No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V
Wars of aggression are unpopular – allies won’t follow and credibility isn’t sacrificed
Constantine Atlamazoglou, 9-23-2021, (master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "NATO is still living with the consequences of a historic decision it made hours after 9/11," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-still-living-with-consequences-article-5-invocation-after-911-2021-9)//EZAY
The day after the September 11 attacks, most NATO countries called for the invocation of Article 5. This did not immediately happen since the origin of the attacks had yet to be determined to the satisfaction of some members.
It took until October 2, 2001 — when then-NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson announced that the attacks had indeed been directed from abroad — for Article 5 to be invoked.
This was a watershed moment for the alliance. Failure to invoke Article 5 would have rendered NATO obsolete. Instead, the alliance, which had struggled to find its raison d'être following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was propelled into Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism.
A number of NATO allies were involved in the war from the very beginning.
The UK participated in the first airstrikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. German and British special-operations units took part in the Battle of Tora Bora. A number of NATO countries contributed personnel, aircraft, and logistical support during 2002's Operation Anaconda, the successful mission to rout out Al Qaeda from Afghanistan's Shahi Kot valley.
After dismantling the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan, NATO's role there only grew.
In 2003, at the request of the UN and the Afghan government, NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force. This was a landmark moment for the alliance.
ISAF would be NATO's first deployment outside of Europe and North America. All NATO members would contribute personnel to ISAF — some contributed more per capita than the US.
Eventually, the ISAF mandate would expand from securing Kabul to the whole country. This nominally transferred control of the war to NATO.
The war exposes NATO's weaknesses
Assuming control of such a high-stakes mission provided significant operational and organizational experience to NATO. However, as the war's toll increased, weaknesses within the alliance were exposed.
Participation in the war in Afghanistan had been a contentious issue in many European countries from the beginning.
In some, like Spain, parliamentary approval had not been obtained to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. In others, like Germany and Italy, the deployed troops were limited by legal constraints, which in some cases prevented them from actually fighting the Taliban.
Most NATO members had not fought a war in decades, so even limited combat casualties caused significant backlash at home. The 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings — which brought Islamist terror to Europe in two of the continent's worst attacks in decades — further increased the war's unpopularity.
As a result, many NATO members only contributed a few support troops and tried to sidle away from combat operations and troubled areas. France even withdrew its combat forces in 2012. The lack of specificity in Article 5 meant members could abide by their NATO commitment without totally participating in the war effort.
In 2015, ISAF became the Resolute Support Mission. A non-combat mission, RSM significantly scaled down the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan as it focused on supporting and advising Afghan security forces..
The alliance emerges from Afghanistan with a mixed record.
On the one hand, it undertook its largest mission ever and the first outside its normal area of operations, learning valuable lessons about organization and interoperability that will be useful for future deployments.
On the other hand, the intractable problem at the alliance's core was exposed: the near-impossibility of getting all 30 members to agree on and commit to military and political priorities.
To apply those lessons and stay relevant, the alliance will need to ensure that alignment.
As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, "Afghanistan will not be the last crisis for which North America and Europe need to act together through NATO."
Alliances aren’t honored mindlessly
– Quantitative analysis of every single alliance invocation
Berkemeier, M., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018). [Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University M.A. Non-Proliferation & International Security B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago, 2012 “Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war.” Research & Politics, 5(2), 205316801877969. doi:10.1177/2053168018779697]//EZAY
Table 1 lists the opportunities to fulfill alliance commitments from 1945 to 2003. This information offers some possible explanations for the sharp decrease in promise fulfillment after World War II. One thing that stands out is that offense pacts and neutrality agreements, which are honored at higher rates than defense pacts and nonaggression pacts, are less common in the modern era. Only 20% of alliance performance opportunities from 1945 to 2003 included offensive or neutrality-based commitments, compared with more than 70% from 1816 to 1944. Changes in the types of alliance commitments that are invoked in war over time might partially account for the puzzling trend that we identify. Yet we still see sizable variation in compliance within the same commitment type in the two eras. Defense pacts, for instance, were honored 61.02% of the time from 1816 to 1944 and only 13.95% of the time post-World War II. What else, then, could explain the changing patterns over time?
