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Evaluate securitization by weighing the truth claims of our advantages and the ability of our plan to solve---our framework solves the impacts to securitization better than theirs---securitizing objective threats to democracy is good

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

The project of establishing a list of criteria that can be used to determine the moral rightness of securitization should be seen as related to work in just war theory, where a list of criteria is used to determine the morality of war. Indeed, some of my criteria are very similar to those proposed by just war theorists. My appropriateness-of-response criterion, broken down into measured response and sincerity, for example, can be found in many writings on just war, while my requirement for the existence of an objective existential threat is comparable to the criterion of just cause. This suggests that certain things that hold true for just war theory could also apply to a just securitization theory. At the very least, they can be used to argue the case in favour of such a theory, while they also suggest what kind of criticisms might be levelled against what is attempted here.

The greatest success of just war theory – at least in the West – is that it has come to inform the practice of war, as decisions about war and how to fight it are made with reference to that theory. In Michael Walzer’s (2002: 933) words, ‘Moral theory has been incorporated into war-making as a real constraint on when and how wars are fought.’ A related positive consequence has been that just war theory has helped democratize war-making, insofar as citizens that are well versed in the ideas of a just war can and repeatedly do hold decisionmakers accountable for their actions. The outcry of the British public over the 2003 Iraq war serves as a useful example.

All this could hold true for a just securitization theory. Not only does such a theory promise to morally constrain securitization, making its occurrence less likely, but also general knowledge of such a theory could help to democratize the process of securitization itself. Both results are desirable because, like war – and regardless of what analysts might wish – securitizations are a recurrent feature of international relations, and the abnegation of moral reflection on securitization is simply not an option (see Rengger, 2002: 363). With this in mind, I will now discuss my three criteria in detail.

Objective existential threats Objective existential threats are threats to the existence of actors and orders regardless of whether anyone has realized this. To give an example, suppose I am exposed to lethal levels of radiation in an area where radiation levels are not normally checked, which leaves my exposure undetected. Given that I can neither smell nor see radiation, I am unlikely to be aware of it, yet my obliviousness is not going to save my life.

Objective existential threats become matters of security, and therefore ‘security threats’, only when a powerful actor frames and responds to them as such. Importantly, not all objective existential threats become security issues: Some are treated as health issues, others as police matters, and some may well be ignored. The reverse also holds, and not everything that is securitized necessarily refers to an objective existential threat; some security threats refer to perceived threats only.

Securitization can be justified as the right thing to do only if it refers to an objective existential threat. This is because the killing of innocent persons (directly or as ‘collateral damage’) that might well be an extraordinary measure resulting from securitization cannot be morally justified unless there is an objective existential threat. Once again, the storm that has erupted over the 2003 Iraq invasion is a case in point. Here, precisely the fact that lies about the existence of weapons of mass destruction artificially heightened the acuteness of the threat renders the whole endeavour and its consequences morally untenable.

How, then, can we find out whether a securitization refers to an objective existential threat or merely to a perceived threat? First, we need to figure out whether the aggressor really intends to destroy a given referent object. Second, we need to examine whether or not the aggressor has the means (capability) to do so.4 It should be clear that both of these conditions will have to be met at the same time.5 In the absence of any intention to harm A, the capabilities of B pose no danger to A. And the absence or lack of capabilities amounts to the same as insincerity. Insincerity in turn renders the threat non-objective.

In line with my revision of securitization theory, outlined above, I propose that just as we can get at the intentions of securitizing actors, we can get at the intentions of aggressors by comparing what they say with what they do. And, by ‘doing’ I mean a relevant behavioural change made by the aggressor, or by some entity instructed by the aggressor, in response to the threat. Discrepancies between what aggressors say and the actions they subsequently take to follow through on a threat are vital, as they suggest insincerity.

Having assessed the intentions of aggressors, we need to continue by assessing their capabilities. Within a state-centric context, traditionalists have made advances that are instructive for our purposes. Zeev Moaz (2009), for example, assesses capabilities by examining the level of manpower an aggressor has available for military service, along with its weapons capability, military budget, population size and political capacity to mobilize for national security. Capability assessment is easier in the context of the state, where data are more freely available, including from independent sources. In a non-state context, however, the analyst will have to try to figure out things such as the size of the aggressor (how many people subscribe to the cause), what the aggressor has done in the past, what kinds of states/organizations it is friendly with, and what we know about the latter.

To illustrate how we might proceed, let us consider the case of Al-Qaeda and whether it poses an objective existential threat to civilians in the West. Like most terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda’s leadership has never made a secret of its intentions, having called on all Muslims to kill all Americans and their allies in order to liberate Islamic countries (Bin Laden, 2006: 296). A series of bombings/attacks provides conclusive evidence that they are sincere, as their words are matched by actions. These attacks also leave us with ideas about the organization’s capabilities: not only do they show ingenuity insofar as Al-Qaeda has transformed conventional means (passenger airplanes) into weapons, they also show that the organization’s biggest capability consists of human beings prepared to die for the cause. To summarize, as long as Al-Qaeda’s intentions do not change and as long as they are able to recruit new potential suicide bombers, they constitute an objective existential threat to at least some civilians in the West.

