Fear of retaliation solves
Butt 10, Yousaf Butt is a staff scientist at the Center for Astrophysics at Harvard University, where he worked on NASA’s orbiting Chandra X-ray Observatory project from 1999–2004. He was a research fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program from 2005–2007. He holds BSc degrees in physics and in mechanical engineering from MIT and a PhD in experimental nuclear astrophysics from Yale University. “The EMP threat: fact, fiction, and response (part 2),” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1553/2
A state would be highly unlikely to launch an EMP strike from their own territory because the rocket could be traced to the country of origin and would probably result in nuclear or massive conventional retaliation by the US. The EMP commission also considers adversarial nations carrying out a shipborne EMP attack that would be less traceable. However, even so, there would some small risk of trace-back that would give the leadership in such nations pause. While nuclear forensics are not well enough developed to assuredly ascribe the origin of a nuclear explosion, even their current state of development would, in some measure, dissuade the leaders of a nation from seriously contemplating such an attack. Furthermore, the US certainly has data, via its DSP satellites, on the infrared (IR) signatures of the rocket exhausts from the missiles of various countries. Though these signatures are probably virtually identical for the Scud/Shahab/No-dong family of missiles, the nations which may entertain such attacks do not necessarily know whether, e.g., the DSP data can discriminate between a NK Nodong versus an Iranian Shahabs, perhaps due to differences in fuel and/or subtle design idiosyncrasies. This is data only the US has, and it has an inherent deterrent value to nations thinking about launching an EMP strike via a ship-launched ballistic missile. This is almost certainly the case if, say, Iran were to use its solid rocket motor technology to launch such a strike—if and when Iran obtains nuclear weapons, of course. In such a case, the burn time-profile and solid-motor IR signatures could probably be used to tie the missile to a nation. Furthermore, the leaders of a nation contemplating such an attack would have to carefully consider what would happen in case the warhead was not delivered properly. If it fell short and/or did not explode, it may be possible for US engineers and scientists to ascribe a national origin given the forensic material. For the leadership of any nation to chance such an attack they must be almost suicidally optimistic: they would have to presume that everything would go perfectly. Even so, it may still be possible to identify the country of origin, which would invite massive US retribution.