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Entrapment False—AT: Reputational risk theory

Reputation alone is insufficient to trigger entrapment

Alexander Lanoszka 17 — (Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo, Published: 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-4-2022; https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102)//Pen-SY

Scholars are divided about whether fighting for reputation is a rational motive for states and thus whether it creates perverse incentives for allies. Some claim that states calculate the credibility of an ally or an adversary on the basis of its willingness and ability to fulfill a threat or promise. Credibility thus does not depend on having a record of keeping pledges (Press, 2005). Accordingly, states cannot develop reputations for reliability among their own allies (Mercer, 1996; Tang, 2005). Fighting for reputation is irrational. However, some dispute the proposition that actions do not matter for building credibility since actions provide information as to the interests and resolve of a state. Moreover, a record of standing up to adversaries could generate credibility, which in turn helps develop a bargaining advantage (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Whichever is the case, recent scholarship has cast doubt as to whether reputational concerns worsen entrapment risks. The Vietnam War is an oft-cited example of the entrapment of strong states by friendly states, but the evidence shows that American allies wished to restrain the United States because they feared that questionable wars of choice would divert resources away from them (Beckley, 2015, pp. 33–38, pp. 46–47). Another weakness of the reputational explanation for entrapment is its deceptively simple counterfactual. Simply stated, the counterfactual is that the defender does not care about its reputation. Yet the implications of this counterfactual are unclear. For example, does the defender not help the ally at all? And if it does assist the ally, is it doing so only because of reputational concerns? By offering an alliance commitment in the first place, the defender reveals that it has some common security interests with that ally (Walt, 1987; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, & Cooper, 2016). A defender unconcerned with its reputation might still help that ally for various national security reasons, as its decision-makers understand them. Alternatively, a defender might even enhance its reputation by not assisting the ally in a militarized conflict that the very ally instigated. The defender could decide that following the reckless ally into an undesirable war will undermine its ability to protect other, less problematic allies. The defender could even limit the damage to its reputation by deflecting blame onto a misbehaving ally. These observations suggest that the ally might not necessarily want to wager that the defender would fight on its behalf simply because of reputational concerns. And so an ally that is willing to make this wager is the sort of state that might already be pre-disposed to risk-acceptant behavior. If war does break out because the ally made that gamble, then the war should not be attributed to the alliance per se but rather to the ally and its innate risk propensity.

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