Moves towards progress through an embracement of a collective humanity relies on an Enlightenment reading of humanism that is incoherent for accounting for black disabled life. Black life is not locked into the position of being fully human nor fully slave; instead you should understand black life as lived within social death.
Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 74-78, JMH]
The ideological conceit of the human materializes at every turn. It operates as the main thrust of an argument about the (in)validity of Black and mad subjects’ existence. As it becomes an appeal to or for a purported universal experience, it ironically denies some humans a humanity according to Western European ideals, which are fundamentally anti-Black and sanist. Since it masquerades as normalcy, it insidiously functions as an apparition—ghosting a text or an event. Conceptually, humanity separates the human from flora and fauna and ostensibly guarantees that a human will be thought of as an autonomous subject, operating with agency and securing the legal, social, cultural, political, and material conditions to do so. For mad Black subjects, this definition of the human does not apply. This understanding of humanity, forged in the crucible of the Enlightenment period, undergirds our analytic praxis as well. Its materiality affects the access Black mad subjects are granted to particular conditions and, as a discursive construct, adherence to it affects the theoretical paradigms with which we work in literary criticism. This is the break where the criticism reveals itself to itself: this notion of humanity lingers in the criticism that art—exclusive to humans, of course—must have specific characteristics (formalism). As the previous conversation intimates, it subtends our attention to and preoccupation with ocularity and the logos (deconstruction, structuralism). It assumes that readers’ seldom autonomous interpretations evince the value of meaning in a text (reader-oriented criticism). It occupies our concerns about interiority (psychoanalysis) and labor (Marxism) since it finds critical purchase in the energy expended by certain human bodies and minds (feminist criticism, queer studies, disability studies, ethnic studies, etc.). Sedimented within our interpretive strategies and invested with promise— so much so since we refer to ourselves as humanists—the concept of the human becomes nearly impossible to critically examine. The ideology of the human carries with it an exclusivity: namely, that the category of human belongs solely to a figure Rosemarie Garland Thomson terms the normate. Such a figure—white, male, cis gendered, straight, able-bodied, Protestant— excludes multiple identity categories on its face.1 Because of its origins in the Enlightenment and entanglement with the Middle Passage, eugenics, imperialism/colonialism, and the carceral system, the human poses a set of ontic and narratological problems for Black madness and mad Blackness. In the previous conversations within this text we’ve seen how the concept of the human could be opened up, the cut widened, when an artist-theorist places Blackness and madness at the center rather than the periphery. For instance, Butler uses Ina to theorize about the constellation of intimate relationships available when Blackness and madness form the crux of a new identity. Hopkinson’s cognitively disabled and mentally ill characters shift the narratological terrain when their specific minds become the locus of the novel. Each artist-theorist questions how capacious the category of human can be. What boundaries keep humans fundamentally human? If remaining human is possible or preferable, what exactly does it mean to be one? How might we read and interpret if we cannot assume the validity of the human? Following a politics of curiosity,2 I conjecture about what it might mean to unmake madness and Blackness, detract from the critical and narrative power each has accrued as derogatory. Though I consider that both discourses were fomented in the Enlightenment as a way of defining and disciplining nonnormative bodies, I am not interested in turning to con versations between Enlightenment thinkers (or those wrestling within that tradition). I am much more interested in the critical gaps and folds explored by Black studies and disability studies thinkers. Their analyses invaginate our discussions, forcing us to examine how we think about madness and Blackness in a world hostile to them. This discussion comes from two strains: one, from the previous conversations in this project in which nonhuman characters populate the landscape, and, two, from a larger conversation beyond this project about the potential of madness and Blackness to be disruptive once one divests from the human as a category or concept. I turn to those in disability and Black studies who have theorized about the creation of human and humanity as a concept vis-à-vis madness and Blackness. I purpose to trace their understanding of this concept and, since the two have often implicated but not involved each other, I also aim to find the common conceptual ground between them.3 Last, I turn to artist-theorist Tananarive Due’s African Immortals series as a mad Black text that operates as a heuristic, questions the validity of human as a concept, and explores the repercussions of abandoning it. Though I read the text as a set of experiments, I concentrate on a few overarching story lines—desiring Blackness, understanding the ideology of ability, and forming new interpretive strategies—that question whether the conception of the human has particular narrative power. Other F-Words: Fugitivity, Fungibility, & Futility Scholars within Black studies have long contested the category of human for Black people. Sylvia Wynter’s oeuvre contains a rigorous and adroit critique of this concept, designating the human as a localized Judeo Christian concept that she terms Man.4 She traces it through the Enlightenment to the late