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Chinese hybrid threats risks mischaracteriziation---being able to successfully characterize attacks is key

Hanna Smith 21, Director of Research and Analysis at the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and visiting professor for the academic year 2020–2021 at the College of Europe, Bruges. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf //pipk

Recent digital and technological developments have enabled many completely new tools, which have given rise to new virtual platforms that fall outside current norms and rules. These new tools have also brought unprecedented speed to all kinds of action. Interconnectivity and globalization have created new possibilities for network-based action, lowered borders, changed geopolitics and made sure that there is more data around us than ever before. New actors have emerged in international politics, who are looking to enhance their status. Authoritarian and democratic states appear to be entering into a new form of ideological battle. In this situation one can ask: what are the rules of the game? An important weapon in this new battle is hybrid threats. Hybrid threats constitute a shadow policy for authoritarian states that supports their strategic aims and is based on their strategic culture traditions. The clear dividing lines, unwritten rules, players and goals of the Cold War are history. This situation is challenging for planners, decision-makers and foresight building.

The concept of hybrid threats has entered into political normality by appearing in the discourses and documents of the EU, NATO and their member states. The concept has been examined through many different disciplinary lenses: international relations, strategic studies, security studies, military studies, history and political science – to name a few. This multidisciplinary analytical mosaic also blurs the picture of what hybrid threats really are. The Report “The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model”, issued by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) together with the European Union (EU) Commission’s Joint Research Center, uses hybrid threats as an umbrella concept, under which different types of activity occur: interference, influence, operations, campaigns and even warfare (Giannopoulos, Smith and Theocharidou, 2020). The approach adopted would enable a comprehensive analysis including civilian, political, military and academic thinking. This chapter will take the report’s conceptual model as its starting point for hybrid threat analysis.

Hybrid threats are still difficult to define, which on the one hand complicates the adoption of strategies to counter them, common positions and a holistic approach, but on the other hand gives flexibility, greater freedom to be creative and possibility to combine different disciplines and backgrounds. Consequently, the characterization of hybrid threats will help to identify real threats, potential threats and also those aspects that might look like threats but are not. Too tight definition might, in the worst case, point in the wrong direction and also tie one’s hands when it comes to responding.

There is still an ongoing debate regarding the usefulness of the concept of hybrid threats. Those saying that hybrid threats are mostly “old wine in new bottles” mean that perhaps we do not need a new concept, and we could just adjust the old ones to current circumstances. To this Frank Hoffman, who is often seen as the man behind the ‘hybrid warfare’ concept, answered in the following way: “New language and new terms aid us in thinking differently and characterizing what is truly new, hopefully without overlooking what is enduring in war. A new lexicon captures the changes better than hanging on to old terms with new meanings” (Hoffmann, 2010).

The ‘old’ in the concept of hybrid threats lies in the fact that interference and influence have always been part of international politics. Also, the technique of combining different domains like social, political, informational, military and legal ones has been part of the strategic thinking behind influence, interference and military operations. This thinking is also present in today’s activities that constitute hybrid threats. What is new, then – although anchored to traditions in the authoritarian strategic thinking – is related to today’s security environment and how it is different compared to the Cold War’s, for example. The battle between democratic and authoritarian state systems today is not as clear-cut as the division between communist and capitalist countries was during the Cold War. Furthermore, digital and technological developments have provided new platforms for influencing, new tools for both interference and influence, and have extended the domains where action happens – from the traditional military domains like land, air and sea, to cyber and space, to more comprehensive domains like culture and administration. These are all connected and, through hybrid threats activities with a targeted approach, even the best prepared states and alliances can be challenged.

The logic of interference found in hybrid threats is substantially based on authoritarian strategic culture. Strategic culture itself as a concept has been contested, but in recent years it has found its way back into security studies. It is worth noting that the Cold War juxtaposition, the bipolarity of the superpowers, crucially downplayed the relevance of national aspects relating to cooperation, competition, conflict, and war. In that way, the ‘national character’ of the enemy, which was very important before the Second World War, was downplayed during the Cold War years (Miklossy & Smith, 2020: xiii). Post-Cold War studies started to pay attention again to different domestic processes and their effects. As Glenn observed, “[t]he mid-nineties witnessed the emergence of a new school of realists that sought to move beyond the basic insights of Waltzian neorealism by investigating the interaction of systemic pressures and domestic processes in the foreign policy decision making process, thus providing a much richer explanatory account of why states choose certain foreign policies over others” (2009: 523-551). From examining national strategic cultures, the theory can also be extended to cover strategic cultures of a particular state system. Here the concept of authoritarian strategic culture comes from the studies that produce characterizations of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Linz, 2000; Svolik, 2012; Brooker, 2014). There are national specificities when it comes to behavior, and there are specificities that are linked to the state system. The national specificities are more difficult to define due to the fact that culture as a concept is complex. A state system is relatively easier. A state system often defines the regime type as well as its relationship to civil society, opposition and the military.

This chapter begins by presenting the characteristics of hybrid threats, as identified in the authoritarian strategic thinking specifically in relation to Russia and Chinese traditions. Those characteristics are then put into the context of decision-making following David Omand’s Situation awareness, Explanation, Estimate and Strategic notice (SEES) model. In the third part, the challenges that the new information environment presents us are considered, and finally the chapter draws some conclusions relating to allied decision-making.

