No Escalation—Moral Hazard
No impact to moral hazard---the higher the hazard, the less likely conflict occurs
Benson 14, Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University (Brett, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.2)
Do military alliances cause allies to act so aggressively that their behavior undermines the security goal of the alliance? If so, then leaders may be cautious about joining an alliance, doing so only if they can select safe alliance partners or design the terms of the treaty in a way that captures the deterrence benefits while managing the dangers of overaggression. We show that while alliance commitments may cause alliance partners to behave aggressively, under some conditions the added aggressiveness actually enhances deterrence. From this perspective, the effectiveness of an alliance is related both to the structure and to the content of the treaty.
This view stands in contrast to the standard explanation that the content of an alliance agreement is designed to balance the benefit of deterring an enemy against the risk of emboldening an ally (Fearon 1997; Snyder 1997; Yuen 2009). Our approach builds on existing models of alliance formation (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995) but adds intra-alliance contracting over the benefits from successful deterrence. Specifically, avoiding a conflict that they otherwise might expect creates a surplus equal to the foregone cost of war, which may be divided among alliance partners.
To facilitate an understanding of the intuition, we suggest that military alliances share many similarities with standard insurance contracts. Much as an auto insurance policy stipulates how much a policy holder will receive if he or she is in an accident, an alliance agreement likewise often describes how much aid an ally will provide to the attacked party if there is a war. For example, the 1656 Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Brandenburg and France enumerates precisely the amount and form of aid each ally would provide to the other if it was attacked: Brandenburg pledged 2,400 men and 600 horses to France while France promised 5,000 men, 1,200 horses, and artillery to Brandenburg. In the 1893 Franco-Russian alliance, France promised to supply 1.3 million troops and Russia pledged to contribute 700,000 to 800,000 troops in a conflict against Germany.1
Furthermore, in an insurance contract, the size of the insurance premium the insured pays usually depends on the amount of risk being indemnified by the insurance provider: the more risk for the insurer, the higher the premium. Our explanation of the content of alliance commitments likewise ties the level of support to the amount of security risk alliance partners face. That is, leaders of threatened countries may look to team up with each other, and the amount of support they promise one another may depend on the amount of threat each faces. However, insurance against risk carries with it the potential problem of moral hazard, which occurs when the guarantee of indemnity distorts the insured's behavior because the insurance policy insulates her from the risks of her actions (Pauly 1968, 1974; Shavell 1979). Just as insured motorists may exercise less caution in their driving, states insured by alliance treaties have an incentive to behave more aggressively in negotiating with other states.
Generally, scholars of alliances take the position that moral hazard creates potentially harmful effects. Most notably, Snyder (1984, 1997) and Christensen and Snyder (1990) claim that alliances “embolden” state leaders to “entrap” unwilling allies in wars that they would prefer to avoid. Yuen (2009) shows that moral hazard increases allied states’ level of aggression in crisis bargaining, and this added aggression may heighten the risk of war or affect the bargaining settlements. As a result of the potential harmful effects of moral hazard, scholars argue that leaders may either avoid alliances, screen alliance partners based on their likelihood of behaving recklessly, or attempt to design treaties carefully so as to balance their dueling goals of deterring external threats while restraining alliance partners (Snyder 1984, 1997; Jervis 1994; Zagare and Kilgour 2003, 2006; Yuen 2009).
A more subtle side effect of moral hazard, however, is that states may be attracted to alliances because the tendency of an ally to behave aggressively actually enhances deterrence. The possibility that an allied state will negotiate aggressively may cause third-party adversaries to refrain from initiating a crisis. Likewise, a defensive alliance might make an alliance partner more willing to retaliate if challenged because it benefits from its ally’s support in war; this may cause a prospective adversary to be reluctant to initiate a challenge targeting the alliance partner (Smith 1995).
In cases where moral hazard advances the deterrence objective of an alliance, there is little cost to entrapment, because the third-party adversary calibrates its hostility toward the allies based on its expectation about its likelihood of winning a conflict if the target of its challenge does not capitulate. The combination of added resources from an ally and the increased willingness of the target to fight back encourages the third party to refrain from initiating violence. When encouraging an alliance partner to fight back if it is attacked enhances deterrence, then the goal of the contract is to induce a maximal amount of moral hazard so as to deter potential aggressors to such an extent that the risk of conflict is negligible. In this case, allies are not called upon to expend costly resources in support of their partners, as no conflict occurs. Thus, a priori, it seems equally likely that moral hazard will deter would-be challenges or increase the likelihood of conflict. Therefore, an important challenge for a theory of alliances is to identify the conditions under which moral hazard serves the deterrence purpose of the alliance rather than causing harmful effects that undermine the alliance’s objective.