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Democracy key to growth---their ev uses bad models

Daron Acemoglu et al 19, Professor of Economics at MIT. Suresh Naidu Columbia University Pascual Restrepo Boston University James A. Robinson University of Chicago. Journal of Political Economy "Democracy Does Cause Growth" //pipk

We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score reweighting strategy as well as an instrumental-variables strategy using regional waves of democratization. The effects are similar across different levels of development and appear to be driven by greater investments in capital, schooling, and health.

I. Introduction With the spectacular economic growth under nondemocracy in China, the eclipse of the Arab Spring, and the recent rise of populist politics in Europe and the United States, the view that democratic institutions are at best irrelevant and at worst a hindrance for economic growth has become increasingly popular in both academia and policy discourse. For example, the prominent New York Times columnist Tom Friedman (2009) argues that “one-party nondemocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages. That one party can just impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward in the 21st century.” Robert Barro (1997, 1) states this view even more boldly: “More political rights do not have an effect on growth.”

Although some recent contributions estimate a positive effect of democracy on growth, the pessimistic view of the economic implications of democracy is still widely shared. From their review of the academic literature until the mid-2000s, Gerring et al. (2005, 323) conclude that “the net effect of democracy on growth performance cross-nationally over the last five decades is negative or null.”

In this paper, we challenge this view. Using a panel of countries from 1960 to 2010, we estimate the impact on economic growth of the unprecedented spread of democracy around the world that took place in the past 50 years. The evidence suggests that democracy does cause growth and that its effect is significant and sizable.1 Our estimates imply that a country that transitions from nondemocracy to democracy achieves about 20 percent higher GDP per capita in the next 25 years than a country that remains a nondemocracy. The effect of democracy does not depend on the initial level of economic development, although we find some evidence that democracy is more conducive to growth in countries with greater levels of secondary education.

The estimation of the causal effect of democracy (or a democratization) on GDP faces several challenges. First, existing democracy indices are subject to considerable measurement error, leading to spurious changes in democracy scores that do not correspond to real changes in democratic institutions.

Second, democracies differ from nondemocracies in unobserved characteristics, such as institutional, historical, and cultural aspects, that also have an impact on their GDP. As a result, cross-country regressions, as those in Barro (1996, 1999), could be biased and are unlikely to reveal the causal effect of democracy on growth. Recent studies tackle this problem by using difference-in-differences or panel data estimates with country fixed effects.

Third, as shown in figure 1, as well as in Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Brückner and Ciccone (2011), democratizations are, on average, preceded by a temporary dip in GDP. This figure depicts GDP dynamics in countries that democratized at year 0 relative to other countries that remained nondemocratic at the time. The pattern in this figure implies that failure to properly model GDP dynamics, or the propensity to democratize based on past GDP, will lead to biased estimates of democracy on GDP. Though largely overlooked in previous work, the dip in GDP that precedes a democratization constitutes a clear violation of the paralleltrends assumption that underlies the difference-in-differences or panel data estimates used in the literature. Modeling GDP dynamics would also enable an investigation of whether the impact of democratization on GDP is short-lived or gradual.

Last but not least, even if we control for country fixed effects and GDP dynamics, changes in democracy could be driven by time-varying unobservables related to future economic conditions, potentially leading to biased estimates.

In this paper, we address these challenges. We build on the important work by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) to develop a dichotomous measure of democracy, which combines several indices to purge spurious changes in each. We rely on this measure for most of our analysis but also document the robustness of our results to other measures of democracy in the online appendix.

There is no perfect strategy for tackling the remaining challenges and estimating the causal effect of democracy on GDP. Our approach is to use a number of different strategies, which reassuringly all give similar results. Our first approach uses a dynamic (linear) panel model for GDP, which includes both country fixed effects and autoregressive dynamics. The underlying economic assumption here is that, conditional on the lags of GDP and country fixed effects, countries that change their democratic status are not on a differential GDP trend (and thus these lags successfully model the dip in GDP that precedes democratizations shown in fig. 1). This strategy leads to robust and precise estimates that indicate that in the 25 years following a permanent democratization, GDP per capita is about 20 percent higher than it would be otherwise.

