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Addressing ethical concerns is key to interoperability – differing ethical views cause different technological approaches, which destroys NATO’s ability to coordinate between different militaries.

Michelson, 2021 - Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative [Colonel (Retired) Brian M. February 23 “Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards” https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/ Acc. 4/5/22 TA]

NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.

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