Defense cooperation key
Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey 20, concurrent Master of Public Policy and Juris Doctorate 2024 candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School and recipient of Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Fellowship. She previously worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman where she focused on regulatory risk and global data protection for financial institutions. She also worked at the Department of State. Her research with the Belfer Cyber Project includes AI policy, cybersecurity, US-Russian cyber relations, and US foreign policy in the digital age. a dual Master degree in International Affairs candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the University of St. Gallen and was a Belfer Cyber Security Project research assistant. He previously worked for the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs in Washington D.C. and currently works as a researcher for the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The Cyber Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School. "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" August. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf //pipk
The US defense sector and the EU340 have separately recognized the importance of AI innovation and adoption. The Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes the need for the Department to modernize its programs and address changing threats posed by new technologies like AI.341 The accompanying DOD Artificial Intelligence Strategy stressed that AI will change “the character of the future battlefield and the pace of threats” the US will face. Therefore, the AI Strategy outlined the need to develop and adopt AI to strengthen the DOD’s capabilities, enhance and streamline businesses processes through AI and ML applications, cultivate its AI workforce, engage with industry and allies to enhance capabilities and security, and lead in military ethics around AI.342 To lead defense-related AI efforts, the DOD created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018 to: 1) accelerate the operationalization and adoption of AI across the DOD, 2) establish a “common foundation” to enable the DOD to scale AI’s impact, 3) coordinate the DOD’s AI priorities, and 4) attract and foster leading AI talent.343 The US has undertaken extensive AI and ML-related R&D and, as mentioned in the United States Government Funding section, defense-related AI R&D appears344 to be larger than non-defense AI R&D. For example, DARPA’s AI Next Campaign—launched in 2018—focuses on improving the security, robustness, and reliability of AI and ML while decreasing the required computing resources, while its Artificial Intelligence Exploration (AIE) funds academia and small industry for high-risk, high-reward projects.345
The EU is less advanced in developing an AI strategy for the defense sector. This broadly stems from its comparatively more nascent defense industry and differing opinions between EU Member States on AI’s defense applications. In 2017, the EU established the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to bolster its security, defense industry, and strategic autonomy.346 EDF and PESCO, as Ulrike Franke, Policy Fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations explains, are vehicles to establish greater European defense collaboration, but these vehicles are not as developed or unified as other defense cooperative mechanisms or alliances like NATO.347 Furthermore, European Member States disagree about the role AI should play in the defense sector, with some countries extremely averse to the idea of developing lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) given the trope of the “killer robot.”348
Joint US-EU defense-related AI efforts appear sparse,349 however there is a growing push particularly from the US and NATO to increase transatlantic defense cooperation on AI. The aforementioned DOD Artificial Intelligence Strategy stressed the importance the US and allied partners to “maintain its strategic position to prevail in future battlefields and safeguard a free and open international order.”350 Growing Chinese and Russia aggression and weaponization of new technologies like AI is a central motivation for the US government’s push to strengthen the international AI alliance.351 Acting Director of JAIC Nand Mulchandani explains that collaboration with European partners on AI is necessary for three main reasons. First, joint AI R&D and adoption efforts are important for developing strong capabilities and bolstering transatlantic hard power. Second, leading AI capabilities--among the US and its allies--acts as a deterrent for conflict. Third, if deterrence fails, AI-related interoperability and capabilities are necessary if the US and its allies must go to war. A military alliance cannot be lopsided and unequal AI adoption may hinder the tactical aspects of conflict.352 During the already mentioned recent visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Former Director of the JAIC Lt. Gen. Shanahan had collaborative engagements with European allies and NATO around the importance of AI joint efforts, ensuring military interoperability, and the convergence of Europe’s AI ethical principles with the DOD’s five principles of AI ethics.353 The visit appeared to increase NATO’s focus on devising an AI strategy for the Alliance.354 Despite these positive steps, there are still concerns about potential obstacles to increased defense collaboration, particularly around IP ownership and funding restrictions that may exclude US involvement in EDF and PESCO.355, 356
Overall, as noted in the US-EU roadmap for S&T, the volume and intensity of transatlantic scientific and technology collaboration has increased since the 1990s. Most notably, it has blossomed in areas where interests— whether strategic, societal, or economic—of both sides of the Atlantic overlap (e.g., in the health, environmental sciences, and energy sectors). However, in the case of AI there seems to be a large imbalance between the level, intensity, and volume of cooperation relative to the importance of AI. Indeed, both the US and the EU recognize AI’s transformative potential and share interests in its development and deployment. Yet transatlantic cooperation on AI is still its infancy—at least compared to other technological sectors. As a result, it has plenty of room to grow. Deepening this collaboration will not only require proactive efforts but also strategic endeavors to overcome the existing underlying challenges to collaboration.