Perm shifts backlash to the states
A. Brooke Overby, 3 (A. Brooke Overby, Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, 2003, accessed on 7-4-2022, Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education Temple Law Review, Summer, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 297,“Our New Commercial Law Federalism”, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/temple76&div=16&id=&page=, HBisevac)
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.n65 The concerns articulated in New York and echoed again in Printz addressed the erosion of the lines of political accountability that could result from federal commandeering.n66 Federal authority to compel implementation of a national legislative agenda through the state legislatures or officers would blur or launder the federal provenance of the legislation and shift political consequences and costs thereof to the state legislators. Left unchecked, Congress could foist upon the states expensive or unpopular programs yet shield itself from accountability to citizens. While drawing the line between constitutionally permissible optional implementation and impermissible mandatory implementation does not erase these concerns with accountability, it does ameliorate them slightly.