“Empirical evidence” can’t prove the internal psyche of states.
Abulof ’15 — Uriel; associate professor at Tel-Aviv University's School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs. He is a LISD research fellow at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School and at the Truman Institute. July 16, 2015; “The Malpractice of “Rationality” in International Relations”; Rationality and Society, Volume 25, Issue 3; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang
What is the purpose (or scholarly function) of ascribing rationality? Two aims are plain: describing/explaining or prescribing (wherein the actor or act either is, or ought to be, rational). Stein (1999) observes a curious shift: “What started as a normative enterprise has become a positive one. Tools once created to improve the quality of otherwise imperfect human decision making are now being used to explain choice” (p. 212). But this trend is more intricate. In principle, many contemporary RCT scholars agree that “rational-choice theory is first and foremost normative. It tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible” (Elster, 1989: 3). Still, in practice, RCT scholarship abounds in descriptive and explanatory analyses (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010; Lovett, 2006).
The descriptive-prescriptive schism should not obfuscate rationality’s third purpose: rationality “as if” it were real. I refer to this as subjunctive rationality. It is pervasive in RCT, especially in formal modeling (Morton, 1999). Accordingly, actors “behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns,” much like “the density of leaves around a tree” is determined “as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws …” — this subjunctive “formula is accepted because it works,” not because it is a truthful account of reality (Friedman, 1953: 21,19,18; cf. Nagel, 1963). On a larger scale, decisions may then be aggregated in order to understand collective actions as if they were decided by rational individuals, even when it is not so (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 75).
Subjunctive rationality is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, neither objective nor subjective. Depending on its specific actual usage, it may be false, probable, indeterminate, or true. Subjunctive rationality offers important benefits. It fosters creative puzzles and theorization, otherwise hard to conceive. Its employment may moreover be predictive and, if correlative to desired goals, make for prescriptive claims. But these potential benefits of subjunctive rationality do not change the fact that it is not descriptive, let alone explanatory: “‘As-if’ explanations do not actually explain anything” (Elster, 2007: 25; see also Macdonald, 2003). Postulating subjunctive rationality as explanatory may commit the argumentum ad consequentiam logical fallacy: deriving an argument from desirable or undesirable consequences. Fall, however desirable, is not caused by the leaves’ rationality.
This fallacy lurks in FPA, for while the rational actor model implicitly follows RCT’s clear preference for either subjunctive or prescriptive rationalities (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 3, 24), FPA’s explanandum is usually very real and concrete, enticing the use of descriptive (and explanatory) rationality. However, as game theorist Herbert Gintis (2009) rightly insists, “rational actor model applies to choice situations where ambiguities are absent, the choice set is clearly delineated, and the payoffs are unmediated,” and not to complex “deliberative choices,” which forms the crux of FPA (p. 237).