AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails
Asia Pivot Fails - NATO and U.S pivot against China is both unnecessary and causes conflict
Shankar ’22 (Priyanka Shankar, Independent Journalist based in the Brussels, “Nato leaders say China is a ‘systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” ) //sethlee
It accused Beijing of employing “a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up”.
The policy document said China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target allies and harm alliance security”.
It said that China sought to “control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies”.
After the strategy was adopted at the Nato Summit in Madrid, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters: “China does not share our values, and like Russia is working on undermining our values.”
“China was not mentioned in our previous strategic concept,” he said. “In this year’s strategic concept, allies have stated that the People’s Republic of China’s ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.”
Chinese officials reacted almost immediately in refuting the claims.
“How can an Asia-Pacific China pose any challenge to the security of a North Atlantic military alliance? In fact, it’s the other way round. It’s Nato that dropped bombs on a Chinese embassy,” Wang Lutong the Chinese foreign ministry’s top official for Europe, wrote on Twitter.
He was referring to the strike that hit Beijing’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the war in then Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists.
“China is never engaged in exporting values. We don’t impose our ideas on anyone. Nato should not allow itself to be used by some superpower to maintain hegemony and suppress other countries,” Wang said.
Before the summit, China’s envoy to the United Nations, Zhang Jun said: “Nato’s five eastward expansions after the Cold War have not only failed to make Europe securer, but also sowed the seed of conflict.”
“We firmly oppose certain elements clamouring for Nato’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific, or an Asia-Pacific version of Nato on the back of military alliances,” he said.
The sentiment by other Chinese diplomats on Twitter, in what appeared to be a coordinated response.
Pivot fails—no planning
Jackson 22, Van Jackson is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, “America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End,” January 9th 2022, Foreign Policy, Argument, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/
In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. Washington must also stop conflating economic strategy with stale tropes on free trade and coercive sanctions. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints.