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No Norway Entrapment

Norway isn’t interested in conflict, but US support causes deterrence—solves wider scale conflicts

Frank Bakke-Jensen, 1-11-2021,(writing when he was the Norwegian minister of defense; "Norway’s defense minister: We must ensure strategic stability in the High North," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/norways-defense-minister-we-must-ensure-strategic-stability-in-the-high-north//EZAY

The United States and Norway have a strong and longstanding bilateral relationship based on mutual interests and common values. The trans-Atlantic link remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security, and our two countries cooperate closely on almost every aspect of military operations. Looking ahead, the two key dimensions for Norwegian security policy are the Arctic and Russia.

Strategic environment in the High North

Since Russia began its military reform effort in 2008, it has built layered, integrated and scalable defenses. Russia’s armed forces have become an increasingly useful political instrument for the Kremlin across the entire conflict spectrum, from peace to crisis and war.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 added a more threatening undertone to the development. In recent years, Norway has experienced Russian simulated air attacks on Norwegian targets and jamming of GPS signals that threaten the security of civilian aviation. Last fall, Russia conducted a sophisticated cyberattack on the Norwegian parliament, a serious incident that affected our country’s most important democratic institution.

The Russian so-called active defense emphasizes high readiness, agility, mobility and close coordination, as well as the ability to launch massive firepower. Russian prioritization of the Arctic has resulted in a large-scale modernization of the armed forces and infrastructure reestablishment in the Russian north. The key task of the Russian capabilities on the Kola Peninsula is global deterrence, making horizontal escalation a lasting concern for Norway. There is no indication that Russia will slow down its engagement in the Arctic — rather, the opposite.

China’s ambitions and increased involvement in great power competition introduces new challenges. China’s interest in the Arctic is growing, especially in light of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has a broad range of means available, as it invests in research, ports and infrastructure in the region. Although China currently does not pose a military threat in the Arctic, Norway closely monitors China’s engagement in the north and its growing cooperation with Russia.

Key priority

Norway’s key priority is to . The newly published whitepaper on the Arctic emphasizes its strategic importance for Norway, and our new long-term plan for defense outlines significant investments in relevant military capabilities.

Furthermore, Norway welcomes the increased presence of key NATO allies in the High North. In recent years, the Pentagon has published Arctic strategies illustrating that the U.S. views the High North as an area that requires attention in order to preserve strategic stability and a rules-based international order. Along with the U.S. Navy, Marines and special forces, the Air and Space Forces are now developing strategic cooperation with likeminded nations in the region. This includes increasingly regular allied naval and air presence in the High North. Norway aims to participate in these activities when they take place in the waters off the Norwegian coast, in order to enhance allied interoperability. We consider these activities as a sign of alliance solidarity and cohesion.

Norway's allies recognize the country as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. But there is no time for complacency.

NATO also emphasizes the strategic importance of the Arctic. Exercise Trident Juncture, hosted by Norway in 2018, proves that the alliance is able to conduct large-scale exercises in harsh weather conditions with an Article 5 scenario. As part of a more persistent allied presence, we look forward to hosting the biannual exercise Cold Response in 2022. This exercise will also test allied ability to protect NATO interests in the Arctic. This is deterrence in action.

Deterrence and reassurance

The balance between deterrence and reassurance is our main approach to achieve our security goals for the High North. At the same time, we continue to be prudent and avoid unnecessary provocation.

We remain Russia’s neighbor, and we continue to cooperate with Russia on issues such as search and rescue, border patrol, and coast guard operations to control fisheries. To preserve stability, we uphold dialogue while at the same time remain firmly committed to our values and a rules-based international order.

I would like to commend the U.S. for the continued leadership in defense and commitment to European security. Norway and the U.S. cooperate closely on maritime surveillance and intelligence in the High North. We also have close cooperation on integrating fifth-generation capabilities into the force structure, and our special forces work shoulder to shoulder around the globe. As maritime nations, the U.S. and Norway cooperate on naval matters around the world. In 2023, we plan to launch two satellites into orbit in a bilateral effort to establish broadband satellite communications in the Arctic.

