Cruel optimism DA- There framework reproduces ideas of cruel optimism by ignoring most the role of critical disability studies.
Kolářová 14( Kolářová, Kateřina. “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip: On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic.” Journal of Literary; Cultural Disability Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, September 1, 2014, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 257–74, doi:10.3828/jlcds.2014.22)// RB
Echoing Sara Ahmed’s understanding of the future as “a question [that] unfolds […] in the present” (Promise, 164), I want to come back to the questions that opened this article in order to ruminate on what it means to cruise a geopolitical time and place that apparently no longer exists. I want to ask what the vantage point crafted from the specific historical experience of socialism and the post-socialist transition offers to critiques of neoliberalism—more specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. In engaging with these questions, I come back to Berlant’s concept of cruel optimism, which has been extremely helpful as I identify structural attachments to promises of better futures that created the ideological base of the project of transition. The engagement with post-socialist material also shows, however, that Berlant’s brilliant discussion of the toxicity of the neoliberal version of the promise of a good life needs, as I implied earlier, to be reformulated not only to correspond to the specificity of the particular experience of post-socialism, but also to reveal how such a confrontation brings forth more general challenges and lines of critique. There is a strange incongruity in and around Berlant’s book. Disability is literally on its cover, as the crip artist Riva Lehrer provided the cover image, If Body: Riva and Zora in Middle Age. It is embedded in the title of the book, as “cruel optimism” could in fact be a very appropriate name for the violent, recuperative, and compulsory optimism of the cultural logic of rehabilitation to which “the disabled” are permanently subjected. The book’s discussions are haunted by disability, and at times it is even evoked directly, yet only through the clinical and medicalized language of “disease,” “depression,” “obesity,” “spina bifida,” rather than through the transformative and politicized vocabulary of cripness. In this sense, Berlant’s book replicates the failing of the majority of critical work that exposes the neoliberal debasement of the values of solidarity, social justice, and equity. This lack of discussion is startling. Indeed, how is it possible that the bulk of critiques of neoliberalism and neoliberal governmentality provides such engaging and incisive insights into the politics of maximizing vitality, capitalizing on the very act of living, or exposing the morbid utilization of “slow death” and the necropolitical distribution of death, yet does so without including disability/cripness in its analytical instrumentarium? How can a discussion of “the politics of life” itself do without a category that is integral to modern definitions of life and vitality? Taking up the one crip lead from the book, I speak to the image of If Body (approaching it differently to Berlant herself in her closing “Note on the cover image” [265–67]) and ask what a critique of cruel optimism would look like if it thought of crip bodies, if it thought of crip bodies elsewhere from the Western context, and if it thought of crip existence in the context of post-socialist, neoliberal promises.6
In formulating the crip reading of cruel optimism, in cripping cruel optimism, we need to address the different affective structures of post-socialist promises. We also need to read those affective structures along with and perhaps against the relationality of cruel optimism Berlant first identified. Most importantly, the concept needs to be expanded so that its more capacious definition would account for the pressures of compulsory able-bodiedness and for the specific experiences of disabled people and crips. In other words, Berlant’s concept of toxic and hurtful promises and her repertoire of critical analysis of fantasies of the good life call for encounters with crip versions of “life” as well as for a cripping of the notion ofcr the “good life.” They need to be read more carefully and closely along with the realities of lives that were never promised (let alone lived through) by this liberal fantasy, lives that are appropriated and colonized by images of “life not worth living,” or lives that are at times not even granted the recognition of life itself. The transition into neoliberalism produced forms of affective citizenship based on what Berlant calls “aspirational normativity” (164). In the post-socialist context, the aspiration promising the utopia of the “good life” was not expressed in the imperative to keep going; the moral aspiration of the post-socialist transition was by definition that of rehabilitation, overcoming the failure and shame of the bad past. It was not the “nearly utopian” (163–64) desire for a prolonged present, but the “nearly utopian” desire for a recuperative future. The cruelty of the post-socialist moment lies—as I hope my analysis above unmasks—in conditioning forms of social belonging through an “affectivity of debt,” discourses of overcoming, and fantasies of cure. The cultural grammar of rehabilitation saturated the political and the social so fully that claims to social equity could be disavowed and turned into a chimera, the crip monstrous ghost haunting the post-socialist redefinition of sociality and community, where any form of social belonging for crips other than under the rubrics of paternalizingly charitable humanism was (and remains) virtually impossible (see also Kolářová). Registering the temporal coincidence of different structures of compulsory optimism also emphasizes their cruel irony. The project of rehabilitating the post-socialist crip virtually overlaps with the moment when, in the West, states started to retract their social welfare commitments. Even more specifically, the countries in “transition” served to uphold the fantasies of success, health, and the general “good life” made possible by capitalism. For instance, with the claims that it was living the “post-communist dream” (qtd. in Weiner 53), the Czech Republic was in the early 1990s (before the myth of smooth, straightforward, and successful transition was ruptured by the first crisis in 1994) put forth as the model for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The “teleology of ‘transition’” (Hann 9) of the post-socialist countries along the same path the West followed decades earlier (see also Verdery) also served, however, as an important projection space for the “West,” where the apparent rehabilitative capacity of capitalism in the East was utilized to bolster the “secular faith” (Duggan xiii) in (neoliberal) capitalism as the only possibility for human history. This did not go completely unnoticed, as the key figure of the Czech transformation, Václav Klaus, himself notes: “It is nearly paradoxical that the speeches of some of us [sic] delivered in the West are perceived not only as signs of the vital renaissance of thought in the East, but are also sought after as a support in their own ideological skirmishes” (Klaus, “Síla,” 1). Yet, in his ego-centrism, Klaus did not draw the conclusions at hand: that the project of rehabilitation/transformation in the “East” and its shock method helped to sustain the “West”—and at the same time inhibited the development of a critical crip consciousness in both locations.