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NATO AI cooperation is key to preserve democracy

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

The ongoing technological transformation has not only renewed great powers’ longforgotten competition in areas like technology, with the so-called AI race,330 but it has also given rise to new instruments for political competition and influence.331 The effect of these instruments is particularly subtle, because they undermine the very principles and institutions – such as democracy, freedom of speech and free markets – on which NATO is built and which, as an Alliance, it tries to promote.

Propaganda, disinformation, deception and counter-intelligence have always existed. However, the possibility of applying emerging technologies with disruptive potential to these domains is relatively unprecedented.332 For instance, forensic evidence related to popular digital platforms like WeChat and TikTok shows that specific hashtags, accounts or information have been suppressed by foreign actors or governments, likely for political reasons.333 Similarly, in the past few years, autocratic regimes have recurrently relied on chatbots, troll farms and diffusion of disinformation through Facebook or Twitter with a view to altering political competition within, and outside, NATO.

Second, key technologies related to AI, ML and BD, such as facial and speech recognition software, provide new opportunities for autocratic rulers to curtail individual freedoms, impose human rights abuses and implement societal control measures which would be deemed unacceptable within NATO. However, some countries are exporting those technologies around the world, thus making undermining democracy and freedom not only at home but also abroad.334

Last but not least, while economic competition and economic intelligence have long characterized statecraft and international relations, in an age when technology yields accelerating returns, adversaries and competitors can (and do) exploit free markets and open societies so as to steer chaos and appropriate foreign technology. This has nefarious implications for competitiveness as well as national security, given the dual nature of many technologies at hand.335

These are issues on which NATO and its Allies are in a sense caught unprepared. The dominant consensus has long held that digital technologies would undermine autocratic rule, and that that state-sponsored economic activities would struggle to keep pace with free markets.336 Recent history has proved both assumptions wrong. Firewalls can permit autocratic countries to control their internal flow of information. ML and BD can increase, rather than undermine, societal control. Free markets and open societies are vulnerable to uncompetitive and unfair measures and, such as theft of intellectual property or illicit transfer of technology, as well as to disinformation and propaganda, which are made more effective by digital platforms.

Whether these are examples of hybrid threats is an important discussion, which cannot be addressed here.337 NATO Allies, however, have important issues to discuss. Anti-fake software. We are all potential victims of disinformation. The evolution of disinformation, thanks to the development of generative adversian networks and the emergence of so-called deepfakes – videos that create artificial speeches over video clips of notable public individuals – is particularly worrying. For NATO, deepfakes could represent an existential threat as trust in political and social institutions could be dramatically undermined. One layer of defence for NATO could consist in promoting the development and adoption of an anti-fake software – i.e., one that can be easily installed on anyone’s phone or desktop as an alert system against seemingly illegitimate content. This could be funded as a pilot project or through a Grand Challenge. The goal would be to enable all individuals to be protected from disinformation attacks. Self-evidently, the software, its code as well as its parameters must be sufficiently open and transparent to enable public scrutiny.338

Algorithmic principles. NATO Allies have a strong interest in agreeing on, and setting out, a series of principles and actions to stop their companies supporting, even unintentionally, the rise of digital authoritarianism. In particular, it is important to ensure that their technologies or services be prevented from enabling the use of AI for purposes which go against NATO values and principles, such as mass societal control or suppression of free speech.

Cyber security and investments screening. Cyber attacks, theft of intellectual property as well as well illicit transfer of technology, including through mergers and acquisitions of foreign companies, have grown exponentially in recent years. Such tactics undermine economic competition and are extremely perilous from a security perspective, given that they make it possible to bypass measures such as technology export control regimes. NATO and its Allies have a strong interest in strengthening the cyber defence of their companies. This may imply, for start-ups and small and medium enterprises, various incentives to build up their cyber security, as well as direct government support. At the same time, a NATOwide effort towards the screening of foreign companies’ investments and acquisitions is important to counter illicit transfer of technology: cooperation with the European Union would be important in this respect.339

A technological alliance of democracies. As highlighted in previous sections, the challenge facing NATO and its Allies is massive, sudden, subtle and multidimensional. In some areas, intra-Alliance cooperation and coordination combined with powerful initiatives will not suffice, as close work with the private sector and with external partners will be necessary. This is why a group of prominent researchers have proposed a technological alliance of democracies, to better address the threats and challenges we are facing.340 The role of NATO outside its borders – and the Euro-Atlantic area more generally – is admittedly a sensitive issue, on which multiple perspectives and sensitivities co-exist. However, there is room for the Alliance to play a more proactive role around the world in upholding, mostly through diplomacy, the very principles on which it is based: democracy, free markets, rule of law and human rights.

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