Under shifting administrations, the U.S. has built lasting relationships with allies and partners all over the world, including in the north. We look forward to continuing the close cooperation with the U.S. and NATO allies to protect our common values and interests.

Norway is stable, covered by article 5, and cooperative with Russia

Koivurova 16, is Research Professor and Director of the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland. (Tim, 11-18-2016, “Analysis: The Arctic conflict - truth, fantasy or a little bit of both?” High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/analysis-arctic-conflict-truth-fantasy-or-little-bit-both)

What do we mean by a conflict? Since Arctic countries have so much practical cooperation, it is important to ask what sort of conflicts could occur in the region. If we are claiming that the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the West is about to lead to some sort of a conflict, it is important to stop and think what kind of a conflict we are talking about. If a conflict means, for example, an unresolved dispute over where a maritime border should lie, this does not shock many experts. Arctic states have disputed over their maritime borders bilaterally and sometimes even at the International Court of Justice, but such disputes have been settled sooner or later. It took more than 40 years for Russia and Norway to resolve a border dispute in the Barents Sea, but even this was settled in 2010. Furthermore, the dispute did not prevent cooperation between the countries. Norway, a NATO member, and the Soviet Union used to jointly manage fish stocks in the disputed region. In fact, most of the Arctic maritime disputes occur between close allies, like the United States and Canada. Or, does a conflict refer to a single event, which causes diplomatic slanging match? If, for example, the Coast Guard of the US or Norway seizes a Russian fishing vessel or a person subject to sanctions travels to Svalbard, can this be defined as a conflict? It is very rare that single events escalate into worse conflicts than a mild war of words, which is quickly lost in the mists of time. A case in point is when a Russian fishing vessel Elektron escaped in 2005 from the Norwegian Coast Guard to the Russian territorial waters, after having been arrested for illegal fishing. While the case lingered for some time, it did not affect general long-term Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic. What would it mean, then, if the geopolitical tension expanded to the Arctic region? In general, if Russian tensions grow with NATO, it is important to keep in mind that the Arctic plays a crucial role in Russia’s global military strategy: its Northern Fleet requires access to the Atlantic. We could also claim that since Russia has now increased its military presence in its Arctic regions, we have a security dilemma at hand: Could armament in Russian Arctic also lead to increased military investment from the part of its neighbors, and such investments reinforce each other in a vicious circle? Although the Arctic states have sometimes declared they will boost their investments in measures guaranteeing Arctic security, this has not actually occurred. The United States has so far been unable to even purchase one new icebreaker for its Arctic areas. Overall, it is important to ask for what purpose Russia is militarily equipping its Arctic areas. Due to the difficult circumstances in the region, militaries are needed in many tasks in the Arctic, ranging from rescue tasks to safeguarding shipping in the Northern Sea Route. It is also important to monitor whether Russia implements all the planned military investments in its Arctic areas. They are expensive measures in a country whose economy is not doing well. It is also important to consider for what strategic purposes could Russian military act in the Arctic. Russia has demonstrated to have the ability and will to use also military power to achieve its aims in foreign policy. This has been visible for a long time, since Russia’s Georgia operation in 2008, and it has accelerated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine and military support for the Syrian government. This consideration leads to two questions: "Could Russia gain anything by military occupation in the Arctic and what would it even mean in the Arctic?", and: "What is the difference between Ukraine, Georgia and the Arctic?" To the first question: Could it be possible for Russia to also use military power in forcibly claim the Lomonosov Ridge, if Denmark-Greenland and perhaps Canada, too, want it? We could also ask, what would Russia celebrate as a foreign policy win, if it did conquer the Lomonosov Ridge? It is very likely that Russia receives a large part of the Lomonosov Ridge and its hypothetical hydrocarbon resources just by complying with the UNCLOS rules. Furthermore, most likely they have nothing economically exploitable and even if something was found, it would take decades for Russia to even dream of drilling oil in these areas. As regards the second question on differences between Russian actions in the Arctic and Eastern Europe, Russia has used military power against two states, which both were part of the former Soviet Union and which are not NATO members. It is a different matter to carry out attack in the Arctic Ocean against NATO member states, which are covered by alliance security guarantee. But could Putin’s regime, then, attack the non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden? Although these countries are EU member states and thus enjoy a softer form of security guarantee, the famous fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty would not push the alliance to defend Finland and Sweden. It is important to ask these types of questions, since they allow us to reflect what Putin’s Russia is prepared to pursue with military means in actual terms. There are no signs of Russia’s military strategy being completely unpredictable. Russia has enabled the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and annexed Crimea. All the regions have had a Russian majority, even though they were part of Georgia and Ukraine. To be sure, safeguarding the Crimean naval base and access to the Black Sea contributed to the decision to annex Crimea. Considering Putin’s military strategy so far, it is difficult to draw any parallels between the Georgian regions and the Crimean Peninsula on one hand and Finland and Sweden on the other. The Arctic region lacks similar reasons for any military confrontation. If the general tension in the relations , however, leads to military actions between Russia and Western powers elsewhere, however, these confrontations are very likely to expand to the Arctic region. This is for the present, though, an unlikely course of events. A more crucial question is this: When do the relations between the US and Russia freeze to a point where it starts to affect Arctic cooperation, which has so far been largely shielded from tensions from outside the region? The recent signs are not promising: The plutonium agreement was suspended by Russia, the United States and Russia are again on opposite sides in Syria, and the situation in Eastern Ukraine continues to be difficult. The situation is constantly changing, and we cannot exclude the possibility that we reach a point where the deterioration of the relations also leads to difficulties in the Arctic cooperation. Did we receive answers to these questions from the election of Donald Trump as the next US President? On one hand, it seems, Trump and Putin seem to pull in the same direction, perhaps leading to less confrontational relations and better Arctic co-operation. However, it is the unpredictability of Donald Trump that makes it very difficult to say anything clear on what his foreign policy agenda will eventually look like. Moreover, the Arctic Council may not be the forum where Trump would like to pursue his policies, given that the climate change is at the core of what the Arctic Council does – a phenomenon that does not seem to exist for the president-elect.

