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PC is real, finite, and trades off with other initiatives – mathematical modeling

Beckmann 11 (Mathew Beckmann, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine with a B.A. from UCLA and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, 2011, "How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1), DOI:10.1177/0951629810378545, acc6/17/21, pg15-17) mamk-j1

Constitutional niceties notwithstanding, American citizens believe their presidents should play a signal role in US lawmaking. Americans expect presidential aspirants to articulate a detailed legislative agenda during the campaign, and then to advocate it once in Washington. Not surprisingly, recent administrations have happily obliged; today’s presidents routinely propose preferred initiatives and consistently lobby for their passage. at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 25, 2015jtp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 16Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1)In light of this self- and public perception of contemporary presidents as ‘Legislator-in-Chief’, political scientists have long sought to assess the empirical reality of presidents’ potential influence in Congress. Although earlier generations of scholars largely concurred with Woodrow Wilson’s proclamation that ‘The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can’, subsequent research has rebutted such great man’ conceptions of presidential power in lawmaking. More recent takes suggest presidents may see some opportunities for exerting influence on Capitol Hill, but as yet none has specified either the opportunities or the systematic means by which presidents can exploit them. This was what our paper sought to offer. Agreeing that presidents’ strategic options in Congress do indeed depend heavily on factors beyond their control, our model’s first insight is explicating the two systematic strategies presidents have available for exerting influence in Congress: they can target marginal voters to shift the preference distribution on roll-call votes and they can tar-get congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far. While the first of these is widely recognized and studied, the second is not. By detailing the actual mechanisms of president-led coalition building on Capitol Hill, ours is a theory that puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and capitalizing on them depends on nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading. In this way, we subscribe to President Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’ (Hughes, 1963: 124). However, if spending political capital in the service of vote-centered and agenda-centered strategies is a necessary condition for presidents to have positive influence in Congress, it certainly is not a sufficient condition. Instead, we find the exact policy return on a particular presidential lobbying campaign is conditioned by the location of the status quo, and the nature of leading opponents’ and pivotal voters’ preferences. Beyond enjoying ample political capital, then, those presidents who seek to change far-off status quos and confront pliable leading opponents and/or pivotal voters are expected to wield the greatest policymaking impact. By comparison, presidents with little to no political capital, seeking to change centrist status quos, or confronting opposing leaders and pivotal voters who staunchly oppose their proposals can find themselves with ‘nothing to do but stand there and take it’, as Lyndon Johnson once put it. Going forward, then, this more nuanced conception of presidential power suggests presidential leadership in lawmaking works through mechanisms different from those recognized previously and is manifested in ways different from those tested previously. In fact, our theoretical results set forth specific guidelines for properly testing presidents’ legislative influence. To conclude, let us briefly delineate these empirical implications of our theoretical model. The first and perhaps most important prescription is that the White House does not treat all presidential positions equally: most receive nothing more than a mere comment, a precious few get the White House’s ‘full court press’, and such prioritizing matters. Specifically, our basic hypothesis holds that presidents’ positive influence depends heavily on lobbying to work. The corollary, therefore, is that the crucial test of presidents’ influence is not whether ‘skilled’ presidents fare better than their ‘unskilled’ counterparts, at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 25, but rather whether Congress responds differently to bills depending on the presidents’ lobbying, all else being equal. Second, our model underscores the important distinction between policy outcomes and roll-call votes. Because the White House wants to change the nation’s laws, the paramount metric of presidential success is the substantive result. While political scientists lack any precise measure of policy content, that is, there is no metric to judge one policy as ‘units’ more liberal or conservative than another, the foremost tests of presidents’ influence should still highlight outcomes; they should address the legislative process’s ideological results. At the same time, to say presidents’ influence is primarily evidenced in substantive outcomes does not mean its symptoms cannot be seen in roll-call votes. After all, a requisite part of winning on the overall outcome is winning on the relevant votes. On this score, our model has shown (1) tests of presidential power should emphasize those votes that best indicate the substantive outcome, such as CQ’s ‘key’ votes and (2) tests based exclusively on roll-call votes have missed an important aspect of president-led coalition building. To properly test presidents’ influence on votes, researchers must simultaneously account for voting and pre-voting processes. A final empirically relevant point about testing presidential influence in Congress is the relative unimportance of each president’s personal character or idiosyncratic traits. Like other recent scholars, we predict that because presidents’ strategic opportunities are constrained, their tactical resources are limited, so all presidents will execute more or less comparable strategies (see Cameron (2000), Edwards (1989), Hagar and Sullivan (1994),Jones (1994), and Moe (1984, 1993)). This is especially true for presidents’ congressional relations since all modern White House staffs include a team of Washington’s most experienced, successful legislative operatives (Collier, 1997). Thus, we echo the growing scholarly consensus that the presidency’s institutional incentives trump presidents’ personal characteristics.

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