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Binaries aren’t inherently violent

Carson 9 – PhD in English @ Toronto and MA @ Queen’s, Associate Professor of English – since 2008 - at Hobart and William Smith Colleges (Rob, “DIGESTING THE THIRD: RECONFIGURING BINARIES IN SHAKESPEARE AND EARLY MODERN THOUGHT,” https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17736/1/Carson_Robert_B_200906_PhD_thesis.pdf)

There seems to be a widespread consensus among current literary critics that there is a problem with binaries, so much so that even the word "binary" itself has taken on a strong pejorative connotation. To begin with, then, I should go on the record as saying that even though the hemiolic strategy that I develop in this chapter sets out to redescribe binary structures using ternary strategies, I am by no means opposed to all binaries whatsoever. Many of them, in fact, seem to me to be entirely unproblematic, if not wholly indispensable: for example, I have no misgivings at all when it comes to flipping light-switches that place "off" and "on" in binary opposition to each other; I am not at all concerned that my computer saves my work in an enormous chain of 1’s and 0’s; I feel no compulsion to seek out creative alternatives to "heads" or "tails" during a coin-toss; and so on. The world is full of a great many wholly sensible binary oppositions, I suggest, and thus one of the shortcomings that I frequently find in post-structuralist and deconstructive critiques of binary thinking is the knee-jerk (or even essentialist?) assumption that binaries are somehow problematic "violent hierarchies" by their very nature. Furthermore, I think it is important to acknowledge that the term "binaries" is used to represent quite a varied range of dyads: not just dichotomous oppositions, but also more open-ended competing alternatives, and even at times dyads that seem to me to be wholly complementary pairs of ideas. We might see a confusion of this sort, I suggest, at the core of Anna Maria Cimitile's argument in Shakespearean Orders, which offers a deconstructive reading of how Shakespeare's plays subvert a whole range of binaries that she envisions as being parallel to one another, including nature and culture, good and evil, justice and mercy, matter and spirit, filiation and usurpation, and commerce and law (23). I would argue in response that there seem to be crucial differences to be found between these dyads. Good and evil, for example, quite clearly form a dichotomous binary opposition, whereas justice and mercy seem to present us with a much more ambiguous pair of partly-competing alternatives, and commerce and law in turn seem to be little more than two vaguely related concepts that Cimitile considers alongside each other. Surely, I suggest, these dyads are not all "binaries" in the same way, structured on a model of presence and absence. I greatly appreciate the work that the past generation of critical theorists has done in drawing attention to the ways in which violent hierarchies of social power are often constructed and maintained through particular binary oppositions in language. However, at the same time, I am far from persuaded by the strategies that both the post-structuralists and the deconstructivists have adopted in their attempts to address this concern. It seems to me that the usual post-structuralist strategy of inverting binaries in order to privilege whatever position had previously been marginalized does little to overcome the problem of binaries, since the inversion of a binary preserves it intact. An upside-down binary, after all, is undoubtedly still a binary nonetheless. This is, as I understand it, the thrust of the complex and convincing argument that Derrida develops against Foucault in "Cogito and the History of Madness." To make the same point much more prosaically, however, I am reminded of the famous quip that the cartoonist Bob Thaves made about Ginger Rogers, namely that she was a better dancer than Fred Astaire because she managed to do everything that he did, only backwards and in high heels. I sometimes find myself thinking the same thing about Foucault and Descartes. Foucault, of course, undoubtedly comes across as the more compelling philosopher as he tackles Enlightenment metaphysics so daringly and so stylishly, but it seems to me that in the end what Foucault is doing is very much the same old song and dance that Descartes did, only backwards and in high heels.9 In cases where binary thinking really is a problem, the post-structuralist response challenges the hierarchy within a binary, privileging the marginalized and validating the undervalued, and although I see this as a worthwhile task in its own right, I do not see how it enables us to overcome the problem of the binary itself.

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