Norway wants peace and won’t provoke Russia.

Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger 17, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Associate Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Stockholm University, M.A. in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies; Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North,” in “Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century,” pp. 91-113, June 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/GA.06.2017.07

Whereas the end of the Cold War implied that ‘for most other states than Russia the region has remained either marginal or peripheral’, the importance of the High North was revitalised in Norway with the Norwegian High North strategy from 2005 onwards.73 The significant Russian military build-up on the Kola Peninsula from the mid-2000s also raised concerns about security among Norwegian politicians, diplomats and militaries. In particular, the Russian reopening of old military bases, the increased level of military exercises and, not least, the increase in overflights of Russian bombers and strategic bombers off the coast of Norway sparked a new round of ‘New Cold War’ rhetoric and media headlines.

Certainly, a more aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Ukraine in 2014 in particular has also put the High North, where Russia has ‘geo-political and military-strategic interests’, back at the top of the Norwegian security and defence policy agenda.74 For instance, the main focus of the expert commission was the security challenges that Russia represents in the region, which they describe as ‘an arena for geopolitical struggle’.75 The forward-leaning Russian foreign policy has also gained a lot of attention in Nordic academic environments.76 Even after the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia has not been considered as a direct threat to Norway, at least not at present.77 As formulated by the head of Norwegian military intelligence, ‘Russia has not suddenly become a military threat—not in the short term. But, in the long term the picture is more uncertain’.78 Hence the focus on strengthening the military presence in northern Norway in subsequent defence plans and reports.79 Rather than seeing any impending security threats in the region, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low tension’, emphasises the safety aspect of Arctic activity.

All of the peacetime, cooperative military bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the Arctic are between the nation states in the region. For instance, the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed by the five Arctic coastal states, established a common framework for maritime sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean. All signatories have agreed that claims and disputes are to be negotiated between the Arctic coastal states to prevent the escalation of political disagreements into security issues. Norway and Russia, who have had overlapping claims in the Barents Sea for decades, finally managed to conclude negotiations and sign an agreement in 2010.