Hybrid Threats and Strategic Thinking As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter takes as its starting point the report “The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model”. The report does not claim to be an exhaustive source for the description of all the characteristics that hybrid threats might have, and there might be many more that have to do with the changing nature of the phenomenon. However, the report does identify five characteristics deemed to be the most important with respect to the challenges they pose to decision-making: Usage of multiple synchronized tools, used to create linear and non-linear effects; Ability to create ambiguity with plausible or implausible deniability and to hide true intent; Deliberate threshold manipulation and the use of grey zones like borders between war and peace, friend and enemy, virtual and real, internal and external, etc; Exploitation of the seams of democratic societies and the different jurisdictions (local, state, international); Use of decoys. These five challenges are all related to Russian and Chinese interference and influence traditions, which will be presented in the following sections. In turn, they are part of wider strategic culture, which is the product of a centuries-long dialogue between a people and its history (Gray, 2006: 15). Strategic culture is closely interlinked with the idea of national interests in a spatial context that is defined by potential threats, perceptions of friends and foes, traditions of alliances, and institutional linkages (Miklossy & Smith, 2020: 263).

Traditions of Chinese strategic thinking Since uncovering strategic culture is beyond the scope of this chapter, the approach is to present some dominant ideas that are still present today in Chinese thinking relating to interference, influence and winning conflicts and wars. The Chinese thinking presented here is based on three books; On Strategy Studies (2006) published by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army (2003), where the “Three Warfares” concept is introduced, and The seven military classics of Ancient China (2017), which presents seven texts from different times seen as cornerstones of Chinese military tradition. This is particularly relevant since President Xi Jingping has forbidden the use of foreign theory books in education and has mandated turning back to their own classics including those on strategy (Nojonen, 2019). Therefore, Chinese practitioners of strategy are actively studying their own classics in building a professional identity and practices based on the particular traditional conceptualization of the Chinese strategy work (Nojonen, 2019).

The book On Strategy Studies, published in Chinese, introduces the concept of “supraplanning”: a dynamic process towards a goal – and not a rigid adherence to a sequence of steps that is forever fixed and precisely worked out in advance. The authors outline three factors that determine the strategic behavior of the Chinese military: strategic thinking, strategic environment and military capacity. The book makes a point that the aim is “to lure the other side into developing misperceptions…and to [establish for oneself] a strategically advantageous position by producing various kinds of false phenomena in an organized and planned manner with the smallest cost in manpower and materials” (Detweiler, 2009: 10).

In analyzing Chinese strategic behavior, the authors argue that the tradition, understanding and practice of stratagems is the dominant pattern of Chinese strategy thinking. Based on the book, the characteristics of Chinese supraplanning are: a) resourcefulness and decisiveness; b) deep stratagems and distant deliberations; c) comprehensive planning and preparations; d) flexibility and ingenuity. It is important to note that different concepts found in traditional Chinese strategic thinking are presented in a dialectic way, such as “weakness and strength”, and “clandestine manoeuvres and open operations”. This means that concepts are not strictly defined, but rather remain borderless and ambivalent, creating ambiguity. Also, these concepts can be nouns and verbs at the same time; in other words, they can be both abstractions of cognitive processes as well as actual practices. This means that a solid picture of each given situation might be very difficult to form without a profound knowledge of Chinese language (Nojonen, 2019).

Also, the more well know Chinese concept of “Three Warfares”, in the book Political Work Guidelines, comprises three different components: Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare and Legal Warfare. The Three Warfare concept was first made official in the revisions of the PLA’s Political Work Regulations in 2003. - Psychological Warfare is defined as operations that achieve political and military aims by influencing a target’s psychology and behavior through the distribution of specific information. Situational awareness can be blurred with informational manipulation, and different biases can be supported. In this respect, the ‘targets’ are practitioners and decision-makers. Psychological Warfare methods include deterrence, coercion, deception, instigation, seduction, bribery, inducement and confusion. These methods are part of both theoretical and doctrinal descriptions. - Public Opinion Warfare is defined as operations aimed at influencing both domestic and international support with the use of selective information delivered through different media. This is different from psychological warfare in the way that it aims to control the masses. The main channels for this type of activity are the internet and traditional media sources, such as broadcasting and newspapers. Towards the public opinion, warfare concept channels also include international organizations and academic forums that can be used from within under a tailor-made approach. - Legal Warfare is used to attain legal superiority by using domestic and international law to gain a political initiative or military advantage. Rather than viewing law as a method of rational order- making, legal warfare looks for ways to use legal advantage to influence targets by delivering the effects of interference, response, defeat, deterrence, or defense via legal means, including through national or international channels.

The third book, The seven military classics of Ancient China, gives a comprehensive picture from a historical perspective of how Chinese rulers and generals have analyzed the best ways to keep power, get power, conquer land, defeat the enemy and gain control. The book includes Sun Tzu’s famous “Art of War”, and Huang Shigong’s “Three Strategies”, which discusses the Art of War. In the latter text, for example, the line “Follow their (enemy) trends in order to break them. Be wild with your words in order for them to make mistakes. Surround them with your net in order to catch them”, could be applied to today’s security environment, where the manipulation of information is based on the assumption that decision-makers will make mistakes that favor the actors providing misinformation. All these texts have psychological elements, search for weaknesses and look for ways to covertly succeed.

This snapshot of Chinese strategic thinking already shows that it will be very hard from outside China to identify actions that are seen and planned by Beijing to be borderless and ambivalent. Furthermore, different levels of decision-making are the main target. The various tools are designed to work in the way that situational awareness is blurred and context is lost, which means that estimates, warnings and preparedness in the target are incomplete.

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