Western rationality frames disability as incompatible with the “reality” of its logics, excusing the worst structural violences while focusing on the “opaque" image of the disabled
Elizabeth J White Vidarte 21 [Disability, Dependency, and the Mind: Representations of Care-Giving and Receiving,. Temple University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2021. 28542354, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2572601236?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true, -ekh-]
The AMA’s code of ethics did more than prescribe obedience for patients and tender deportment for doctors; it emphasized the intimately personal connection between a doctor and the ethics of his practice: “A Physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his mind ought also to be imbued with the greatness of his mission, and the responsibility he habitually incurs in its discharge. Those obligations are the more deep and enduring, because there is no tribunal other than his own conscience, to adjudge penalties for carelessness or neglect” (np, emphasis mine).
The weight of this ethical charge lies heavily on Dr. Trescott, the protagonist of Stephen Crane’s61 1892 novella, The Monster. The novella frames the medical conundrum at the heart of the story as a question of morality. Dr. Trescott has saved the life of his black servant, Henry, badly burned after having attempted to save Trescott’s own son from a fire. Yet Henry is left “without a face” and apparently with little mind; he has become “the monster.” In the eyes of the town, Henry has transformed into a gothic horror trope, terrorizing children and the infantilized black residents of the town; the second half of the novella shows “the monster” repeating scenes from the first half — asking the doctor about his horses, walking through town, and courting his fiancée at her mother’s house, though this time he is met with screams and stones instead of affectionate ridicule, in part because Henry “the monster” shows no awareness of his transformation. Eventually a mob forms to demand his removal from their collective sight, and when the doctor refuses to send him to the state hospital, he and his wife are socially ostracized. The town’s venerated judge had himself suggested, when Henry was in limbo between life and death, that the most ethical decision Trescott could make was to let Henry die.
Ultimately, the novella asks readers to decide whose way of knowing Henry hews closest to a true understanding of his condition — and therefore whose judgement is morally sound. In doing so, readers are prompted to ask where the limits of morality lie. Is the judge immoral for suggesting that Henry would be better off dead or are the townspeople immoral for their small-minded fear and disgust? Is the doctor immoral for centering the choice to save Henry on his personal feelings rather than his patient’s best interest? Is this a story about social prejudice or a story about a doctor’s hubris?
Susan Schweik has argued persuasively, in “Disability Politics and American Literary History: Some Suggestions,” that The Monster is a story of aftermath, of what happens in the wake of the unthinkable. The townspeople, no less than most critics, cannot seem to conceive of a world in which the Henry of the story’s after — that is, the monster — exists as part of the social fabric of the small town, no matter how picturesque its mischievous small boys and gay outdoor concerts, its barbershop and its tea parties, its volunteer fire companies and its kitchen gossip. If the intimacies of a small town cannot embrace Henry, the novella seemingly implies, there is no place for him anywhere in the universe of American realism. That there were real, historical Henry Johnsons in the America of the 1890s, Schweik argues — Civil War veterans, face cancer patients, factory accident victims, those with congenital harelips, etc. — changes little, for even in the realm of “history,” there existed institutions — overfilled state hospitals, traveling freak shows that specialized in medical oddities, and formal and informal urban “ugly laws” that jailed the disabled for begging in public — that all served a similar purpose: to remove from public view (unless contained appropriately in the cages and stages of the circus) and public consciousness, if not public imagination, those whose very existence was inconceivable in the context of life and community.
This is where reading with attention to the gothic can reveal the hybrid — even monstrous — generic structure of Crane’s novella; we can see the ways that Crane’s realist and gothic modes are inextricably imbricated such that “the real horrors of social relations are simultaneously exposed and concealed,” as Nick Lolordo insightfully argues in his essay, “Possessed by the Gothic” (36). Beyond this, we can attend to what the text works hard to disguise through the narrator’s exaggerated irony, along with Crane’s exuberant literary style, full of distractingly improbable similes and figurative expressions to describe even the most mundane of acts,62 and the cartoonish parodies of black minstrelsy, immigrant dialect, and the follies of womanly gossip and jilted spinsters (all of which are jarringly contrasted with the seriousness with which the novella takes Trescott’s dilemma). Through the medical gaze that constitutes Henry as a knowable monster, the narrator exteriorizes Henry both before and after the fire through the eyes of the town’s characters and, crucially, also through the narrative itself, such that we are presented with what Lolordo calls Henry’s “absolute opacity” (Lolordo 47). Attending to what the narrative paints as the irreducible knowability — emptied of all subjectivity and interiority — of Henry as a black minstrel figure and as “the monster,” we can also interrogate the comforting notion that such an objectifying view of disability is entirely of the past.