AT: INB—No Impact—US increase spending
Independent of what Europe does, the US will just increase spending for strategic and nuclear dominance.
Thimm, 18 [Johannes Thimm, Head of Research Division “The Americas” at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 4-09-2018, ‘NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin’, /alundy]
US defense policy is made strictly on US terms.
Second, the US defense budget does not depend on Europe’s military spending. It is misleading to argue that Europe must spend more so that the United States can spend less. The Pentagon’s budget is determined by Washington’s assessment of the capabilities necessary to maintain US strategic dominance – on its own, not through any alliance. When Congress adopts the annual defense budget, European expenditures play a marginal role. In 2017, President Trump increased the US defense budget, despite the fact that European states also spent more (and Russia’s spending decreased by 20 percent). According to calculations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, US spending on NATO and the defense of Europe amounts to $30 billion, or just over 5 percent of its defense budget. Comparing that figure to the roughly $240 billion of European spending for NATO, the imbalance no longer seems so great. Given these numbers, it is also hard to argue that Europe is principally to blame for a US defense budget of around $600 billion.
Looking specifically at the cost of the US nuclear arsenal, it becomes even clearer how detached the US budget is from burden-sharing in NATO. Washington defines the US nuclear strategy with little regard for Europe’s policy priorities. Over the next thirty years (calculated from 2017), Washington plans a massive qualitative nuclear build-up, spending $400 billion on modernizing its nuclear arsenal – in addition to the costs of maintaining existing systems. This move was partly a reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but above all a concession by President Obama to the Republican Congress in exchange for its approval of the 2014 New START treaty, in which the United States and Russia pledged to limit numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. If Trump were really interested in reducing costs, he would make serious efforts on arms control. Instead, he refused Russia’s offer to extend the New START treaty beyond its 2021 expiration date and increased spending on nuclear weapons by almost 20 percent. So, yes, to some extent Europe is free-riding on US security guarantees. But the reasons include the US desire for unrivalled military and nuclear capabilities, and not simply European reluctance to spend money on defense.
No impact---defense spending is irrelevant.
Mira Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center., “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances,” Harvard University Press//Wompus =)
But it is also reasonable to argue that these spending gaps are of little consequence. The important question is whether it is cheaper to have a foreign policy that relies on sustained cooperation with allies afflicted by moral hazard than to have a unilateral policy with no burden-sharing at all. On this view, as long as US defense spending does not exceed national means, it is hardly tragic if allies spend a bit less as a proportion of GDP. There is no evidence that American defense spending hampers growth or makes the country less competitive. And while the defense budget makes up a sizable chunk of federal spending, a relatively small portion of that money goes to forward basing. To those who bemoan burden-sharing gaps, a reasonable rejoinder is that Washington should ensure that its own budget commitments are sound in national terms, rather than preoccupy itself with false equivalence abroad.7
Finally, when we think about the costs of alliances, we should be mindful that alliance agreements themselves impose no financial burdens on the US Treasury. What costs money—and potentially lives—is the associated force posture. Proposals for cutting US alliance spending are usually suggestions about curtailing overseas defense presence. This is not a semantic difference. It points to an important reality that many miss when they refer to alliances as extravagant: in order to generate substantial savings in its own defense budget—that is, to close the gap between its “allied contribution” ratio and those of its thriftier partners—the United States would have to close overseas bases and return the personnel and materiel to the continental United States. Simply consolidating bases and relying more on rotational deployments would not generate substantial cost savings.8 Leading scholars have argued for just this kind of move—ending alliances and shuttering related bases to curb commitments and spending. Such dramatic changes would require not just a transformed alliance policy but a completely different grand strategy— one that does not seek to secure the balance of power in Eurasia through forward defense, deterrence, and allied assurance and control.