Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Litigation DA- the deployment of topicality operates as a litmus test in which debaters must prove they are productive enough for the white debate community.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 54-57, JMH]

Narratives about people of color with cognitive disabilities are difficult to come by, generally speaking.9 The largest stumbling block is the issue of representation: who represents whom, and where those representations occur. There have been some popular representations of Black people with cognitive disabilities, most recently celebrity mothers of autistic children. This cadre of mothers includes famed R&B chanteuse Toni Braxton, actress Holly Robinson Peete, and actress and singer Tisha Campbell-Martin. Their work largely focuses on advocacy for their children. On the occasions when their children do speak (usually within the context of reality television), they tend to voice overcoming narratives. Largely, these tellings rely on the idea that the cognitive disability is an invisible one, which poses trouble because it is not readily understood as disability. The resulting misunderstandings, bullying, or trauma stems from the unrecognizability of these illnesses. These narratives fall in line, culturally speaking, with the arguments of those of Nirmala Erevelles, Allison Carey, and Michael Bérubé, who all agree that the repercussion of announcing oneself or being identified as cognitively disabled is a loss of citizenship rights. Here, the rights are not merely material but can also include cultural capital. Invisibility surfaces as a long-standing component of stories about Blacks with cognitive disabilities. During the antebellum period, slaveholders could demand compensation for supposedly unfit slaves. Within the critical literature, the understanding of physical and mental fitness are combined not only because slaves were not thought to be particularly intelligent but also because mental fitness was a necessary component in some assessments of physical labor. So-called soundness of mind was determined by a confluence of physical and mental conditions such as “skin color, gender, character, vice, health, body, and emotional state.”10 One of the characteristics of fitness was a degree of mental acuity (which slavers were likely to miss upon initial inspection of the human property) and a characteristic for which slavers could demand compensation. Successful litigation often depended on the slaver’s ability to prove that the human property was unable to perform the duties for which it was purchased. Most important for these discussions is that the litigation occurred after sales were made, indicating that slavers were expected to have recourse to legal action for impairments that were not visible at the time of purchase. In this paradigm, one’s worth as a Black person with a cognitive impairment—no matter its imaginary quality—is determined by one’s production. Such possibilities for legal action created a link between the mental acuity of enslaved persons, invisibility, and profit. This connection appears in the discourse regarding rehabilitation in the early twentieth century as well. The historical record conflates physical ability and mental ability as a way to disenfranchise Blacks economically. Here, I mine the gaps in critical literature similarly to my earlier discussion of Rosemarie Garland Thomson. Black World War I veterans contended with rehabilitation policies that “devalued, deskilled, and institutionalized [them] and dismissed their claims to rehabilitation as spurious attempts to unjustly profit from their ‘natural inferiority.’”11 Rather than review their claims as disabilities acquired during military service, officials delegitimized Black veterans’ need for rehabilitation by ascribing their disabilities to venereal disease and tuberculosis, which were, again according to officials, endemic to the race. This rhetoric built upon the idea of Blackness itself as a congenital, cognitive defect (further conflating physical ailment with cognitive impairment). The result was the removal of some veterans from the communities to which they may have contributed and of which they were definitely a part. When these veterans were denied rehabilitation, they were also denied the opportunity to earn a living in the postwar labor economy. Here, the connection between mental acuity, invisibility, and profit arises again. This time, the putative defect of Blackness gives rise to an imagined and invisible cognitive impairment that circumscribes the availability of economic self-determination. Though cognitive impairment is not, strictly speaking, emblazoned on the flesh, it nevertheless subtends interaction as a structuring presence. The conception about worth, particularly related to capitalist profit and economic viability, becomes imbricated in the narratives about cognitive disability. Entangled here, enfolded here, are legibility, visibility, economic viability, and cognitive disability. On the one hand, cognitive disability and the rhetoric thereof are marshaled as a way to justify exclusion from resources. On the other hand, cognitive disability becomes visible when one cannot prove one’s worth or value to the labor economy. In either case, cognitive disability remains wedded to its legibility as an identity category, regardless of whether it is linked to other categories (Blackness itself). One reads cognitive disability based on interaction within a community regardless of whether that cognitive disability has a diagnosis attached. Such a reading may be complicated by the shifting terrain of legibility, determined as it is by cultural expectation, social convention, and medical narratives about cognition. Of interest to this conversation is how observation and visibility rests at the crux of these ideas: namely, one believes that one can judge, ascertain, and observe cognitive disability at work. The stare, despite its interrogative heft, is incomplete.12 The problem is that these understandings operate with ocularity as the central sensory praxis despite the fact that legibility is not determined by sight, neither singularly nor primarily. Cognitive disability disrupts sight as having exclusive critical purchase over interpretation.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.