AT: INB—LIO Turn
Burden-sharing wrecks the LIO and decenters US dominance
McTague, 22 [Tom McTague, staff writer at the Atlantic, 3-24-2022, The Atlantic, ‘Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity’, /alundy]
Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either guarantees European security or it doesn’t.
Biden will undoubtedly speak a familiar language to European leaders—one of liberal values and the defense of democracy, and that will be comforting to them. But the question that nevertheless troubles European politicians, diplomats, and officials is whether instead of Trump being an eccentric one-off, his instinctive antagonism to the obligations of global leadership represents a trend in American public opinion more generally. The question that follows is whether the U.S. has the political will to be the hegemonic power it has been since the end of the Second World War, the basis on which the Western world functions.
As one former NATO insider put it to me, the alliance’s strength is its strategic capability, and this is possible only because the U.S. dominates it. An alliance of lots of similar-size states would not be the same: It would be the European Union—a worthwhile political and trade bloc, but not a capable military grouping. What happens if Washington decides it no longer wants the role of leader?
One somewhat counterintuitive conclusion from the past 20 years is that, if anything, America’s relative dominance over Europe has grown, not declined. After the financial crash, it was the Federal Reserve that stepped in to become the global lender of last resort, while Europe descended into a set of rolling crises. The fundamentals of U.S. economic strength remain extraordinary: the dollar, Silicon Valley, America’s universities, Wall Street. Europe lags behind on all of these, and Germany’s sudden commitment to additional defense spending will do little to bridge the yawning security gap.
The reality is that the West functions as an American-led alliance, but it is not clear that Europe entirely agrees on America’s principal strategic threats. Whether Trump returns to the White House or Biden is the one who returns to some future NATO summit, there will come a point when Europe and the U.S. must decide whether and how to renew their alliance for the next challenge—be that Russia, or China, or something else entirely. And if they do, it will take far more than a small uptick in defense spending and a change in energy policy to keep them united.