The role of NATO in the region has been brought up from time to time. NATO is not, however, likely to increase its activity in the Arctic in peacetime and instead encourages the continuation of the cooperation between all of the Arctic states. The defence establishments of the Arctic states promote peacetime confidence-building measures.80 There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the region that include Russia and the individual NATO members among the Arctic states. There are annual informal meetings between military leaders from all of the Arctic states where ‘soft security’ measures and military support to civilian agencies responsible for safety-related matters are discussed. These matters have become increasingly important with growing levels of human activity in the Arctic Ocean. This emphasis on safety capabilities corresponds with recent efforts under the auspices of the Arctic Council that resulted in a new search and rescue agreement (2011) and an oil-spill preparedness and response agreement (2013).

The requirement for monitoring and safety arrangements depends on the volume and scope of future civilian activities. The Arctic may be a promising area for commercial opportunities. There is a potential for shorter transcontinental maritime transit though the Northern Sea Route, increasing the profit and value of extraction of onshore and offshore petroleum and mineral resources. Analysts, however, have recently addressed several factors dampening the most optimistic future predictions. Operations in the Arctic environment can be complex, difficult (extremely low temperatures and icing contribute to this) and costly. Profitability of commercial ventures in the Arctic may also be influenced by the dynamics in the market itself and evolving concepts for production and distribution.

The Arctic—where Norway has invested significant political and economic capital—can be seen as a unique arena for the country as a place where Norway meets and interacts with many non-Arctic states. Meeting both Arctic and non-Arctic partners in the High North has been a priority for Norway. For instance, the rapidly growing economies of Asia have expressed a particular interest in the Arctic, which has coincided with Norway’s recognition of Asia as an increasingly important arena for Norwegian foreign policy.81 Similar to its other Nordic regional partners, Norway has been forthcoming and welcoming of Asian states’ Arctic interests, as it encourages broad dialogue on issues affecting the Arctic and competence sharing. Norway welcomes the diverse opinions, complementary expertise and outside-of-the-Arctic thinking that non-Arctic states can provide. Norway has developed especially close bilateral ties on Arctic issues with Singapore, South Korea and Japan. South Korea has prioritised Norway as a cooperation partner in Arctic and regular bilateral interactions between Norway and Singapore and Norway and South Korea have also strengthened collaborative commitments and interest in the region.82 Norway proclaimed its support of the Asian states’ inclusion in the Arctic Council in early 2013 and continued to play a role in the states’ ultimate acceptance and inclusion in the council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013. This receptive attitude towards the Asian states can be in part explained by a Norwegian interest in revitalising the Arctic Council.83 Given its geographic placement and record in the High North, Norway can play a significant role as a gatekeeper and facilitator of non-Arctic states’ interests in the region, which can in turn have positive offshoots in other bilateral, regional and international settings.84

No Norway-Russia war---robust cooperation and mutual interests.

Andreas Østhagen 18, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of British Columbia, “How Norway and Russia avoid Conflict over Svalbard,” The Arctic Institute, 06-19-2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-russia-avoid-conflict-svalbard/

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. Norway avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be challenged due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1) A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose, although the two countries quickly agreed to disagree as long as Russian fishermen would have access to fisheries in the Zone.

In the late 1990s, Norwegian fisheries enforcement in the FPZ became stricter, in tandem with declining fish stocks and fear of considerable illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Barents Sea. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow.2) In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue.

Today, the risk of events spiralling out of control in the FPZ remains a primary concern for both the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Echoing these fears, in 2017 the Russian Defence Ministry deemed Svalbard a potential area for future conflict with Norway, and in consequence NATO.3) Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Two intertwining relationships are integral to answering this.

