Nuclear war with Russia
Spiro '99 (Peter J. Spiro, Associate Professor at Hofstra Law School, 1999, Lexis//GH-Aspomer)
Zschernig has been questioned even by those who otherwise propound federal exclusivity. n87 But the decision seems both explained and justified (at least at the time) by its Cold War context. In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential consequences of giving offense were obviously profound. One could not expect the Soviets necessarily to understand that when a state official spoke, it was not for the nation; or at least one would not want to risk error in assessing that perception. At the very least, there was the specter of state action upsetting the elaborately choreographed relationship between East and West Blocs; at worst, one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by state action lit the fuse to World War III. Nor against this backdrop could one rely on the political branches to beat back state action before the damage was done; n88 the context, in other words, supported the strict application of a dormant federal power. n89 [*1243] Zschernig found parallels in two other contexts at the juncture of state activity and foreign relations. In applying the dormant foreign Commerce Clause to strike down a state tax on foreign-owned cargo containers, the Court in Japan Line emphasized the "paramount" requirement that the federal government "speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." n90 The Court stressed the danger that a state tax on international instrumentalities could provoke the retaliation of foreign nations, which "retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in general, not just that of the taxing state, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer." n91 As in Zschernig, the Japan Line Court nullified the state measure notwithstanding the absence of an affirmative federal policy (either through treaty or statute) on the issue. California, the Court concluded, "may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies" in "an area where a uniform federal rule is essential... Even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." n92 Perhaps even more clearly than the dormant foreign affairs power, this sort of severe application of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause would have seemed defensible, especially insofar as it built upon a well-settled dormant power in the domestic commerce context. n93 Japan Line was handed down against an international economic backdrop not far removed from the corresponding national security context, where before theentrenchment of today's free trade regimes the specter of trade wars loomed in economic relations even between friendly states. [*1244] Finally, one can also integrate into the rule of federal exclusivity the designation of customary international law as part of federal common law. Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, n94 the federal courts were free to apply general common law, including customary international law, without regard to the common law interpretations of state courts; there was no need specially to justify the application of customary international law in the absence of controlling state or federal statutory or constitutional law. n95 That changed with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, n96 which denied the federal courts the power to create common law "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress." n97 The presumption thereafter was that federal common lawmaking had to be grounded in some particular federal interest. n98 It was only with the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Sabbatino that the application of customary international law as federal common law was found acceptable under Erie. n99 That holding can be justified on the same basis as the dormant [*1245] foreign affairs power. Inappropriate interpretation of or noncompliance with customary international law could cause offense to foreign nations, which might respond with action against the nation as a whole. The Court did not clearly articulate its holding in such terms, adverting only to unspecified "potential dangers" n100 were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations, and noting "a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations." n101 The decision did, however, cite commentary that advocated federal court interpretation of customary international law, "lest the provincialism of state courts lead to impolitic judicial decisions offensive to the sensibilities of foreign nations." n102 As with the dormant foreign affairs power cases, the rule against state court interpretation of customary international law would seem to have been justified, especially in a Cold War context. To take the facts of Sabbatino itself, the federal government couldn't have state courts misapplying the act of state doctrine n103 to deny the effectiveness of Cuban (and other Communist Bloc) nationalizations; the risk of upsetting the superpower balance would have been too great to trust the responsibility of applying or interpreting the relevant standards to nonfederal actors. n104 And that perhaps explains why [*1246] the inclusion of customary international law in the category of federal common law has, until recently, been accepted as uncontroversial. n105 And so these three different strands of the exclusivity principle - the dormant foreign affairs power, the dormant foreign commerce power, and the inclusion of customary international law as a part of federal common law - all seemed sustainable in a world that would not differentiate between the component unit and the whole. However important they would otherwise be, federalism values could not be vindicated in the face of a plausible and substantial risk that unconstrained state action would result in dramatic harm to the nation as a whole. C. The Case for Maintaining Federal Exclusivity If one assumed a world in which nations were still held responsible for the acts of their component units, one could support a fairly strong case for confirming the holdings of Zschernig, Japan Line, and Sabbatino, and the precept that the states should be denied the tools to interfere with national foreign relations. n106 Constitutional pedigree aside, the functional [*1247] underpinnings of the exclusivity principle are powerful. It is not just that individual states will take action that will harm other states, though that fact highlights the problems of state-level action from a democratic process perspective. It is that such decisions will be consistently distorted in the face of significant externalities; state-level actors, because they do not shoulder the consequences of their actions, will not take into account those consequences in the decision-making balance. These externalities will also tend to create information deficiencies; because the states will not shoulder the consequences of their conduct, they have less incentive to understand what those consequences will be. Indeed, a standard lament of state-level foreign policy activity is that it is based on insufficient expertise. n107 Assuming continued externalities, the case against state-level action remains strong. The magnitude of state and local international activity has grown dramatically in recent years, so that one might expect a growing risk of unwelcome resulting entanglements; though much of this activity is benign, some provokes the traditional concerns of the exclusivity principle. The persistent potential for subfederal action to disrupt national foreign relations is demonstrated by the recent diplomatic controversy and constitutional litigation concerning state and local sanctions against companies doing business in Burma. n108 Though they enjoy the formal power to suppress it, the political branches of the federal government remain less well positioned to police this activity than the courts. The changing construction of international society aside, n109 perhaps the best argument for softening the rule of federal exclusivity highlights the end of the Cold War and the diminished ultimate dangers of foreign retaliation. In recent years there has been a marked blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; so fast has the line eroded - hastened by the communications revolution, the greater ease of travel, and the growing priority of trade over traditional national security issues - that globalization has become almost an instant cliche. The international arena is now very much of local interest, as reflected in the dramatically [*1248] heightened profile of state and local governments on the world scene. This is particularly pronounced in matters relating to trade and investment. One in six private-sector jobs in the United States is now linked to the global economy. n110 The number of Americans working for foreign companies in the United States now stands at five million; foreign direct investment in the United States has quadrupled since 1981. n111 Subfederal jurisdictions now see international trade and foreign investment as critical to their economic well-being. They compete ferociously for foreign investment with tax breaks and other incentives. n112 Most states now maintain at least one trade office abroad; n113 many have concluded trade-related agreements with foreign entities; n114 and the foreign trade mission has become a standard responsibility for governors and large-city mayors. Most of these trade and investment-related activities are unobjectionable, from both policy and constitutional perspectives. n115 [*1249] The growing importance of the world to the states has also made the states more important to the world. If they stood as independent nations, seven American states would be counted among the top twenty-five countries in terms of gross domestic product; even Vermont, with the smallest economy among the states, would outrank almost 100 nations. n116 It is thus not surprising that foreign authorities, themselves critically interested in global commerce, court state-level officials to attract investment from and promote exports within the subfederal jurisdictions. Moreover, state and local governments directly control vast procurement budgets; the annual expenditures of state and local governments exceeds one trillion dollars. n117 Subfederal governments now have international economic clout. The problem is that this clout can and will occasionally be deployed in ways that offend foreign nations.