Thus, we affirm the black cyborg – a project of imagination, memory, longing, aversion. A diplomatic strategy that is alive, insurgent. A human being that no longer is, at least temporarily
Joy James 13 [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]
The essential duty of the one is to struggle for the realization or consciousness of the cyborg. The cyborg is born at that moment in which the convergence of interests among anyone and everyone seeking or dodging freedom is inescapable and inescapably recognized; the cyborg glimpses the possibilities of permanent revolution, as the veil descends. This convergence is cemented in more than blood and rational choice. It is shaped by imagination and memory, longing and aversion.
Fanon’s 1960s writings about the Algerian war of liberation from the French illuminate aspects of the 1980s Cold War’s détente. The first, like all of the post–World War II battles for freedom in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Middle East (and the “internal colonies” in the Americas and beyond), was asymmetrical warfare. The Cold War was not. Both forms of warfare, hot or cold, were in the postwar era largely fought on or against the bodies of the colonized.2
To inhibit nuclear proliferation between two waning empires, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), diplomats and activists crafted new vocabulary. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) was coined as the language of rational-minded Westerners seeking to preserve what they had accumulated or appropriated. In order to avoid an apocalypse— at least for the imperial crowd—sobering reality would dictate the demilitarization of East and West and the playing out of antagonisms on Third World terrain where the casualties against bodies already dehumanized by Europe would not create significant political collateral damages in either democracies or dictatorships of the people.3
“Concerning Violence” exhibits contempt for superpowers and their respective blocs or adherents for the native who has completed a revolutionary struggle against the colonizer and now enters the world arena as a leader. For Fanon, diplomacy is simply another war strategy or strategy of maneuver to safeguard the newly emerging nation that seeks to avoid becoming a neocolony or a “failed state.” Fanon offers the possibilities of a diplomacy that is dynamic, alive, and insurgent: a “strange contrast to the motionless, petrified world of colonization” (1963: 78). He cites several examples of “boorish” or inappropriate behavior on the part of those ostracized or distanced by the West: “[When] Mr. Khrushchev brandishes his shoe at the United Nations, or thumps the table with it, there’s not a single ex-native, nor any representative of an underdeveloped country, who laughs. For what Mr. Khrushchev shows the colonized countries which are looking on is that he, the moujik, who moreover is the possessor of space rockets, treats those miserable capitalists in the way that they deserve” (78).
Fanon finds the theatre of Soviets similar to that of the Cuban representatives, although only the latter fought a prolonged bloody war in the postwar period. Thus there is a profound difference in the ways in which Fanon describes the implications of Nikita Khrushchev’s pounding of footgear and Fidel Castro’s presentation of war as bloodshed, not mere theater:
In the same way, Castro sitting in military uniform in the United Nations Organization does not scandalize the underdeveloped countries. What Castro demonstrates is the consciousness he has of the continuing existence of the rule of violence. The astonishing thing is that he did not come into the UNO with a machine-gun; but if he had would anyone have minded? All the jacqueries and desperate deeds, all those bands armed with cutlasses or axes find their nationality in the implacable struggle which opposes socialism and capitalism. (78)
There is a violence reserved for the colonized both as receiver and as proponent that seems predictable and part of the biopolitical world he or she is reduced to living and being perceived as living. Khrushchev by some accounts actually seems to have enjoyed his visit to the United States (embracing at arm’s length, with considerable threat, his distant Euro cousins). The same cannot be said of Castro (who would be subject to multiple assassination attempts by the CIA), unless one counts perhaps his visit with Malcolm X in Harlem and his stay at the Theresa Hotel in Harlem when hotels in downtown Manhattan denied accommodations for the Cuban leader and his entourage.
“Concerning Violence” intimates that the Soviet/Eastern bloc would be an adventurer in Third World freedom and as opportunistic as the West in its own fashion. However, Fanon does not explicate, writing in the height of decolonization struggles against Western imperialism and before the Soviet collapse, how the specter of Western colonization and the benign face of Soviet domination, through weapons and currency to those seeking freedom from the West and United States, might in fact mutate into a shared body or host. One cohort in alliance against black freedom, one corporate-military state conglomerate that understood its feeding grounds to be the “wretched of the earth”—the black, brown, yellow bodies who had not morphed or blossomed into cyborgs capable of resisting colonization and slavery.
Understandably Fanon need not depict an adversary so grotesque in its abilities to consume black life. He can focus on the colonialist, the French settler as the enemy formation, although this colonialist or settler is actually just an errand boy for another, more formidable foe. Fanon, without confronting the increasing concentration of military power and finance witnessed in the twenty-first century, offers a redemptive possibility beyond enlightenment or rational self-interest or choice; he offers an apocalypse of sorts. For when the “one” solitary merges with others to become the revolutionary, he or she is no longer a conventional human. As cyborg, as one/mass unified against the divine, mechanical, and biological terror of the colonizer, as its own biological, mechanical, and divine formation, a human being as a conventional being no longer exists (at least momentarily).
Revolutions of course mark the end of time and space as conventionally understood and relied on. What happens when the human becomes part machine and part divine, the alternate manifestation to what the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, an amendment theoretically crafted for former enslaved blacks, created when it enabled corporations to become cyborgs by allowing them humanity or political personhood? What, then, is the predictability of time and space in a struggle between cyborgs? And would such a struggle of unequal equals be a form of MAD?
If the enslaved or colonized disappear as materiality and consciousness, then the consciousness of the enslaver and colonialist is left homeless, a roaming ghost, the zombie that Fanon mocks the native for fearing more than her oppressor or the secret police. The enslaver and the colonialist without the slave or native cannot haunt themselves. Thus the colonialist or enslaver would be insane or suicidal to usher in the henceforward moment in which every native is massacred. The disintegration of the multitude of individual natives is based on their common vulnerabilities to suffering as slaves or colonized folks. Their pain becomes a weapon against their oppressor (who, although decapitated, is still capable of a lethal strike).