Interest alignment

First, cooperation can be the product of discord. In other words, states cooperate when they disagree. Sometimes institutions are needed to overcome the self-help tendencies of the international system. Along this line of argumentation, cooperation between Norway and Russia concerning shared fish stocks, oil spill response, search and rescue, and ship traffic management are formalised arrangements set up to manage potential areas of discord. Along the same line of argumentation, the Barents Sea maritime boundary agreement in 2010 was a result of interests between the two states converging sufficiently.4)

In other words, the reason why Norway and Russia manage to keep crises from escalating further is mutual interest in preserving aspects of their cooperation; cooperation that benefits both parties. This relates to multiple issue areas. Concerning resource management, Russia is assumed to be satisfied with the current quota scheme, in contrast to what might be achieved if an actual debate over the status of the FPZ took place.5) Concerning the UNCLOS-regime, both parties benefit from a stable legal regime in the FPZ specifically, but also in the Arctic at large.6) And concerning national security, both parties have an interest in low levels of conflict for fear of coercive efforts by other actors within and outside the Barents/Arctic region.7)

The interests that drive cooperation might, however, be subject to change (over time). We can see changes taking place within all the issue-areas addressed: as climate change continues to alter the marine resource base in the Barents Sea; as external actors challenge the validity of the UNCLOS-regime in the Arctic; or as the power relations between various actors fluctuate. The institutions set up to manage cooperation are also challenged and questions of institutional resilience become salient: how will cooperative mechanisms adapt as conditions influencing the premise for cooperation change?8)

For example, as Norway and Russia struggled to reach agreement on a reduction of annual quotas for the Barents Sea in the early 2000s, several institutional measures were taken. In 2002, a harvest control rule was introduced in the Joint Fisheries Commission to set quotas according to scientific advice while also limiting fluctuations from year to year. This has been described as the most important change in the work of the Commission, removing a source of friction between the two states (which had spill-over effects into the FPZ).9)

Talking to your neighbour

Second, as emphasised by officials in the Norwegian Coast Guard, former Coast Guard officers, and multiple scholarly works written on the management of shared fish stocks in the Barents Sea, personal contact between individuals constitute a core element of conflict management in the Barents Sea. The importance of dialogue during a crisis is given much credit for solving incidents between the Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian fishing vessels. This includes communication between the Coast Guard and Russian trawlers (including the use of Russian interpreters); between the Norwegian Joint Military Headquarters and the Chief of the Russian Northern Fleet at Severomorsk; and between the negotiating groups in the Joint Fisheries Commission.

Having various means of communicating, and keeping channels open as a crisis is unfolding, constitute central elements in the management of conflict in the FPZ. This can be linked to the notion of ‘track two diplomacy’, albeit without an immediate large-scale international crisis as an impetus. Still, instilling so called low-level or ‘soft’ dialogue in addition to other more formal channels of communication, have – in this case – provided an effective approach to conflict management.10)

This concerns the larger concept of personal relations, as social contact between two or more individuals representing different sides in a dispute. The theory of socialisation emphasises not only the communication component, but also the fact that a change occurs between the parties. Norms (expected behaviour) socialise (change) actors according to a logic of appropriateness.11) By interacting regularly with the same individuals on the same issues (fisheries, quotas, inspections) over time, mutual understanding emerges as the individuals themselves better comprehend the position of the other party.

Maintaining low tension

Personal relations have formed the basis for the institutionalisation of some of the mechanisms described above, that enable cooperation between Norway and Russia in this specific instance. Examples include the exchange of coast guard officers from Norway and Russia, as well as the formalised sharing of information and annual meetings between the Chiefs of the coast guards. This institutionalisation and its relevance for the issues at hand in the Barents Sea at large, and the FPZ specifically, played a central part in sheltering the coast guard cooperation from sanctions and restrictions put in place between Norway and Russia in 2014.12) There is thus a feedback loop taking place between institutionalisation and personal interactions.

This article does not attempt to outline a monocausal explanation for success in maritime dispute management. Instead, the aim is to showcase how multiple explanations emphasising different aspects of conflict relations contribute to the outcome. In sum, several factors concerning the dispute in the Svalbard Zone help explain why it has been managed adequately in the context of a larger quarrel.

Looking ahead, the writing on the wall is relatively clear: to maintain low tension in the zone around Svalbard, Norway and Russia need both be aware of the factors that keep their relations civil. Upholding dialogue between the two countries’ coast guards regardless of fluctuating international relations is crucial. So is establishing and re-developing cooperative mechanisms such as the Joint Fisheries Commission, as the resource situation in Arctic waters might change.

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