Disabled, racial bodies have been derealized, an ontological limbo manifested in an infinite paranoia unexplainable with their broader ontological claims
Omar Zahzah 20 [A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature, Undercover and Hyper-Visible: Security Poetics and Pacification Prosaics in African American and Arab American Literature, UCLA, 2020, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2404384586?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=trueM, -ekh-]
Judith Butler’s notion of derealization may very well have become one of the premier analytics for considering the epistemological ravages performed by the so-called “War on ‘Terror’” upon countless racialized bodies and collectives (this is, of course, contemporaneous to the physical ravages of bombs, bullets, metal cages and attendant tortures). Butler qualifies the status afforded the Muslim “Other,” the enemy of the interminable “War on ‘Terror,” as a kind of ontological limbo, one fully admitted neither to life nor death:
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness… The derealization of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. (Precarious Life 33-4)
Michael Malek Najjar’s gloss of Butler’s concept cleanly emphasizes how the notion of “spectrality” ensures the endlessness of both the paranoia of and against the Arab subject as well as the interminability of the so-called “war” waged against the “terror” with which they are both suddenly and transcendentally coupled (152). In fact, this “war” is not only interminable; Najjar’s resuscitation of Butler’s 2004 framework also implies that, in a very real sense, the beginning of this “war” in earnest is inevitably deferred, for: “the derealization of the Other’ means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral” (Butler 33-4), an insight of Butler’s that Najjar expands to surmise that “Interminable spectrality is a state where subjects are forced into a liminal position where they are not allowed to live freely and instead become victims of an infinite paranoia… they are left in a state where they cannot be freed until the socalled “war on terror” is realized” (ibid, emphasis mine).
This understanding of the “war on ‘terror’” as a state offensive that is simultaneously endless and also only ever about to begin couples a framework for racial and epistemological precarity with paradoxical temporal inflections. That this split temporality is rife with strategic benefit is patently obvious via the similarly contradictory ensemble of legal neologisms its perpetuation has generated (e.g., enemy combatant, a construct endemic to the timeless time of the “war on ‘terror’” that simultaneously marshals the full, exceptional weight of the Law against an implicated subject that is inoculated against any of its typical precautions). With no fixed end—or beginning—locatable, the “war on ‘terror’s’” pacification prosaics enact their violence through a chronological assault that exceeds the presumed finality of notions such as Fukuyama’s “end of history”75 and Jameson’s cultural “schizophrenia.”76
The players in this killing farce, then, are not only geopolitics, nor racial politics, and not even these combined with epistemological politics alone. For the stage is also haunted by a politics of time, a chronopolitics that constellates the workings of each of these components with fatal precision and nimble contingency.77 I argue that, just as the pacification prosaics endemic to the “war on ‘terror’” are effectuated via a politics of time, so too do security poetics likewise utilize their own textual politics of time as a means of staging their dissent. But there is a crucial distinction: while the “war on ‘terror’s” pacification prosaics are assembled around tropes of a single Time, a mono-Time, resistant security poetics upend this para-Time via a temporal pluralization that is irreducible in its complexity. What follows will therefore be an attempt to illuminate the nature and significance of the chronopolitics found within three particular texts: two plays by Ismail Khalidi—Truth Serum Blues (2005) and Dead Are My People (2018, and still in process) and a novel by Mohja Kahf, The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf (2006). I find it important to note that the choice of texts is simultaneously intentional and arbitrary, by which I mean that any number of texts with similar topical concerns might have worked for the purposes of this analysis. And yet, analytical intentionality is cohered through the texts’ temporal orientations (by which I refer to the date of publication for Kahf’s novel and Khalidi’s earlier play, and the historical setting of Khalidi’s most recent theatrical work). On this point, I find it both conceptually humorous and intellectually perfect that Khalidi slightly attempted to dissuade me from using Truth Serum Blues, his first play, within my dissertation because, as he wrote in an email, “it is nearly fifteen years old.” After all, what is a decade or more when hegemonic registers continue to police and restrict collective access to time and history?
Here (or now, if you will), it is necessary to sketch out some important distinctions between time and history, though the two are certainly interrelated. Along with “events,” time is conventionally understood as a unit of history, with the latter accommodating various strategies of explicit reflexivity regarding the passage of time and the transpiring—and subsequent schematization—of variously significant occurrences. Hayden White grasped as much when he argued that historiography is perceived as approaching the quality of “reality” the more it reveals the trait of “narrativity,”78 that history is considered history proper only insofar as it reveals the sequential ordering of events over a given period into the form of a story. The implications of this argument are, of course, a blow to the “objective” character of history. If history is a story, or series of stories in form rather than in essence, other stories—or “Other” stories—can be told over, above, in between, and in place of hegemonic (hi)stories.
