Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP
The 2% standard is not an accurate representation of contribution--- destabilizes the alliance by calling out competent countries.
Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, /alundy]
The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser , Boyer , Oneal , Sandler and Hartley ). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Zyla , Techau , Kunertova ).
US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI ). Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP , (GDP data is calculated from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all NATO countries.
If we look at the funding of NATO itself and of such functions and operations that are under the direct control of the alliance rather than member countries, the picture changes dramatically. If security is a public good and there is an agreement on how best to protect it, one could assume that NATO countries should have no difficulties in channelling their military spending through a common, rather than a national, decision-making structure. The fact that this is not the case already challenges the credibility of seeing security as a public good for NATO countries.
Direct NATO funding is proportional to each member country’s GDP, with the exception of the US, which is compensated in its NATO shares for its superior national spending. According to NATO statistics on defence spending (NATO 2018) from 2016 and the CIA World Factbook (“The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d., NATO ) data on GDPs, all NATO countries contribute more to NATO’s budget than their GDP share (the GDP share equals the GDP of the country divided by the GDP sum of all NATO countries), excepting Luxembourg and the United States. While NATO’s budget share from Luxembourg is likely to be a result of fluctuation in GDPs and a specific year’s (2016) contribution, and while the share of Luxembourg’s contribution to the NATO budget is still very close to its share of GDP, the case of the US is different. US funding for NATO is systematically lower than its GDP share, less than half of it. Obviously, this relates to US superior national military spending, but again, it highlights problems with the assumption that the security needs of NATO countries are identical. If the US actually contributes 22% of the NATO budget while its GDP share would be 45%, then we either have to believe that US national defence spending serves NATO’s security needs or relinquish the conclusion that the US is such a disproportionate contributor to NATO. However, the question of burden sharing is much more complicated than the debate on defence expenditures may suggest.
Allies are unwilling to meet 2% burdens---it’s not realistic
Techau 15 [Jan Techau; director of Carnegie Europe, a part of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 9/2/15; THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT;
If 2 percent has become the gold standard for defense spending in the debate on NATO’s future, then how realistic is it that the goal will ever be reached? Pessimism prevails on this issue. “The guideline . . . if taken literally, would create an impossible situation for some allies,” writes Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A country like Germany would have to absorb €74 billion ($82 billion) of defense spending instead of its current €37 billion ($41 billion), something it would be unable (and unwilling) to do and that would in turn lead to “inefficiency and waste, rather than an increase in useful capability.”20 Germany is also the focus of another argument that aims at making 2 percent look unrealistic. The enormous increase in absolute defense spending in Germany, with its large economy, that would result from 2 percent could also lead to a degree of nervousness among some of the country’s allies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy argues, “If Germany spent 2 percent of its huge GDP, it would produce a defense budget overshadowing those of France and the UK, arguably causing more concern than reassurance among its neighbors.”21 This is a weak argument, as it essentially questions the political reliability of a key NATO partner that is most under pressure to spend more The strength of the 2 percent metric is its triumph of simplicity over complexity. 12 | The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe on defense. For the most part, it is a self-serving defensive argument against higher defense spending that has been used primarily by Germans themselves, not so much by other NATO allies. But the lack of capacity among member states to absorb significantly increased defense budgets is not the only factor that leads to doubt about hitting the 2 percent target. The biggest concern comes from the fact that many NATO countries agreed to the 2 percent pledge in Wales but have no real intention to make good on the promise. “The problem is not that most NATO allies will fail to reach the 2 percent bar. The trouble comes with those that don’t even try,” as Kamp puts it.22 Initial budget decisions made around or after the Wales summit and even public announcements by many member states seem to indicate that the political will to really reach 2 percent is indeed underdeveloped across NATO. Overriding economic concerns are also reasons for skepticism that the 2 percent pledge can be fulfilled. “As long as austerity remains the eurozone’s economic mantra, it is unlikely that European allies will meet the target,” one researcher argues.23 Under the prevailing economic circumstances, it is often claimed that a reversal of the downward trend in defense spending would already be a success, but that an increase to 2 percent would be too much to realistically expect. The Wales summit declaration itself makes 2 percent dependent on positive economic development, stipulating that allies “aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows.”24 This conditionality is meant to generate more defense spending from the moment economic recovery sets in. The volume of growth that would be needed to increase defense spending is not specified, nor is a time reference for growth given. Should spending be measured against absolute GDP growth on an annual basis, or should the growth rate be the metric? Or should GDP growth be measured against a fixed point in time—for instance, GDP before the financial crisis?