Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears
CP causes allies to perceive lack of US commitment
Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43
Since its creation in response to Soviet aggression after World War II, the majority of the U.S. public has consistently held favorable views of NATO. But Trump’s repeated public criticism of NATO may be having an effect on popular support for the Alliance. Support for NATO by Republicans decreased from 52 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017, during the first year of the Trump administration.81 Nevertheless, a strong majority of Americans polled have a favorable view of NATO. While Republican support for NATO may have gone down slightly, support for NATO by Democrats and Independents has increased significantly. As a result, overall public support for NATO has grown, from 53 percent in 2016 to 62 percent in 2017. 82 Still, Trump’s tough NATO policy is putting great strain on the Alliance. It will not convince the majority of U.S. allies to meet NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending pledge by 2024. Moreover, reducing U.S. commitments to NATO and cutting contributions to the Alliance will only make the problem worse and may make hostile powers more willing to test the Alliance by using force or engaging in a hybrid attack against a NATO member. Instead of focusing on threats, Trump’s NATO policy should propose feasible burden-sharing ideas that can be implemented quickly.83 But the key to a successful NATO policy from the Trump administration must be a more accurate perspective on the central role of NATO in U.S. national security. Trump needs to stop overestimating the harm from burden-sharing and underestimating the value of NATO to U.S. national interests. The security that NATO provides Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean is worth much more to the United States than the 5 percent of the Department of Defense budget allocated to U.S. forces in Europe. It is critical that Trump appreciate the unique value that previous presidents saw in NATO. As George W. Bush described it,“These trans-Atlantic ties could not be severed by U-boats. They could not be cut by checkpoints and barbed wire. They were not ended by SS-20s and nuclear blackmail. And they certainly will not be broken by commercial quarrels and political debates.”84 NATO must not be evaluated simply as a transactional cost. It is a unique asset for the United States that protects American citizens, interests, and values. As Barack Obama explained,“Our nations are stronger and more prosperous when we stand together. In good times and in bad, our alliance has endured; in fact, it has thrived—because we share an unbreakable commitment to the freedom and security of our citizens. NATO is a force multiplier…. There is nothing else like it on Earth.”85 Notably, on July 6, 2017, Trump gave one of his most powerful foreign policy speeches in Warsaw. In the speech, he made two strong statements. “Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation,” he said.86 It is important that Trump recognize how his threats and demands are jeopardizing the significant value that NATO offers. If Trump leaves NATO or unintentionally breaks up the Alliance, the United States will not be able to replace it. Rather, the Trump administration should pursue alternative options to produce more responsible and fair behavior from NATO allies. As President, it is in Trump’s interest to strengthen NATO and find more positive and feasible policies to resolve the burden-sharing problem. NATO is the most powerful alliance in history and a key asset in U.S. national security. None of our competitors have anything like it. The loss of NATO would be a major victory for U.S. adversaries. As former Secretary of Defense Mattis has explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “history is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.”87
Using the threat of abandonment to induce burden sharing causes allied distancing and wrecks assurance.
Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. (Mira, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central)
If the benefits of coercion—especially the capricious sort in which Trump specializes—are small, the costs may be sizable. As we have seen, postwar American leaders saw value in asymmetric alliances in part because, by taking on the burden of defending others, they gained control over allies whose territory replaced the homeland as America’s front line. Washington spent more on defense than its allies, but got far more out of its alliances than any one of them did. If the United States continues to emphasize cost-sharing above all other strategic priorities, it will reduce its ability to assure and control allies, which may in turn weaken the defense and deterrence benefits those allies provide. America may pay less, but it will also get far less in return.
A loss of allied control may take the form of political distance, as allies look for other relationships to replace their faltering partner. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already declared that Europe can no longer depend on the United States, and French President Emmanuel Macron has lamented that, amid US neglect and browbeating, NATO is “experiencing brain death.” South Korean President Moon Jae-In has prioritized his ongoing negotiations with Kim Jong Un, distancing himself from the United States. Both South Korea and Japan have improved their relations with China.16 Distance undermines policy coordination and can seriously diminish a guarantor’s political influence. It may even foster conditions in which allies to tilt toward rivals.
CP kills assurances – freeriding accusations and contested metrics
Foucalt and Mérand 12, Martial Foucault is a professor of political science at Sciences Pro Paris and a researches of political economy and political behavior, Frédéric Mérand is a profession of political science and the Scientific Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Montreal and a researcher in international relations and global security, “The Challenge of Burden Sharing,” Spring 2012, International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 2,
Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden-sharing has served as a useful rhetorical weapon to blame those who were seen as not contributing enough to the cause. Each time, however, Washington's call has fallen on deaf ears, at least in public. In private, European and Canadian officials highlight other contributions they think they are making to NATO operations, for example in the shape of development aid or considerable troop casualties in Afghanistan. They mention UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon, where the US is not involved. Cynics admit that they never really bought much into the military adventures into which the US threw them, and that the US itself did not seem to believe much in the Libya mission. The reality, French foreign minister Alain Juppe retorted to Gates, is that it is the Europeans who "think the Americans aren't doing enough."3 The evolution of the transatlantic debate suggests two things. First, burden-sharing is about more than NATO. One cannot just look at defence spending at a time when humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, and the fight against climate change can all be considered contributions of a sort to collective security.4 Disentangling what counts as a contribution to which public good is no easy thing. Second, burden-sharing is a contested political concept. Statesmen and diplomats do not speak the abstract language of public choice, with its "non-excludable" and "non-rival" goods. Rather, they talk about "being fair," "doing what you can," and "making a real contribution." In other words, they speak the normative language of justice rather than the utilitarian language of economics.