of exception and that only then can an IO organ decide on emergency measures. The range of available emergency measures can be circumscribed so that the sovereign’s discretion does not trespass on elementary rules and rights even in the state of emergency.
In addition, IO emergency powers can be contained ex post with the help of accountability mechanisms. As scholars in the literature on emerging global administrative law argue, basic principles of domestic administrative law – and thereby mechanisms of political and judicial review – can and should be instituted within the international legal system to increase IO accountability (see Kingsbury et al., 2005).9 Accountability can take the form of political review, whereby an interstate assembly or executive board watches over IO emergency powers. Legal review, in turn, can be achieved by either a legal counsel or an internal review panel to assess the lawfulness of the actions of IOs. In addition, inter-institutional processes of steering and control can contribute to the review of an IO’s deployment of emergency competencies (Kingsbury and Casini, 2009: 337). An important side-effect of accountability mechanisms is that they enhance the transparency and public scrutiny of IO activities. This may also prove to be positive feedback for desecuritization efforts by opening the possibility of discursively contesting the securitizing moves of IOs.