Objective existential threat analysis is not easy. Importantly, discourse analysis of publically available texts alone may not suffice here; instead, researchers might have to conduct interviews with relevant people and, if possible, analyse documents that are not in the public domain.6 Given this, it will be much easier to judge the morality of securitizations with hindsight, when information tends to be more freely available.

Legitimate referent objects My second requirement for moral securitizations is that the referent object of security is morally legitimate (hereafter legitimate). Inspired by consequentialism, I hold that a referent object of security is legitimate only if it is conducive to human well-being.7 This is based on the humanistic principle that holds ‘that the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality’ (Raz, 1986: 194).

Note that rather than subjective levels of ‘happiness’ or ‘life satisfaction’, I am interested in objective levels of well-being. In Amartya Sen’s terminology, my concern is with a person’s freedom (capabilities), which leaves them in a position ‘to promote or achieve objectives they value’ (functionings) (Alkire, 2002: 4). What matters, in short, is the capability to flourish.

There is, however, no consensus among the many people who have devised lists of capabilities/ human needs/human values (see Alkire, 2002: 78–84). But, it seems to me that different human needs (the term I prefer) are either more or less basic to well-being. Among the most basic of all human needs is the one that enables us to function as humans (Doyal and Gough, 1991). But, what is it to be human? James Griffin (2008: 32) offers a convincing answer when he suggests that what makes us human, and thus different from other sentient creatures, is the ability to make autonomous decisions: Human life is different from the life of other animals. We humans have a conception of ourselves and our past and future. We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what the good life would be…. And we try to realise these pictures. [Our status as human beings] centres on our being agents – deliberating, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good life for ourselves.

Importantly, however, autonomy is not exclusively internal to the agent. Rather, different political regimes and structures are more or less good at encouraging and fostering autonomous behaviour (Doyal and Gough, 1991). Joseph Raz (1986: 391) puts it as follows: a person lives autonomously if he conducts himself in a certain way … and lives in a certain environment, an environment which respects the condition of independence, and furnishes him with an adequate range of options. In other words, in the absence of the necessary options I cannot lead an autonomous life, which is why autonomy is not only what makes us human but simultaneously a basic human need that must be satisfied if the objective is well-being.

The two ideas that have contributed most to providing individuals with options and therefore autonomy are liberal democracy and human rights. The latter foster autonomy by their very nature: they are based on the principle of the equality of all people, which entails that everyone is entitled to live a life of their own choosing, provided of course that this life does not infringe upon anyone else’s life choices (Donnelly, 1998: 44). It is also widely acknowledged that liberal democracy is intimately connected with autonomy, as liberal democracies are inseparable from certain individual liberties, including the right to free speech and the right to vote (Waldron, 2002; see also Dahl, 1998; Raz, 1986).

Such normative arguments are backed by empirical evidence, as it has been conclusively shown that liberal democracies generally do better than non-democracies in terms of providing people with the conditions and options that foster autonomy, including education, physical security, meaningful employment and economic security (Przeworski et al., 2000; Doyal and Gough, 1991). It is, hence, possible to argue, for example, that none of the North African states experiencing popular uprisings in the spring of 2011 qualifies as a legitimate referent object of security, precisely because those uprisings have been based on demands for democracy, economic security and respect for human rights.

To summarize, the moral rightness of securitization is in part a function of the legitimacy of the referent object, and legitimacy in turn is a function of the referent object being conducive to human well-being. Well-being is highest and most sustainably ensured in liberal democracies and when actors endorse human rights. The presence of liberal democracy and the honouring of human rights therefore serve as helpful indicators of human well-being in any given context.

Appropriateness of response The distinguishing characteristic of securitization is that it justifies the breaking of established rules and regulations in an effort to ensure the referent object’s survival. To achieve the desired goal, the emergency measures taken may even be extraordinary in nature. If our concern is with the morality of securitization, however, even the response to objective existential threats is not free from requirements. There are two such requirements: The first is that the degree of response must be measured to the threat in question. Not even the existence of objective existential threats automatically justifies a response that is equal to the action of the aggressor in both means and degree. A response is measured if it takes account of the capabilities of the aggressor. Depending on those capabilities, a measured response could be either more severe than the initial attack/threat or less so. One example of a measured response was Operation ‘Deny Flight’, when the UN Security Council imposed and NATO enforced a no-fly zone to protect civilians from aerial bombings during the Bosnian war (1992–5).

The second requirement is that the response must genuinely aim at addressing the threat. The securitizing actor must seriously intend to secure the referent object they themselves identified. Securitization does not necessarily benefit the referent object but can instead benefit the agent, as when the securitizing actor uses securitization to further his or her own ends with no intention of safeguarding the referent object of security (Floyd, 2010). We can test for the intentions of securitizing actors by examining whether or not a securitization is consistent in its own terms. This is done by comparing and contrasting what a securitizing actor says about a particular threat (securitizing move) with what they do in response to that threat (security practice). The securitizing actor is sincere only if the response matches the securitizing move. An example where this was not the case is provided by US environmental security policy under the Clinton administrations. The administrations indentified environmental security threats as acute, yet what was done in the name of environmental security barely addressed any of the threats. Indeed, the real beneficiary of such policies was the US national security establishment, not the American people, which was the stated referent object of security (Floyd, 2010: 118).

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