No Solvency – the OSCE does not address military concerns directly – that is exclusively NATO’s role
Sánchez-Cobaleda, 2020 - prof of Public International Law at the University of Barcelona [Ana 2020-11-30 “Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjz8v2g46j4AhWlIUQIHWIVDCgQFnoFCLICEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.globe-project.eu%2Fcase-study-of-the-european-security-architecture-nato-and-osce_11317.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2AE86i3ZUkPrll4AK6-Y-y Acc 6/22/22 TA]
NATO, the OSCE and the EU all strive to maintain peace and security in their member states. The way they work to achieve this, however, differs. While NATO has traditionally focused on direct territorial defence, the EU has pursued this goal more indirectly, carrying out missions beyond its borders to ensure stability in its neighbourhood. And it is precisely in the area of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood where the OSCE is working most actively to also guarantee peace and security – in its specific way, namely through the advancement of democracy and human rights throughout the territory of its 57 participating states. Nonetheless, “maintaining peace and security” is too general an idea. Instead of condensing the objectives of these actors to such a high degree, it is useful to assess in greater detail which objectives coincide and where functional overlap is occurring. NATO defends the peace and security of its members in two ways: directly, through its collective defence objective (centred mainly on the eastern flank of the Alliance and consisting of the maintenance of peace and security on its eastern border), and indirectly, through the projection of stability in other territories (especially, but not only, in the region bordering the south of the Alliance). In the collective defence field NATO retains, for now, exclusivity. The relationship between the EU and NATO in this area is clearly defined by role specialisation and division of labour. The Alliance provides what the EU lacks insofar as NATO's raison d'être is collective defence and its comparative advantage remains its military power. Thus, they are “interlocking” institutions that cooperate in an architecture based on comparative advantage and effective multilateralism to address challenges both in Europe and beyond. However, it is important to stress the transitory nature of this situation. If the EU continues to develop its cooperation in defence (as seems to be the case), it could well result in a functional overlap in matters of defence not seen until now. Stronger defence cooperation is indeed one of the EU’s current objectives, and one that is already regarded with suspicion by some of the member states of both NATO and the EU itself. These member states do not welcome the overlap for fear of possible rivalry.115 Beyond pure defence objectives, both the EU and NATO are engaged in crisis management. It is important to subdivide this in two different dimensions, as the organizations’ levels of involvement differ when it comes to (a) the deployment of troops to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire and (b) political and diplomatic efforts in crisis prevention or post-conflict reconstruction. In the first dimension, field-level overlap can exist, but this is not always the case, as it depends on the configuration of missions and the organisations’ mandates. While the EU’s legal framework establishes that territorial defence remains NATO’s responsibility, Page 64 from 109 the EU’s capacity to act independently from NATO’s assets in external crisis management continues to grow.116 In fact, the EU’s goal of obtaining full strategic autonomy has placed the EU on a similar footing with NATO. It is in the second, more civilian and political dimension, however, where the level of functional overlap is the largest. NATO’s and the EU’s missions and operations focus on preventive measures, training and, most of all, security sector reform in partner countries. The convergence in this area that was traditionally occupied by the EU has occurred since NATO progressively expanded its agenda to become more than just a military Alliance. In conclusion, the trend of greater regime complexity in the field of European security has accelerated over the last decade, partly as a result of the expansion of NATO's strategic concept and, potentially soon, as a consequence of the still ongoing development of a stronger security and defence component by the EU. The OSCE, for its part, does not have and neither does it foresee creating a defence component or a military crisis management goal. Instead, the OSCE continues its efforts to enhance cooperative security through arms control agreements. Through this objective, it complements the EU’s efforts to maintain peace and stability in its neighbouring areas. In addition, if the OSCE achieves its goals in this area, NATO would also benefit from respect for arms control treaties and the reduction of arsenals. Thus, while the OSCE does not focus on territorial defence nor military crisis management, its cooperative security mandate can be understood within that same division of labour framework.