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Deficit—Say No—Cost

Say no—defense spending is too costly

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, )

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans won’t pay the political or economic costs even if the United States steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is no net security benefit to the United States (p.261) of administering a shock to NATO via even more dramatic reductions in presence or commitment. Indeed, there are serious expected costs in terms of lost security cooperation and even less capable and interoperable allies. With militarily capable allies like NATO and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is security cooperation (joint training, planning, etc.) that is difficult or impossible to replicate with rotational deployments. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

Countries have limited budgets and can’t afford defense

Gilli 17 (Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “The Trump administration wants Europe to pay more to defend itself. It’s not that easy.” Washington Post. Feb. 3, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/)

The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:

1) European countries have limited defense budgets — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a U.S. retrenchment push European allies to fix this imbalance, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?

Maybe. But half of NATO’s members are small countries with small defense budgets, well below $2 billion per year. Thus, a substantial bump in their military spending won’t bring about a significant increase in Europe’s overall military investments. Estonia’s 2 percent GDP defense expenditure amounts to just $500 million, for instance. That might pay for the operational costs of a few of middle-sized U.S. warships, but wouldn’t push back a Russian invasion.

With the exception of Germany and Poland, large E.U. countries face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure. The U.K. is going through Brexit, which will also affect several countries, in particular the Netherlands and Ireland. Italy’s bank problems loom large, and Spain and France have limited financial and political room for additional public spending. This points to a broader problem.

In part, U.S. security assurances may have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services. However, cutting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive.

On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances.

2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

Countries have no guarantees their partners ultimately will support them in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited.

However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation?

3) Implementing defense cooperation in Europe won’t be easy — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical.

With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon.

And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

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