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Perm do both - resolves the link using postmoderist body as a tool of disability studies, we know the creation of the body is not perfect but when combined with disability studies it goes beyond the incomplete theorizing of the body

Samuels 2002 (Ellen Samuels, NWSA Journal , Autumn, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies “Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of Disability (Autumn, 2002), pp. 58-76, Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4316924 , Transcribed via OCR) // RB

One reading of Butler would suggest that her sustained concern with the normative criteria that form legible, bounded, human bodies versus illegible, uncontrolled, inhuman bodies attempts to recuperate sexuality at the expense of disability. By exposing and explicating the cultural pro cesses at work, Butler aims to demonstrate the unfixed and constructed nature of sexuality/gender, thus destabilizing the hierarchy of normal. (hetero) vs. abnormal (homo) forms. However, in doing so she must necessarily acknowledge and discursively materialize a realm of abnormal bodies, only to rescue queer bodies from inside it. But what remains? Some clues are offered in Butler's discussion of Freudian hypochondria, in which the physically ill body emerges as the product of inappropriately abjected sexuality, forced into psychosomatic emergence through socio psychological prohibition (1993, 58-64). The ill body and the homosexual body emerge, in Butler's paradigm, as ontological opposites whose co existence is the product of oppressive social schemas. It naturally follows for Butler to oppose the "metaphorics of illness that pervade the description of sexuality," especially in the context of AIDS and the subsequent re-pathologization of homosexuality (64). To question Butler on this point is not to endorse the pathologization of gayness, or to imply that queer and ill/disabled bodies have any natural or presumed commonalties. It is, however, to point out that Butler's liberatory approach to sexuality takes as a matter of course that "metaphorics of illness" are always negative, and that somewhere, somehow, bodies do exist which deserve patholo gization based upon the very material, biological "realities" which she seeks to destabilize.

Mitchell and Snyder describe this problem as the "representational double bind of disability" in which, "while disabled populations are firmly entrenched on the outer margins of social power and cultural value, the disabled body also serves as the raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible" (1997, 6). Thus, "any attempt to distance disenfranchised communities from the fantasy of deformity further entrenches the disabled as the 'real' abnor mality from which all other nonnormative groups must be distanced" (6). This "double bind" also emerges in Thomson's critique, cited earlier, of feminist theories that attempt to de-pathologize the normative female body at the expense of the physically deviant or ill body. While Mitchell, Snyder, and Thomson focus their critique of postmodern body theory on the reliance of that theory upon the disabled body as a constitutive Other, Susan Wendell is concerned that postmodern theories focus too exclu sively upon the body-as-construction and thus elide the lived experience of "actual" bodies, particularly the "negative body," i.e., the body which is disabled, ill, or suffering (1996, 166-8).

We can see in Butler's work many examples of such apparently "dis embodied bodies." In particular, body parts separated from their original, intact bodies populate Butler's work in a strangely impersonal fashion that certainly seems divorced from any literally fragmented bodies, i.e., amputees, congenitally "deformed" persons, etc. To elucidate her idea of the imagined phallus vs. the physical penis, Butler extends Freudian theory on hypochondria to suggest that the "ambiguity between a real and conjured pain. . . is sustained in the analogy with eratogenecity, which seems defined as the very vacillation between real and imagined. body parts" (1993, 59). This idea is then extended to include the Lacanian "partitioned body," "the body 'in pieces' before the mirror" which comes to stand for the whole, thus creating a "phantasm of control" (80). These concepts form the basis for Butler's analysis of Willa Cather's fiction, in which, she claims, "body parts disengage from any common center, pull away from each other, lead separate lives, become sites of phantasmic investments that refuse to reduce to singular sexualities" (140). As in Cho's essay discussed above, the disabled body becomes a disinvested. symbolic medium for the display and mediation of sexuality, which then apparently constitutes the "real" and primary subjectivity. In addition, the fragmented body parts littering the landscape are so firmly located within the imaginary that it is not even necessary for Butler to clarify at any point that she is not talking about actual bodies, that no characters in Cather's fiction suffer the loss of limbs, etc. Yet, once versed in the rudiments of the social construction of disability, one cannot help but perceive the incompleteness of Butler's argument, as "the disabled body is a direct imago of the repressed fragmented body. The disabled body. causes a kind of hallucination of the mirror phase gone wrong" (Davis 1995, 139).

