SPP fails
Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” US Army War College, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB
Some critics come from Congress, who raised concerns over SPP’s effectiveness, conformity to federal law, nesting with TSCPs, and encroachment upon or conflicts with DoS and USAID interests, responsibilities, and programs.48 In a 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, congressional researchers noted that the program suffers from written assessments “limited in scope” and focused on “outputs… rather than outcomes”49 The report also noted that “the SPP has no dedicated statute authority”50 of its own and uses several different statues within United States Code (U.S.C.) to authorize SPP activities. These statues range from Title 10 U.S.C. (Armed Forces), to Title 32 U.S.C. (National Guard), to Title 22 U.S.C. (Foreign Relations and Intercourse).51 The 2011 CRS report provided several options for Congress to consider: (1) consider a Directive Type Memorandum regarding SPP funding, (2) direct periodic evaluations, (3) require centralized approval of SPP activities, and (4) codify the SPP in law. 52 Still, the report acknowledged SPP’s ability to build enduring relationships; capitalize upon unique civilian skill sets of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen and the dual state and federal status of the National Guard; remain engaged with high and low priority nations; and develop unique relationships between states and foreign countries.53 Despite the issues outlined in the CRS’s report, a 15 subsequent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report characterized the SPP as “a force enabler for the combatant commands”. 54 In May 2012, the GAO conducted an investigation into SPP and found several problems. They identified a lack of comprehensive oversight that clearly defined and outlined the program’s goals, objectives, and measures of performance. There was insufficient data available for an assessment, to include management of funding from 2007-2011, multiple data management systems, inconsistent program terminology between the GCCs and National Guard Bureau (NGB), and challenges with funding civilian participation in the program.55 The GAO, therefore, found that neither Congress nor the DoD can quantitatively assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.56 Thus, the GAO made the following recommendations to the DoD in May 2012: develop an oversight process to measure program effectiveness and standardize data management; develop specific guidance for funding civilian participation in the program; and develop additional training for SPP Coordinators and Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers.57 In an effort to address the Congressional concerns, NGB began implementing a more formal process for assessing the program’s goals, and tracking program funding in accordance with the recommendations in the GAO’s report. NGB has also initiated a more comprehensive and formal training process for Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers and SPP Coordinators, 58 but the ability to quantitatively assess the program has yet to be Reached.