The invention of nuclear weapons offers one potential answer. In the post-World War II era, the world’s most powerful states possessed nuclear arsenals. Given the destructive power of these weapons, alliance commitments from nuclear powers – especially defense pacts – have rarely been challenged in war (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As a result, major powers appear just a few times in Table 1 and relatively weak states account for a sizable percentage of all “alliance performance opportunities” from 1945 to 2003. This is relevant because state power may affect alliance treaty fulfillment. Countries should be most likely to intervene in war when their participation might change the outcome (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995). Relatively weak states, according to this line of thinking, are less likely to fulfill their alliance promises because they lack the material capacity to sway a conflict’s outcome.7 Israel probably would have prevailed in the Six Day War, for instance, even if Saudi Arabia had joined its allies in the fight. From Riyadh’s perspective, this may have made it easier to largely remain on the sidelines. This is, however, merely a preliminary conjecture. Conclusion This study presented an updated assessment of the reliability of military alliances. Our analysis, which extended earlier work to include the post-World War II era and utilized updated war data, yields three main conclusions. First, the overall rate of alliance fulfillment in war is lower than previously reported. Second, defense pacts and nonaggression pacts are honored much less frequently than neutrality agreements and offensive alliances. Third, there is a large disparity in the rate of alliance fulfillment before and after World War II. This offers a lesson for researchers that extends beyond the realm of alliance politics: trends that apply in one period may not extend to other eras. It is important to consider whether relationships of interest vary over time – particularly when there are structural shocks, like World War II. What implications does the lower compliance rate carry for our understanding of alliance treaty reliability? Our analysis does not imply that military alliances are ineffective, nor does it challenge the evidence that defense pacts promote peace through extended deterrence (Leeds, 2003b; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). The most effective threat is one that never has to be implemented (Schelling, 1966). NATO does not appear in our dataset, for example, precisely because potential adversaries perceive it as effective. However, when alliance commitments are invoked in war, allies uphold their promises less often than the conventional wisdom suggests. This implies that leaders are less restrained by treaty commitments than prior research would expect, a conclusion that carries implications for our understanding of international institutions (for a review of relevant literature, see Simmons, 2010). Our analysis opens up avenues for future research. Scholars could use our updated dataset to revisit enduring debates about alliance politics, such as whether democracies make more (or less) reliable allies (c.f., Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003a). The disparity in compliance rates over time also represents a puzzle worthy of examination in scholarship. Something may have changed after 1944 that fundamentally altered the nature of alliance politics. We have speculated about the sources of this variation, but further analysis is necessary in order to achieve more definitive answers. The disparity in compliance across commitment types is worthy of further investigation in scholarship as well. Dedicated studies on why offense pacts are so much more reliable than defense pacts would be especially welcome. More generally, future research might consider the implications of our findings for extended deterrence, war-fighting, and the efficacy of international institutions.
Article 5 itself doesn’t assure allies and if it’s invoked no impact
Joshua Alley 2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) Alliance Participation and Military Spending. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from .] pg.76-78//EZAY
I focus this brief case study on NATO treaty design for two reasons. First, information from NATO applies to multiple alliances, as other US treaties have similar designs. Most US alliances have conditional promises of military support and understanding why is important. Second, NATO is also the most important alliance in international politics, so understanding how the treaty formed is worthwhile. After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019a) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is not guaranteed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public. Military support from Article V did not assuage European fears that if the Soviets invaded, the United States would not fight. To increase the credibility of NATO, the United States took other measures. A 1951 presentation by Dean Acheson to Dwight Eisenhower argued European allies “fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. ... These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and active contribution in terms of both military forces and economic aid” (Acheson, 1951, pg. 3). The first part of reassurance was the creation of the Atlantic Council, which is an international organization and the main source of depth in the NATO treaty itself. The United States used the Atlantic Council to coordinate collective defense and increase the perceived reliability of the alliance. By investing in the Atlantic Council and related joint military planning, the US addressed European fears of abandonment. For example, US officials thought that the British Foreign Minister viewed US provision of a supreme commander in Europe as “a stimulus to European action” in NATO (Acheson, 1950). Many Senators also opposed military aid to Europe (Acheson, 1969, pg 285), which limited efforts to add further treaty depth. These legislative constraints on the executive branch reduced the formal depth of NATO relative to what many ambassadors preferred (Acheson, 1969, pg 277). Bilateral agreements on troop deployments then became another instrument of reassurance. In 1950 the Germans formally requested clarification on whether an attack on US forces in Germany would be treated as an armed attack on the US- which the US said it would (Acheson, 1969, pg. 395). These bilateral arrangements and basing rights are not covered in the NATO treaty, but they added substantial depth.19 NATO negotiations reveal the tendency of democracies to use treaty depth to reassure their allies, rather than unconditional military support. Fear of foreign entanglement led the United States to offer conditional military support, but did not inhibit deep military cooperation, which helped reassure European allies. Limits on the promises of military support were an important public justification for the NATO treaty, while the Atlantic Council was less discussed. Still, the power of treaty ratification in the Senate limited formal NATO depth to the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council and associated bureaucratic machinery are the formal core of substantial defense cooperation. Altogether though Article V is limited, the US used treaty depth to increase the credibility of NATO.