Of course, history entails more of a sense of entanglement than time. It is for this reason, as Eagleton notes, that it is by no means incidental that Heidegger titled his study Being and Time rather than Being and History:
My own personal history is authentically meaningful when I accept responsibility for my own existence, seize my own future possibilities and live in enduring awareness of my own future death. This may or may not be true, but it does not seem to have any immediate relevance to how I live ‘historically’ in the sense of being bound up with particular individuals, actual social relations and concrete institutions… ‘True’ history for Heidegger is an inward, ‘authentic’ or ‘existential’ history—a mastering of dread and nothingness, a resoluteness towards death, a ‘gathering in’ of my powers—which operates in effect as a substitute for history in its more common and practical senses. As… Georg Lukács put it, Heidegger’s famous ‘historicity’ is not really distinguishable from ahistoricity. (57)
Yet even as history implies more of a sense of interrelatedness and complicity to others, its narrativation can retain a hegemonic, exclusionary function. C. Riley Snorton describes the implications that race and racialization have for these conversations in building upon the insights of Tavia Nyong’o:
[O]ne might also consider that race is a history of theory that functions to express what is un/thinkable across complex temporalities… history becomes less a program for examining change over time and more an examination in disruptions in linear time. Race, then, becomes a way of thinking history doubly, or of thinking about the history of historicity. (Black on Both Sides 8)
The security poetics employed by writers under analysis in this chapter, then, are under a double-bind: on the one hand, they must challenge the presentist exceptionalism of the “war on ‘terror’s’” pacification prosaics. But in doing so, they must also be careful not to reinscribe hegemonic historical narritivations that evade “disruptions in linear time.” Rather, their challenges must simultaneously dismantle artificial temporal exceptions and overly-exclusive conceptions of temporality and history.
The preceding comments suggest how the “war on ‘terror’” insinuates a perpetual present vis-à-vis derealization. Perhaps naturally enough, if a perpetual present is what is at issue, the solution might seem to be a historicization of this perpetual present. Yet a few further comments on the chronopolitics of both the “war on ‘terror’” as well as dissenting literatures will help clarify why this would be an ultimately misguided endeavor, according to the terms of this analysis.
The “war on ‘terror’” edifies its perpetual present via several temporal technologies, the first of which I am presently terming “terrorist exceptionalization.” Simply put, this refers to the phenomenon by which the currently racialized figure of the “terrorist” is imbued with a transhistorical omniscience, conscripted as an “enemy combatant” of fearsome existential proportions and the subsequent ability to upend not only individual (white, “freedom loving”/“dutiful citizen”) life, but also to rend the very fabric of hegemonic Western democratic “enlightened” civilization beyond repair. A symptomatic reading of the current terms of presentist racial-imperial anxiety make these dimensions evident enough. But equally as important as the current adumbrations of terrorist exceptionalization is a consideration of the forms it has taken in the past. For example, though the so-called “Islamic fundamentalist” is inextricable from the category of “terrorist” today, 19th century American racial anxieties told a far different story, one of Eastern Europeans with dynamite ever-ready to obliterate key sites of capitalist production. For this reason, Jeffory Clymer argues, racialized anxieties about “terrorism” are indissociable from paranoid vigilance surrounding the integrity of the capitalist system (America’s Culture of Terrorism 13). Furthermore, even following intense government scrutiny of Arab- and Arab American activism and uprising during the Cold War era, Sarah Gualtieri importantly reminds us that Arab American activists such as the members of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) were accused of being “godless communists” for their championing of the Palestinian freedom struggle, while today they would be far more likely to be condemned as “Muslim terrorists” (Between Arab and White 173). The “terrorist,” then, is not and never has been transhistorically coherent, but rather contingently overdetermined by capitalist, geopolitical and racial fixations and anxieties.
Related to terrorist exceptionalization is another cultural technology of the “war on ‘terror’” that I refer to as “Muslim Exceptionalization.” Here I refer to the “war on ‘terror’s’” current occlusion of Muslim identity that historically preceded post WWII Arab immigration, spanning all the way back to Antebellum Muslim slave identity as well as the activism of organizations such as the Nation of Islam during the Black Power movement. The negative idealization of the “terrorist” as ultimately Arab, even while it does not exculpate Black bodies from ongoing interpellation into the framework of “terrorism,”79 nevertheless symbolically levels important histories of resistance, thereby fracturing the capacity for dissenting collectivities to more naturally gravitate towards mutual uplift and joint struggle.80
The final cultural technology of relevance for this investigation is what I am terming “securitization’s disciplinary tautology.” This concept is intended to capture the more individualized leveling of past and present that occurs when the charge of “terrorism” is deployed against a suspect. By way of a strategic, syntactical inversion, the objectified subject of such a charge is suddenly deprived of any narrational or temporal recourse for exculpation. Any and all responses to the charge merely confirm its elastic accuracy. For, according to this disciplinary tautology: one already always-was a “terrorist” because one is accused. One is accused because one already always-was a “terrorist.”
I opt for the term disfiguring in place of historicizing to refer to these text’s resistance to the “war on ‘terror’s” chronopolitics because to claim these texts “historicize” would be to imply one single, coherent notion of time and history, a construct these texts in fact elude and destabilize as part of their imaginative insurgency. Disfiguring simultaneously both the possibility of “disfigurement”—of scarring the illusionary veneer of the perpetual present to reveal glimpses of the time-worlds surging beneath—as well as “figuring,” meaning a textual representation of the “war on ‘terror’s” temporal assaults.