AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim
More military spending directly contributes to populism across Europe by undermining the political power of centrist and establishment parties
Edoardo Saravalle 17, a Researcher at the Center for a New American Security, “NATO Funding Frustration Could Cause Friction in Europe”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-funding-frustration-could-cause-friction-europe-20216
Second, increased burden sharing may actively hurt the cause of EU stability. Military buildup in Europe would sap the political capital and limit the nondefense spending options of establishment pro-American leaders confronting the gravest threat to the EU and U.S. power on the continent, the insurgent populist movement.
Many EU countries are in a cycle of elections that could be decisive for the future of Europe and the West. Dissatisfaction over lackluster economic prospects and opposition to immigration have powered anti-EU and anti-NATO parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Front and placed electoral victories within their grasp. Brexit proved that EU integration is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Now, populist parties are trying to follow the example and reshape Europe in a more nationalistic vision.
The example of Italy shows the potential dangers of prioritizing military spending. The country currently spends on military capabilities. It also boasts , (35.2 percent for youth), and a caretaker government following Matteo Renzi’s resignation. Spending toward the NATO target would divert resources and embolden the populist parties opposing the government. This budgetary trade-off suggests the fundamental calculation of burden sharing. Between a reliable partner or a 2 percent contribution, the United States will choose the former. The 1.1 percent of GDP military spending under Italian prime minister Paolo Gentiloni of the Democratic Party will always be preferable to 2 percent under Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement.
Some examples of specific parties
Fay 17 - Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” Niskan Center, )
Writing at the Washington Post’s “Monkey Cage” blog, Andrea Gilli—a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—identifies some of the domestic barriers to European states investing in their militaries. Gilli names three main constraints on the ability of European states to balance, but two of them are particularly important. The first is the inability of many European states to contribute financially to their own defense. Some European states simply do not have large enough economies to adequately invest in military capabilities. Gilli notes that Estonia is one of the few European countries to meet the minimum standard of defense spending for NATO member states—two percent of gross domestic product—but that still only amounts to $500 million in defense expenditure. Larger states have greater financial resources to invest, but they are tied up in welfare programs. As Gilli writes, [C]utting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive. On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances. It is possible European states could combine their military capabilities, but as Gilli argues, that option is also problematic. He notes, With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon. And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.
Increased defense spending mobilizes populist voters
Henke 21 [Marina Henke; 17/2/21; Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Northwestern University, focuses on military interventions, peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy; “The populist challenge to European defense”; ]
Right-wing populist parties in the EU are broadly nationalist, sovereignist, and Euroskeptic (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2018). But while these parties sharply oppose supranationalism and the EU's broader integrative trajectory, it is less clear whether their anti-EU sentiment extends to other forms of institutionalized cooperation, and in particular to coordination or collaboration with other EU member states on defense.12 We argue that populist parties are likely to constrain European defense cooperation under the following two conditions: First, populist parties hold strong anti-EU, anti-globalization, and anti-establishment sentiment and a more general skepticism over the merits of international cooperation. If these preferences are given clear precedence over national security interests or concerns, we are unlikely to see these parties engage in defense cooperation. This form of populist challenge to European defense cooperation may come from either right-wing or left-wing parties. While left-wing populist parties highlight economic anxieties and grievances, right-wing populist parties emphasize threats to national identity, culture, and sovereignty (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). They also often mix populism with nationalism (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). These nationalist sentiments are likely to stoke intra-EU divisions and constrain defense cooperation. Second, European defense is presented as an issue that populist parties may use to mobilize the mass public, polarize the electorate, and win votes. In other words, populist parties politicize European defense issues for electoral purposes. According to De Vries et al. (2021), two key elements lead to the politicization of international cooperation: public discontent about existing forms of international cooperation and the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs. Since most mainstream parties have not politicized European defense cooperation, populist parties may perceive an incentive and opportunity to mobilize opposition on this issue to attract new voters, and often in tandem with anti-immigrant and nationalist messages (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015).