No internal link from our securitizing move to securitization by the state---we’re policy analysts, we can’t securitize---our framework for links solves political efficacy of securitization---no discourse links, our speech act is a normative argument as part of policy analysis and doesn’t actually cause securitization
Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk
Postulating what we should be worried about is certainly one way of conducting normative security theory. Yet, there are other forms of normative analysis, and in this article I am offering a set of criteria that permit the analyst to evaluate whether a particular securitization is or was morally right/justifiable. Inspired by just war theory, where it is argued that, among other criteria, a just cause and the right intention determine the morality of war, I argue that there are three criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization: (1) there must be an objective existential threat, which is to say a threat that endangers the survival of a an actor or an order regardless of whether anyone has realized this; (2) the referent object of security must be morally legitimate, which is the case only when the referent object is conducive to human well-being defined as the satisfaction of human needs; and (3) the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question, which is to say that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions. I argue that a securitization is morally right only if all three of the above criteria are fulfilled at the same time. I also argue that a securitization theory complemented by a normative extension of this type would enable analysts to hold securitizing actors accountable, which would render the theory more policy relevant than is currently the case.
It is, however, not possible to extend the Copenhagen School’s original version of securitization theory by the aforementioned three criteria, as that theory precludes objective threat assessment and the School rejects the theorization of securitizing actors’ intentions. In short, original securitization theory cannot be used in normative analysis in the exact way suggested in this article; rather, my three criteria represent a further development of the revised securitization theory that I have developed elsewhere (Floyd, 2010). Given that it will feature as part of the argument set forth in this article, it will be useful to briefly recite my revision here.
My revised version of securitization theory was informed by the central insight that a securitization cannot simultaneously operate as an illocutionary speech act and be dependent on the speech act’s acceptance by the relevant audience, because the illocution denies a meaningful role for the audience (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007). My solution to this conundrum was to bracket the audience from the securitization process.1 This can be done because the audience is not an analytical concept, but rather a normative concept in analytical disguise, which is to say that it does not stem from actual empirical observation of how politics operates but rather from Ole Wæver’s view of how politics, including security policy, should be done (Floyd, 2010: 50). Moreover, the idea that securitization operates like an illocutionary speech act also conflicts with the distinction often made by members of the School between a securitizing move and a complete securitization, because if it is ‘the utterance itself that is the act’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) then the speech act is tantamount to the complete securitization and any distinction redundant. In an effort to uphold this distinction, I suggested that it is not securitization that is an illocution; rather, it is the securitizing move alone that is the illocutionary speech act part of securitization. I argued that by framing an issue in security mode (in terms of an existential threat and a point of no return), the securitizing actor does something insofar as he or she issues a warning to the aggressor and/or promises protection to the referent object of security. A securitization is complete only if the warning/promise made in the speech act is followed up by a change in relevant behaviour by a relevant agent (the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same) that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat. I called this second step security practice. My revised securitization theory thus holds that securitization = securitizing move + security practice (Floyd, 2010: 52–4)
One advantage of this revision is that it makes it possible to examine whether a securitizing actor is sincere. That is, do particular actors really intend to safeguard the referent objects of security they have themselves identified or did they securitize the given objects for different reasons altogether? The key to uncovering sincerity is to examine whether the rhetoric of the speech act is matched by subsequent security practice. Otherwise inexplicable discrepancy suggests insincerity,2 while continuity suggests sincerity.
Another advantage is that my revised securitization theory rejects the idea that language has securitizing force. Consequently, under my framework, the analyst remains functionally distinct from the securitizing actor at all times, including when he or she performs a securitizing move, which amounts to nothing more than a warning.3 And, while it is of course possible that a security analyst can convince decisionmakers of his or her opinion, even this does not make the analyst synonymous with the securitizing actor, because under my framework securitization exists not at the point of the speech act but only when a relevant actor changes his or her own behaviour in response to the existential threat justification. With the analyst not involved in securitization every time he or she makes a normative argument, my revised securitization theory offers a better starting point for normative analysis than the original formulation.
Although my revised securitization theory rivals original securitization theory insofar as it builds on a different understanding of what securitization means, it too aims to enable analysts to examine the process of securitization. In short, it too is an analytical security theory. The just securitization theory proposed here, however, is altogether different: it is a normative theory that aims to enable analysts to judge the moral rightness of any given securitization.
While the three criteria I propose are incompatible with original securitization theory, the idea of developing criteria by which securitization can be judged is not. This is the case because what I propose retains the functional distinction between the securitizing actor – the actor who makes the decision on what is securitized – and the security analyst – who merely sets the criteria for when an issue is securitized. If the securitization analyst can set criteria for the existence of securitization and its success, there is no reason why he or she should not also be able to set criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization.