Export controls are bad---undermine innovation, can’t solve the case
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
Arms control. There have been various calls to adapt different types of arms control regime to AI. Reciprocity, monitoring and compliance pose key challenges here. How can we trust countries that have not complied with existing arms control regimes to respect new ones? How can we convince countries that do not want to enter existing arms control regimes to join new ones? Cooperation, political scientists note, is a matter of interest and trust: any control regime not built on these two pillars is doomed to fail.269 At this stage, it is difficult to find the political conditions conducive to either. There is, however, an additional problem.
Weapons or technology control? Lethal autonomous weapons are a type of military equipment which is hence subjected to clear and existing rules and regulations – both domestic and international – related to the sale, export and transfer of military technology. The key argument for banning lethal autonomous weapons, however, builds on a different logic: the dual-use nature of the constituent technologies favors its swift, and to some extent subtle, diffusion. In terms of inputs, the AI Inputs Triad is based on algorithms, data and microprocessors – although human capital should not be underestimated.270 Banning the weapons without underlying controlling the technology risks being ineffective, at best, and counterproductive, at worst, as it may increase the incentives to countries or actors to source key component technologies and undertake research on their integration so as to neutralize the effects of a ban.
Technology control regime. The above discussion on the dual-use nature of the AI Input Triad has led some to recommend tight control regimes on the export of AI-related technologies. While there is an obviously strong rationale for this line of thinking, its very ease of execution brings its own risks.271 NATO Allies admittedly have a strong interest in preserving international stability and preventing malicious actors from possessing capabilities that may be conducive to destabilizing activities. However, NATO Allies are in this position because of their technological prowess: any export control regime should therefore take into account the possible effects on the Allies’ industrial base and their longerterm implications. Were NATO Allies to lose their technological primacy, their political power – including the capacity to restrict the spread of sensitive technologies – would be undermined. In this respect, it is useful to divide the discussion into the component items conceptualized in the AI Input Triad – data, algorithms and processors.