IR is not a science.
Kavalski ’12 — Emilian; Associate Professor of Global Studies at the Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic University (Sydney). 2012; “Waking IR Up from its ‘Deep Newtonian Slumber’”; Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 41, Issue 1; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries
Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a ‘science’? Its ‘scientific’ credentials have long concerned proponents and detractors. As Ronald Rogowski’s claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an ‘elegant science of international politics’ has virtually become a ‘dream’ to which his and subsequent generations of IR scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IR’s social-scientific inquiry can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an ‘exact science’, cohorts of IR students have been developing ‘powerful’ and ‘parsimonious’ models for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the ‘balance of power’, for instance. Its aim is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs – parity between adversaries. Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival.
In this way, IR has tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this ‘dream’ of a scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some – such as John G. Ruggie – have made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this ‘deep Newtonian slumber’, if it is to have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to this decentring project by advancing the ‘complexification’ of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science.3
Originating in the natural sciences, the complexity paradigm challenges the Newtonian view of an orderly world and suggests that global interactions occur in a non-linear fashion. Consequently, the outcomes of such interactions are difficult to infer, let alone to predict. In this respect, the proponents of the complexification of IR have noted that while the ‘hard’ sciences have become increasingly ‘soft’ as a result of their acceptance of the uncertainty and randomness of reality, IR has ‘hardened’ as a result of its suppression of ambiguity, disregard for surprises and over-investment in its capacity to forecast international developments. Richard Ned Lebow explains this search for (and commitment to) a predictable worldview of regularities as a ‘need for psychological closure’, reflecting a desire for definitive conclusions in support of preferred theoretical assumptions.4 It is in this context that Damian Popolo asks the pertinent question whether ‘scientific IR’ is not premised on ‘fundamentally misleading notions about science’.5 In other words, the question that emerges is whether things appear perplexing because the ken of the mainstream is askew.
In its response to this query, the complexity paradigm reveals that Newtonian IR tends to operate on very little information (usually a few variables); yet, this does not prevent it from jumping to conclusions as if it had knowledge about the whole picture. Such lack of sensitivity to what IR does not know then underpins a model of the world that is rarely stumped. As a result, when the accepted framework for explanation and understanding fails – that is, it faces a question that it cannot answer (for instance, ‘Why IR failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War?’) – IR comes up with a question that it can answer (for instance, ‘Why the Cold War ended?’, answer: ‘Because the Soviet Union could no longer maintain the balance of power and, therefore, without such capability it could no longer survive in the international system and had to implode’).
The complexified IR suggests that by answering the wrong questions, Newtonian IR enacts a theatre of validity to generate explanations far more coherent than reality. Therefore, the ‘incredible rate of failure’ of the very frameworks asserting the ‘law-like regularities’ of international politics to anticipate any of the major events of the past 25 years should not be surprising.6 The irony of this situation is not lost on Lebow, who notes that it is the ‘commitment to science and scientific methods by international relations scholars’ that provides ‘a major impediment to their practice of science’.7 Thus, this review article assesses the three books under review in the context of the current state of the art in the emerging complexity paradigm of IR. Since this paradigm intends a complete rethinking of the discipline, the article will focus on the complexification of the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of IR. It has to be stressed at the outset that while IR students will find all three books under review of immense interest, their authors reach out to much wider and interdisciplinary audiences – thus, the collection edited by Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight will be of immense relevance to any of the subfields of political science, especially international political economy; Lebow’s work has historians, literary theorists and psychologists in mind; while Popolo’s book addresses political theorists and philosophers.
