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Only our framework determines the ballot---their kritik without our criteria is just an FYI---securitization analysis solves better than desecuritization

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

Another more general critique that could be advanced against what is proposed here is that a normative extension of securitization theory confuses the aim of original securitization theory, which is to enable analysts to examine how securitization plays out in practice. While the latter is indeed quite different from what I am trying to achieve here, it is also the case that my argument sits neatly within a wider ‘securitization studies’, the realm wherein the securitization theorist can move from merely observing what is going on to making normative recommendations (Taureck, 2006: 59–60). The latter is desirable because it may not always be satisfying to end one’s analysis without a word regarding the moral rightness of the securitization one has spent (often considerable) time researching. In any case, having an informed opinion on the rightness of a political decision is better than silence, which could be mistaken for approval.

There are reasons to believe that the Copenhagen School would concur with such a view. This is most clearly evinced by the fact that they do not feel obliged to agree with all or any securitization. Indeed, ‘one of the purposes of [the securitization] approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This suggests that although the School’s view of security politics is considered ‘neutral’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 38), normative evaluation is considered desirable, even necessary, and indeed a normative preference can be found in most of its members’ writings.

A key reason why this is the case is that under securitization theory language is believed to have securitizing force, which is to say that the securitization analyst simply by writing or speaking about security brings about securitization (Huysmans, 1999). The latter is problematic for the analyst, given that securitization can be abused by ethically undesirable groups. It is only natural that the securitization analyst will want to distance him- or herself from furthering the causes of such groups, and that can be done only by making a normative statement about the securitization in question. Members of the Copenhagen School do this by challenging all securitizations as negative developments, because in their view securitization leads to de-democratization and potentially a multiplication of the number of security dilemmas found in the world. In response to such negative developments, the securitization analyst is meant to point out that securitization is always a political choice and that actors should solve their differences by ordinary political means. In short, the School advocates desecuritization, the process whereby formerly securitized issues move back into the sphere of normal politics, where they are dealt with by ordinary measures once more.

Objection 5: Desecuritization is an appropriate normative strategy The Copenhagen School’s preference for desecuritization, however, is somewhat more nuanced than the previous section might suggest. After all, its members hold that desecuritization is better only ‘if all other things are equal’, while they also recognize that this is not often the case and that the mobilization power inherent in securitization can be used for good ends (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Nevertheless, these important qualifications do not change the fact that on a level playing field desecuritization is the School’s preferred option.

I take issue with the claim that desecuritization is better in principle for two reasons: first, desecuritization does not necessarily lead to politicization (Floyd, 2010: 57); second, from a moral point of view, ‘desecuritization as politicization’ is not necessarily preferable to ‘desecuritization as depoliticization’ (Floyd, 2007: 343n56).

Desecuritization as a normative strategy is problematic for yet a third reason. Informed by the observation that there are no objective security threats, desecuritization as a normative strategy works by depriving securitizing actors of the ability to ‘hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). Accordingly, why should actors be allowed to turn anything into a security issue if it can be shown that there are no security threats per se, and that all security threats exist in the securitizing actor’s own head (and, later, in the heads of the relevant audience)? The Copenhagen School’s preoccupation with security operating in this way and no other, however, has left its members blind to the fact that while there may be no objective security threats, there still exist objective existential threats (see Balzacq, 2005: 181). Consequently, they cannot see that a securitization that refers to an objective existential threat is distinct from one that refers to a perceived threat only, and that some such threats are best addressed in security mode.

Conclusion It has been the aim of this article to develop securitization theory in such a way that securitization analysts can normatively evaluate securitizations without assuming the role of the securitizing actor and without postulating what we should be worried about. I have argued that setting criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization is akin to the Copenhagen School setting criteria that determine both the existence of securitization and its success.

I have further argued that the strict confines of the Copenhagen School’s version of securitization theory necessitate a move away from this original securitization theory to a revised version that holds that securitization = securitizing move (existential threat justification that amounts to no more than a warning or a promise) + security practice (a change of relevant behaviour by a relevant agent that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat). The revision was necessary because, in order to examine the moral rightness of securitization, the analyst must: (1) establish whether or not existential threats are objectively present; (2) examine both the intentions of aggressors and those of securitizing actors; and (3) identify universal values that determine the referent object’s moral legitimacy. Members of the Copenhagen School would be deeply uncomfortable with all parts of this analysis, as they go against some of the fundamental principles and beliefs underlying original securitization theory, as well as some of the intellectual ancestors of the theory (see Floyd, 2010: 9–23).

I have also argued that a just securitization theory of the kind proposed here renders securitization theory more policy relevant, and that such a theory has the potential to democratize the process of securitization. But one look at the many writings and further theorizations of the role and nature of the audience suggests that such democratization is deemed desirable by many scholars working on securitization theory.

Beyond this, I would also suggest that a just securitization theory has implications for security studies more generally. Securitization theory has established itself as one of the most influential non-traditional security theories in existence. The idea that security is a self-referential practice, the related rejection of objective threat assessment, and not least the preference for desecuritization have meant that securitization theory is often classified as part of the post-structuralist end of critical security studies, yet in its original formulation the theory is conceived as a third way between critical and traditional security studies (Buzan et al., 1998: 203–12). Notably, at its less extreme end, critical security studies includes objectivist formulations of security – for example, the one proposed by the Welsh School. A just securitization theory invites both traditionalists (because of the inclusion of objective existential threats) and those at the moderate end of critical security studies (the Welsh School’s concept of emancipation is similar to my formulation of human well-being as satisfaction of human needs)11 back to the table, making securitization theory attractive to a wider audience. Whether any of these theorists will become interested in the ideas of securitization theory remains to be seen; for certain is that just as just war theory is increasingly complemented by arguments for postwar justice (jus post bellum), a just securitization theory will have to be complemented by criteria that determine just desecuritization.

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