The Cosmopolitanism alt is vague and full of contradictions, providing no basis to actualize a cosmopolitan utopia
Chen 2019 (Xunwu Chen, PhD in philosophy at University of Texas at San Antonio, “Beyond Kant’s Political Cosmopolitanism in advance: Thinking a World Constitution without a World State”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335138243_Beyond_Kant%27s_Political_Cosmopolitanism_in_advance_Thinking_a_World_Constitution_without_a_World_State?enrichId=rgreq-f10fdca2801a6263c75766cd9a67f471-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNTEzODI0MztBUzo4MjQ0NzYwOTA1MTEzNjFAMTU3MzU4MTgyNjEyMg%3D%3D&el=1_x_3&_esc=publicationCoverPdf)
Now, Kant has bequeathed an enduring, daunting question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how is a global order under the rule of cosmopolitan law without a global state possible? Kant wanted a constitutionalized global order, but not a world state. As he claimed, “the proposal for a universal cosmopolitan nation, to whose power all individual nations should voluntarily submit, and whose laws they should obey, may sound ever so nice in the theory of the Abbe St. Pierre or of a Rousseau, yet it is of no practical use” (Kant 1972: 89). Also, “the idea of international right presupposes the existence of many separate, independent, adjoining nations” (Kant 1972: 124). As Kant saw it, the concept of international right contradicts the idea of a world state. “If there were such a global political body, there would strictly speaking be only one state, and then international right would not be applicable” (Kant 1972: 60). How can a global order under the rule of law without a world state be possible? The key challenge here is to locate a legitimate public authority as the necessary enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Kant did find one but his choice leaves much to be desired. He proposed the mechanism of a world congress or federation as the candidate: “This would be a federation of nations, but it must not be a nation consisting of nations” (Kant 1972: 115). In spite of his confidence, Kant’s world federation may not be competent to be the enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Some problems with it are inherent and irradicable. This can be seen as follows: (1) The proposed cosmopolitan order is one under the rule of law; (2) the rule of law calls for a sovereign power that defines and enforces laws and that is the necessary enacting agent and condition for the rule of law; that is to say, the rule of law calls for a government of sovereignty as the necessary enacting agent and condition; (3) in our time, a sovereign government is associated with the sovereignty of a state; (4) therefore, how can we talk about the sovereignty of cosmopolitan laws as civil laws without a world state? In his misgiving about global justice, Thomas Nagel raises a similar question. As he indicates, global justice calls for the rule of law; the rule of law calls for government as the necessary enacting conditions for justice; no wonder, “the nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice”; “justice as a property of the relations among human beings (and also injustice, for the most part) requires government as an enacting condition” (Nagel 2005: 114). Thus, Kant has bequeathed a defining, enduring question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how can we have sovereign global laws without a global state-power?