The Complex Ontology of IR
When he urged IR to come out of its ‘degenerating’ Newtonian repose, Ruggie specifically beckoned that the discipline re-engage with the reality of international life. As he pointed out with chagrin and frustration, ‘the term “ontology” typically draws either blank stares or bemused smiles’ from the IR community.8 The contention is that IR is plagued by attention blindness – that is, because of its preoccupation with ‘reductive theories about “the logic of anarchy”’,9 it cannot discern the vast and heterogeneous reality of global affairs. Owing to its Newtonian commitments, mainstream IR views reality ‘not as a continuous flux … but as a series of instantaneous “snapshots” extracted from this flux’.10 Thus, as Lebow suggests, the dominant accounts of interstate relations miss the ‘open-ended, nonlinear nature of the social world’.11 He insists that the ‘confluence and consequences [of international politics] are best envisaged as a complex, nonlinear system’,12 ‘in which multiple interrelated chains of causation have unanticipated interactions and unpredictable consequences’.13
The ontology of complexity therefore provokes a reckoning with the multiple possibilities of becoming and becoming-other inherent in the pervasive ambiguity of global life.14 As Popolo demonstrates, such commitment reflects the philosophical engagement of Gilles Deleuze and his insistence on ‘the continuous precipitation of new life and new meaning’.15 Of the three books under review, the volume edited by Joseph and Wight engages with the issue of ontology most explicitly. A unique feature of this collection is that it offers the first comprehensive account of Scientific Realism (SR) – one of the strands in the complexification of IR. SR originates in Roy Bhaskar’s work on the philosophy of science. Its application to IR is described explicitly as a ‘shift from epistemology to ontology’.16 The reason for this shift is the understanding of reality as ‘stratified’ between the actual, the empirical and the real.17 This stratification addresses three of the key ontological claims animating the complexification of IR: (i) that the international is emergent; (ii) that the international is irreducible to and much more than its constituent parts; and (iii) that the international is subject to unexpected and (often) radical transformations – that is, small alterations in initial conditions can lead to profound changes in outcomes.18
In this setting, SR asserts that the world with which IR engages, self-organises in complex and contingent ways. This observation is also confirmed by the other two books under review. For instance, Lebow frames world politics as ‘an open system whose outcomes are sensitive to – if not always the result of – chance, agency, and confluence’,19 while Popolo depicts international life as an ‘irreversible’ process that ‘grows out of complex systems to determine its own rules of development’.20 Yet, what distinguishes the collection edited by Joseph and Wight is the confrontation with the ‘ontological issue of the different layering of the social (and natural) world’.21 Conventionally, IR has tended to ignore that international politics both inhabit and are embedded in complex spaces. In this respect, SR infers one of the greatest ontological boons of complexified IR – the recognition of the ‘totality’22 of human and non-human interactions in global life.
Newtonian IR has been exclusively anthropocentric and inspired by the ‘Enlightenment belief in a “makeable world”’, according to which human/socio-political systems (such as civil society, states, international organisations, etc.) are both detached from (not only conceptually, but in practice) and in control of the ‘non-human’ environment in which they occur.23 It is worth pointing out that such diverse and profound considerations of the complex ontology of international politics are intended not merely as a criticism of Newtonian IR, but also as a provocation for re-engaging with the ongoing and overlapping interconnections animating global life. In fact, the radical totality of human and non-human interactions has recently been framed as ‘posthuman IR’. Following SR’s recognition of the qualitative and quantitative difference between human and nonhuman systems, the ‘complex ecologism’ of ‘posthuman IR’ uncovers that the ‘world is not divided into territories in which bounded societies of humans live under singular political authority and in the context of discrete natural environments’;24 instead, global life is ‘a complex interweave of numerous systems nested, intersected and embedded in each other, all undergoing processes of co-evolution and linked by innumerable feedback loops’.25 SR echoes this ontological commitment by describing world affairs as complex interactions ‘between people and each other, their products, their activities, nature and themselves’.26
An Epistemology for the Complexity of IR
