No Escalation—No Interest
No great power entrapment – conflicts stay local
Elizabeth Calos 12 — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY
This argument has been supported by the data gathered from the Correlates of War Project. The data showed that for both weak and medium powered states, alliance membership with a conflict originator had a significant impact on the decision of the state to enter into a conflict that it did not initiate. However, the same level of significance was not found for high-powered states. Thus, the first hypothesis, that a great power or strong state will not necessarily feel compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners because the state is stable enough that changes in the strength of alliance member do not impact the security of the state, has been supported by this study. The second hypothesis, that a weak or medium power state will be compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners, even when the conflict may go against the state's desires or the mandate of the alliance has also been supported by the data. This indicates that the explanation of alliance behavior backed by the logic of rational deterrence is more accurate than the explanations provided by the grievance model, which predicts that this joining behavior would not occur across all three groups, or the Rubicon model, which predicts that it would occur uniformly across the groups.