twentieth-century Caribbean, citing that the human was ideologically designed to exclude Indigenous people and Blacks.5 There could be no room for those whose subjugation made colonial and imperial life possible. To be clear, this subjugation was not simply about putting those bodies to work, and harnessing their labor, but also about the intellectual subjugation and cultural denigration of those bodies. They had to be deployed in service of the colonial and imperial subject physically, and simultaneously disregarded as a space of intellectual and cultural complexity. The prohibitions against reading, gathering, and marriage (just to name a few) ensured that the Black cultural and social institutions developed did not carry with them the validating stamp of approval from social institutions that had power. Excising Blackness from histories (read: time) makes permissible the kind of erasure that facilitates thinking of Blacks as outside the realm of the human. Moreover, the emphasis on labor sustained a set of practices that sought to create a permanent underclass from the antebellum period to the present. Blackness then not only bears the mark of being thought of as having a fundamental lack of humanity, but that lack is determined, and circumscribed, by fungibility and fugitivity. Race, then, and Blackness specifically, determines who lives and who dies.6 As a result of this thanatological constraint, Blackness remains exteriorized, consistently unaccounted for in the construction of the modern world.7 Even after Man, to deploy the term in Wynter’s lexicon for the human, definitions of Blackness must contend with abjection. The analytical praxis consistently turns and returns to the areas where Blackness has a circumscribed agency, limns a limited radicality, and remains enmeshed with histories of violence and degradation. Scholars differ on their responses to abjection such that some attempt to maneuver out of it, and others accept it as part of the experiences of Blackness. To be clear, accepting abjection is not equivalent to accepting institutionalized racism. Instead, it requires viewing Black social life as lived in light of social death,8 or finding freedom in unfreedom. Jared Y. Sexton’s notion that Blacks live in light of social death dovetails with Fred Moten’s understanding of freedom in unfreedom in one crucial way: that abjection must be circumnavigated if one exists. The difference between the two scholars’ arguments resides in how that navigation takes place and with what affective residues. That is, radicality and resistance evince an ontology circumscribed by the discourses of fugitivity and fungibility. Locating the origins of these discourses in the antebellum period, some scholars also find that abjection must be understood as a fundamental aspect of Black life post–Middle Passage. These scholars— among them Kimberly Juanita Brown, Saidiya Hartman, Christina Sharpe, Hortense Spillers, and Alexander Weheliye—all understand the long reach of the antebellum period as having direct repercussions to how Black life functions currently. Slavery as a vast hemispheric project fundamentally shapes how Blacknesses operate discursively and materially.9 The residues of unspoken, ethical grammars force those who find some degree of maneuverability possible to wrestle with some exigencies, such as the queered and erotic Black/white encounter or the presumed degradation of male rape as a locus of Black radical power.10 Man tethers itself to Blackness through abjec tion, requiring Blackness to make meaning through a grammar that enfolds within it the resistance to itself. Abjection becomes the facet of Blackness (not Blackness in toto) typified by the fact that “you can’t win. You can’t break even. And, you can’t get out of the game.”11 Whereas the field of Black studies has chosen to question the validity of the human as a concept, disability studies has taken a decidedly different strategy. Disability studies makes a particular claim on the human even as it acknowledges that the category excludes disability as a matter of course. For instance, myriad scholars clarify that the conception of health and ability determines who is included and who is worthy of living. Lives thought to be too painful, deformed, or requiring too much medical intervention often fight for the right to live at all.12 The typical disability studies response has been to depict disability as a part of human variance, a part of the spectrum of human experience. This particular formulation correlates to the idea that if one lives long enough, one will become disabled. The kingdom of the sick, as Sontag puts it, always welcomes new visitors and permanent residents.13 Undergirding this idea is the conception of the human as potentially inclusive of disability, where disability can function as an absent presence. According to disability studies scholars, this absent presence surfaces in narrative, art, and rhetoric, among other cultural and social spaces. For instance, the Venus de Milo makes its current claim to beauty based on its amputee status.14 In Keywords for Disability Studies, the entry on aesthetics positions disability as hopeful prospect despite its position and history: “The close proximity of aesthetic judgment to carceral isolation and rationalized euthanasia is the darker side of Enlightenment knowledge, even as the increased visibility of the disabled body creates the occasion for its liberation.”15 Narrative relies on intellectual disability even when it is not named as such or embodied within a character.16 Communication requires the disabled body to establish itself not only as coherent but also saleable in terms of diversity.17 In each of these instances, the human is a category to which disabled people already belong, albeit in abjected and absented form. The idea is not only that the human relies on disability to perform conceptual work but also that enfolded into the human is the experience of disability.