Our second strategy adopts a semiparametric treatment effects framework in which democratization—the treatment—influences the distribution of potential GDP in all subsequent years. This strategy requires us to model the process of selection into democracy as a function of observables, in particular, lags of GDP (e.g., Jordà 2005; Angrist and Kuersteiner 2011; Kline 2011), but it does not rely on a parametric model for the dynamics of GDP, which affords us greater flexibility in estimating the time path of the impact of democracy on GDP. Related to our first approach, the economic assumption in this case is that, conditional on the lags of GDP, countries that democratize are not on a differential GDP trend relative to other nondemocracies. We show that this approach successfully controls for the influence of the dip in GDP preceding democratizations shown in figure 1 and estimates that after a democratization, GDP increases gradually until it reaches a level 20–25 percent higher than what it would reach otherwise.

These two strategies model the selection of countries into different regimes and control for the dip in GDP in figure 1 as a function of their re cent GDP per capita and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. However, they do not tackle the possibility that both democracy and GDP might be affected by time-varying omitted variables. Our third strategy confronts this challenge by using an instrumental-variables (IV) approach. The political science literature emphasizes that transitions to democracy often take place in regional waves (e.g., Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996). On the basis of this observation, we use regional waves in transitions to and away from democracy as an instrument for country-level democracy. Our IV strategy exploits the diffusion of political regimes across countries in the same region and with common political histories. We pay special attention to distinguishing the diffusion of democracy from the role of regional economic shocks or the spread of economic conditions to nearby countries through trade and other mechanisms. By focusing on the variation created by regional waves of democratizations, our IV strategy ensures that idiosyncratic changes in a country’s political regime that may be endogenous to its growth do not bias our estimates. The resulting estimates of the impact of democracy on GDP are similar to those from our other two strategies: in our preferred specification, a democratization increases GDP per capita by about 25 percent in the first 25 years—although in some specifications the estimated effects are larger. This similarity bolsters our confidence that all three of our strategies are estimating the causal effect of democracy on GDP.

We further investigate the channels through which democracy increases GDP. Although our findings here are less clear-cut than our baseline results, they suggest that democracy contributes to growth by increasing investment, encouraging economic reforms, improving the provision of schooling and health care, and reducing social unrest. These results are consistent with, though of course do not prove, the hypothesis that democracies invest more in broad-based public goods and are more likely to enact economic reforms that would otherwise be resisted by politically powerful actors (e.g., Acemoglu 2008). Although nondemocracies could also invest in public goods or enact far-ranging economic reforms, our results indicate that, at least in our sample, these countries are less likely to do so than democracies.

At the end of the paper, we turn to the common claim that democracy constrains economic growth for countries with low levels of development (e.g., Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2008; Posner 2010; Brooks 2013). Our results do not support this view, but we do find that democracy has a larger impact on growth in countries where a greater fraction of the population has secondary schooling.

There is a substantial literature in political science that investigates, but does not reach a firm conclusion on, the empirical linkages between democracy and economic outcomes, summarized in part in Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and in Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu’s (2008) meta-analysis.

Cross-country regression analyses, such as Helliwell (1994), Barro (1996, 1999), and Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), have produced negative, though generally inconsistent, results.2 More recent work, including Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), and Bates, Fayad, and Hoeffler (2012), estimate positive effects using panel data techniques, although Murtin and Wacziarg (2014), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) estimate insignificant effects on growth using similar strategies.3 These and other papers in this literature differ in their measure of democracy and choice of specifications and neither systematically control for the dynamics of GDP nor address the endogeneity of democratizations. Although some of the papers in this literature control for lags of GDP in some of their specifications (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2006; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Murtin and Wacziarg 2014), they do not emphasize the importance of GDP dynamics and the bias that results from not appropriately controlling for the dip in GDP shown in figure 1. The failure to recognize this point may, in fact, explain the divergent results in the literature: because growth rates are less serially correlated than GDP, contributions that focus on growth as the dependent variable tend to find positive effects, while studies that estimate models in levels generally find no effects—unless they model the dynamics of GDP as we do.

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