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Links to Entrapment

CP links to entrapment or the da is terminally non-unique—ideological prejudices, lobbying, and issue spillage drive commitments.

Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]

Entrapment could also result from transnational ideological factors. Driscoll and Maliniak (2016) suggest that defenders like the United States get ensnared in conflicts “where their national interests are not implicated” for reasons of “issue slippage” (p. 593). This issue slippage occurs when the alliance takes on additional purposes, losing sight even of its original purpose. In the case of NATO, issue slippage ensued when the Soviet military threat no longer existed and the alliance became instead a political community based on liberal democratic values. Accordingly, an actual or potential ally can “position itself in the imagination of liberal idealists in the West” to maximize external support (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 594). Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2016, pp. 77–82) argue that foreign elites can forge bonds of trust and friendship with American officials and politicians, thereby eliciting more cooperation than what was strategically warranted. The common mechanism underlying these arguments is that the ally exploits some transnational connection via elite networks. This connection often has an ideological character since foreign elites play to the ideological prejudices of the defender by professionalizing the national bureaucracy, highlighting religious and political affinities with the West, contracting with lobbying firms in the defender’s capital city, and developing embassy connections (Cooley & Nexon, 2016, pp. 88–94; Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 601). Sometimes they might instead play on ethnic ties if those ties exist. The net effect is to make foreign policy-making in NATO capitals more amenable to a state’s particular interests. The mechanism resembles what Schimmelfennig (2003) calls rhetorical action, which refers to the “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences” (p. 5). By appealing to the ideological sensibilities of the defender’s elites, the ally can co-opt that defender, thereby increasing the probability that the defender would assist the ally even if doing so is detrimental to its strategic interests.

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