As it can be expected, the inclusive ontological purview of the complexity paradigm presents a number of analytical challenges. Yet, as the proponents of SR indicate, assertions about the appropriate ways of describing the world emerge from the ontological assumptions of what the world is like.27 Thus, on a meta-theoretical level, the problem stems from the realisation that we can never be fully cognisant of the underlying mechanisms and processes of global life, because this will imply ‘knowing the not knowable’.28 Lebow explains that the contingency of our knowledge reflects ‘the critical importance of non-observables and non-systematic factors’. This should not, however, be taken as an indication of the impossibility to provide robust IR interpretation ‘rooted in non-linearity and confluence’.29 In this respect, the acknowledgement of the limits of our knowledge can become a very productive analytical point of departure. While all three books under review pay attention to epistemological concerns, Popolo’s endeavour specifically addresses this aspect of complexified IR. In fact, he ventures that the complexity paradigm provides a ‘genuine Epistemic Revolution’, which renders the Newtonian paradigm ‘obsolete’.30 What is revolutionary about this approach is not only its debunking of the common wisdoms of ‘scientific IR’, but also its dedication to ‘“uncertain knowledge”, where uncertainty is regarded and accepted as an intrinsic quality of nature and not as a result of imperfect knowledge’.31 The suggestion is that by focusing mainly on stable, equilibrium configurations, the study of IR has remained consciously ignorant of a whole ‘new species’ of discontinuous intuition.32 Thus, by painting itself in to the Newtonian corner, the disciplinary mainstream has, on the one hand, evaded the need to recognise that there are dynamics which are not only unknown, but probably cannot ever be meaningfully rendered comprehensible, and, on the other hand, stifled endeavours that can engage in thoughtful deliberation and productive management of the discontinuities, complexity and non-linearity of global life. There are several important features underpinning such an approach to knowledge.
Firstly, the contingency of both global life and our ability to know it makes it impossible to construct predictive explanations of outcomes. Lebow is quite emphatic when he asserts that ‘[v]ariation across time, due to the changing conditions and human reflection, the openness of social systems, and the complexity of the interaction among stipulated causes make the likelihood of predictive theory – even of a probabilistic kind – extraordinarily low’.33 Thus, the proponents of the complexity paradigm ascertain that due to its over-reliance on predictive theories, mainstream IR ‘must be totally discarded’.34 A further reason for such rejection is the observation that the production of knowledge by Newtonian approaches has also limited ‘what is open for debate’.35 For instance, due to the preoccupation with inter-state relations, the discipline produces foot soldiers for this or that theoretical approach to international anarchy rather than students genuinely interested in observing the complex patterns of global affairs.
Secondly, the unwillingness to engage with the unpredictable becoming of global life reflects the patterns of linear causality that still seem to inform the disciplinary mainstream. The issue of ‘complex causation’,36 as Lebow puts it, aims to enhance sensitivity to the unintended consequences of international interactions. Such effects defy the conventional focus on purposive behaviour. In fact, it is ‘chance, confluence, and accident that often play a determining role’ in global life, rather than intentionality.37 The complexified IR thereby intends to supplant reductive explanations by considering the ‘conjuncturally determined’ patterns of world affairs.38
Thirdly, the complexity paradigm critiques the way in which Newtonian IR has theorised international developments by focusing on major events. Lebow indicates that this bias towards events-thinking belies the predisposition ‘to think of big events as having big causes’.39 For instance, the origins of war are usually attributed either to singular events or to the resolve of specific individuals, rather than ‘the result of nonlinear confluences’.40 Thus, the focus on both spatially and temporally proximate causes underpins the blindness to the complex interactions of global life, which turns the disciplinary terrain into a frozen expanse of accidents. Complexified IR evinces that ‘mainstream IR cannot talk about underlying process, only about systems and units’. That is why it advocates the abandonment of the ‘talk of levels of analysis in favour of complex, layered assemblies of social relations’.41
The three-step of such epistemology for the complexity of IR intends simultaneously to rethink and reinvent the study of international politics. Interestingly, all three books under review are in agreement that this should be done through the ‘demystification of science’.42 Such demystification entails the rejection of the Newtonian ‘scientific fallacies’43 and the acceptance of ‘the fact of epistemological realism: namely, that all beliefs are socially produced, so that knowledge is transient, and neither truth values nor criteria of rationality exist outside of historical time’.44 It is also worth pointing out that while assisting the explanation ‘of our chaotic and unordered world’, the complexity paradigm is idiosyncratically self-reflexive about its own epistemological investments in a specific understanding of the international and readily concedes that ‘knowledge sometimes has the effect of accelerating disorder’.45