No Escalation—Diplomacy
Even if entrapment’s true, it’s never driven escalation – nuclear umbrella encourages peaceful resolution
Narang and Mehta 19 [Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State", 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717729025?casa_token=fjphBVEC1bcAAAAA:s1NRigLIcYYxZXkDz9eLxekB42NjmCbbcbFMw_HyiWfIAQl2rkicA4CWZa6pN7ACXfmR6slngz2Jlg]
In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero, assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.
We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella slightly increases the risk that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. However, we find that this overall effect is driven entirely by one-sided use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that never escalates to the reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is positively associated with the likelihood that a crisis will include a peaceful settlement attempt and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory.
That means the aff is the wrong response—prefer comparative evidence
Neil NARANG Poli Sci @ UC Santa Barbara AND Rupal MEHTA Poli Sci @ University of Nebraska-Lincoln ’19 “The unforeseen consequences of extended deterrence: Moral hazard in a nuclear client state,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63.1, p. 218-250 | AS
Conclusion
In this article, we address a long-standing question in the academic and policy communities about the role of nuclear umbrellas in broader interstate relations. Specifically, we examine how client states behave under the protection of a nuclear patron by investigating two important dimensions of behavior: the initiation of militarized disputes and bargaining outcomes short of war. We find that, although client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are no more likely to initiate MIDs against a target state that escalate to war or the reciprocated use of force, these states, nevertheless, appear more emboldened to initiate crises. However, these crises tend not to escalate to higher levels of militarized conflict because target states appear to act in equilibrium: preferring to settle disputes peacefully rather than resist militarily through costly fighting. We find that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are more often the recipients of policy concessions from their targets compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella. Together, these results provide comprehensive support for our argument that there is some risk of moral hazard in a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, as clients appear more emboldened and more successful at revising the status quo in expectation of a patron coming to their aid. The urgency to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear umbrellas is perhaps most real today, as the United States seeks to rebalance its overall security portfolio to the Asia-Pacific in anticipation of a rising China and to provide additional assurances to its allies in the Middle East in light of potential proliferation challenges. And yet, we have surprisingly little evidence that such commitments are effective at reducing the risk of conflict on net, given the widely presumed, but still untested, risk for moral hazard in the client state. Meanwhile, policymakers in the United States and abroad continue to propose expanding the US nuclear umbrella while further reassuring allies covered within it. Our research suggests that the expansion of the nuclear umbrella may perversely exacerbate the concerns of potential targets and inadvertently destabilize the status quo by increasing the risk of a crisis and the opportunity for bargaining to fail. If client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are encouraged to pursue more aggressive military and diplomatic policies toward other states, this may pose an increased risk of conflict to patrons, particularly as nuclear patrons like the United States seek to strengthen and reaffirm their commitments to their allies. Of course, this risk must be balanced against any risk of moral hazard that might flow from a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, or any potential nonnuclear state, acquiring its own nuclear weapons in the absence of such commitments (N. Narang 2015). It may very well be the case that nuclear umbrellas cause emboldenment/moral hazard, but that this is nonetheless preferable to the nuclear emboldenment that would result if the state acquired nuclear weapons (Kapur 2007). In so far as the net effect is unclear, it is possible that policymakers might want to persist in offering nuclear umbrellas to states in order to prevent proliferation despite their moral hazard inducing consequences (Mehta 2017).16