Not only disability studies scholars have challenged Butler for her eli sion of the lived experience of the physical body. Butler tells us that she wrote Bodies That Matter in part to respond to such critiques of Gender Trouble, which she parrots into her introduction in the form of the oft repeated question : "What about the materiality of the body, Judy?" (1993, ix). Her consistent response is that, of course, she is not arguing that bodies or gender are only constructions, but that construction is an inte gral part of their being, and thus must be elucidated :

For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these "facts" one might skeptically proclaim, cannot be dismissed as mere constructions. Surely there must be some kind of necessity that accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there is. But their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what discursive means. (xi)

Butler's point is well taken, but so are those of her critics. The concerns of disability studies scholars such as Wendell who worry about "approaches to cultural construction of 'the body' that ... deny or ignore bodily expe rience in favor of fascination with bodily representations" echo those of some transgender activists regarding pomo gender theory (1996, 44). In her book Read My Lips, Riki Ann Wilchins (1997), co-founder of the political action group Transexual Menace, robustly critiques the aca demic field of gender studies as a voyeuristic anthropology of transgen der experience. Gender studies in the academy, says Wilchins, too often "escalate[s] the politicization of our bodies, choices, and desires, so that, with each new book, while their audience enjoys the illusion of knowing more about us, we find ourselves more disempowered, disembodied, and exploited than before" (22). Wilchins cites the extremely high incidence of physical violence and abuse in transpeople's lives, as well as their pain ful struggles for self-determination, and then notes "you won't find any of this in the next trans or gender studies book because the real challenges of our lives aren't perceived as relevant. ... It is far easier to invest us as a topic of study than the depredations of the gender regime that marginal izes and preys upon us" (24).

This critique is powerful and necessary, yet it jibes oddly with Wil chins's citations of Butler and Foucault in her book, and her description of Butler's Gender Trouble as "the most far-reaching and penetrating critique of feminism, sexuality, and binary sex from a postmodern view point to date" (224). One can reasonably be left confused as to Wilchins's ultimate feelings about gender theory in general, and Butler in particu lar. Yet, perhaps her contradictory attitude can actually provide a useful model for disability theorists as we begin to formulate more nuanced and liberatory ways to integrate Butler and her fellow constructivists into our own scholarship. I find a very similar moment in Carrie Sandahl's wonderfully unresolved interrogation of her own attempt to deconstruct both disability and femininity while directing a production of Joan Schenkar's play Signs of Life. Like other critics of postmodern body theory, Sandahl observes that "Butler's theory of performativity... relies on a metaphori cal association between gender 'freakishness' and deformed bodies. In a sense, then, Butler uses disability (or the deformed, abject body) as a metaphor for gender and sex difference, and . . . ignores the identities and concerns of actual people with disabilities" (1999, 15). Yet on the very next page, Sandahl decides to use Butler anyway, because "Butler's theory... allows us to see the performative parallel between gender and disability" (16). It seems that Butler's work exerts a powerful influence, not only on our academic discourse, but perhaps also on our minds and hearts. Her insights have the potential to be so far-reaching and liberatory that even as we formulate critiques of her theories, we are also drawn in to the possibilities those theories offer.

Conclusion : Can't Think with Her, Can't Think Without Her

[W]riting the disabled body will mean that our most basic conceptions of the body will need to be rewritten.... Like the normative ideologies of the body to which they often stand opposed, theoretical discourses of the body already contain within themselves a series of unacknowledged and/or disavowed assumptions and theories about disability. Bringing these out for inspection is one way that body theory can begin to learn something from disability stud ies and can intervene in them in turn. -James I. Porter (1997, xiv)

Judith Butler's theories have already had a wide and far-reaching influ ence on contemporary critical work on the body, gender, sexuality, and identity. Disability studies scholars cannot, I think, afford to ignore or dismiss Butler's work-but neither should we adopt it uncritically. As I have suggested, merely inserting disability into the mix without thor oughly examining the meaning and implications of the new ideas we thus create is not only inaccurate, but falls short of pushing Butler's work the necessary next step to fully account for the not-always-able body. Such wholesale adoptions treat Butler's theories as more fixed and final than even she, with her emphasis on unfixed, ever-shifting, and irreduc ible meanings, would likely endorse. There is no ideal blueprint of how future work in disability studies should integrate Butler's theories, and I won't pretend to offer one. But ultimately the groundbreaking nature of Butler's work means that it represents the first steps of a new body of thought that will necessarily become more nuanced, comprehensive, and accountable as it grows with time, and I believe that disability studies must and should be an active participant in that growth-not only to enhance our own work, but to provide the necessary apparatus to evolve those theories beyond their original limitations. As postmodern body theory and disability theory continue to develop and expand, they are certain to pursue parallel, if not corresponding, tracks : I have already noted that, as our understanding of disability as visually constructed has begun to evolve toward a more complex analysis of the role of language in forming discursive bodily identities, Butler has also moved from focusing upon the performativity of the body to inquire more deeply into the ways in which "language sustains the body" (1997, 5). Critics such as Mairian Corker develop this parallel to its logical and fruitful next step by integrating Butler's insights with a disability framework (1999; 2001). But this integration will have limited success if it works in only one direction. So I would like to end on a note of challenge to all body-theorists working within Butler's framework (not to mention Butler herself) to include and account for the disabled body in your work, not as a metaphor or sign for gender, but in all its real complexity. Only then can we begin to cross our divide.

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