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2AC---Military Turn

The best diplomacy is a strong military. Oversight destroys US leadership. Extinction.

O’Rourke 22 [Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs; "Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress"; Congressional Research Service; Published: 2-10-2022; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1159700.pdf; KL]

Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies

As part of the renewed emphasis on capabilities for high-end conventional warfare, DOD officials have expressed concern that U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies has narrowed or in some cases even been eliminated by China and (in certain areas) Russia. In response, DOD has taken a number of actions in recent years that are intended to help maintain or regain U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, including increased research and development funding for new militarily applicable technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous unmanned weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed-energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. 68 A February 2, 2022, press report stated:

The Pentagon’s research and engineering chief is crafting a new strategy for investment in 14 critical technology areas, writing in a new memo that “creative application” of emerging concepts is key to maintaining an edge over adversaries.

The Feb. 1 memo, first reported by Inside Defense, does not lay out a timeline for when the strategy will be complete, but notes the work will be informed by the 2022 National Defense Strategy and structured around three pillars: Mission focus, foundation building and succeeding through teamwork.

“Successful competition requires imagining our military capability as an ever-evolving collective, not a static inventory of weapons in development or sustainment,” Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu wrote in the memo, obtained by C4ISRNET. “In many cases, effective competition benefits from sidestepping symmetric arms races and instead comes from the creative application of new concepts with emerging science and technology.”

The technologies identified in the memo ranges from “seed areas”—like quantum science, biotechnology, advanced materials and future-generation wireless technology—to commercially available capabilities such as artificial intelligence, space, microelectronics, integrated networks, renewable energy, human-machine interfaces and advanced computing and software.

The memo also highlights technology needs that are specific to the Defense Department, including hypersonic weapons, directed energy, cyber and integrated sensing.

“By focusing efforts and investments into these 14 critical technology areas, the department will accelerate transitioning key capabilities to the military services and combatant commands,” Shyu writes. “As the department’s strategy evolves and technologies change, the department will update its critical technology priorities.”69

Innovation and Speed of U.S. Weapon System Development and Deployment

In addition to the above-mentioned efforts for maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, DOD is placing new emphasis on innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, so as to more quickly and effectively transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems. The 2018 NDS places states

Deliver performance at the speed of relevance. Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting. Current processes are not responsive to need; the Department is overoptimized for exceptional performance at the expense of providing timely decisions, policies, and capabilities to the warfighter. Our response will be to prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. We must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly risk-averse thinking that impedes change. Delivering performance means we will shed outdated management practices and structures while integrating insights from business innovation.70

The individual military services have taken various actions in recent years to increase innovation and speed in their weapon acquisition programs. Some of these actions make use of special acquisition authorities provided by Congress in recent years that are intended in part to reduce the time needed to transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems, including Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and what is known as Section 804 Middle Tier authority.71

On January 23, 2020, DOD released a new defense acquisition framework, called the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, that is intended to substantially accelerate the DOD’s process for developing and fielding new weapons.72 In previewing the new framework in October 2019, DOD described it as “the most transformational acquisition policy change we’ve seen in decades.” 73

Some observers argue that DOD is not doing enough or moving quickly enough to generate and implement innovations in response to great power competition, and have proposed steps for doing more or moving more quickly.74 <<<FOOTNOTE 74 BEGINS>>> 74 See, for example, Elaine McCusker and Emily Coletta, “Is the U.S. Military Ready to Defend Taiwan?” National Interest, February 6, 2022; Christopher Zember, “Change How OTAs Are Used to Make Them an Essential Tool Against China,” Breaking Defense, February 3, 2022; Robert A. McDonald Sr., M. Sam Araki, and Robert Wilkie, “These Seven Principles Could Help DoD Acquisition in the Face of the China Threat,” Defense News, February 1, 2022; Daniel K. Lim, “Startups and the Defense Department’s Compliance Labyrinth,” War on the Rocks, January 3, 2022; Mike Brest, “Chinese Military Progress ‘Stunning’ While US Slowed by ‘Brutal’ Bureaucracy, Joint Chief Warns,” Washington Examiner, October 28, 2021; Sandra Erwin, “Hyten Blasts ‘Unbelievably’ Slow DoD Bureaucracy as China Advances Space Weapons,” Space News, October 28, 2021; Alex Marquardt and Oren Liebermann, “Senior US General Warns China’s Military Progress Is ‘Stunning’ as US Is Hampered by ‘Brutal’ Bureaucracy,” CNN, October 28, 2021; Meghann Myers, “Risk Aversion and Secrecy Are Costing US Its Military Advantage, No. 2 General Says,” Military Times, October 8, 2021; Ryan Tracy, “As Google, Microsoft and Amazon Seek Bigger Defense Role, Some Are Leery,” Wall Street Journal, September 7, 2021; Peter Spiegel, “How America Found Itself Fighting the Last War—Again,” Financial Times, August 18, 2021; Arnold Punaro, “Book Excerpt: Pruning The Acquisition Kudzu,” Breaking Defense, July 29, 2021; Mike Glenn, “Pentagon Must Pick Up the Pace to Counter China, Top General Warns,” Washington Times, July 26, 2021; Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “Give Combatant Commanders the Tools to Innovate,” Defense News, July 13, 2021; Elaine McCusker and Dan Patt, “Faster Weapon Buys: Try Evolutionary Innovation,” Breaking Defense, July 2, 2021; Melissa Flagg and Jack Corrigan, “Ending Innovation Tourism, Rethinking the U.S. Military’s Approach to Emerging Technology Adoption,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), July 2021, 22 pp.; Michèle A. Flournoy, “America’s Military Risks Losing Its Edge, How to Transform the Pentagon for a Competitive Era,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021; Missy Ryan, “The U.S. System Created the World’s Most Advanced Military. Can It Maintain an Edge?” Washington Post, April 1, 2021; Chris Dougherty, “Want an Agile Pentagon? Don’t Go Chasing ‘Waterfalls,’ Four-Year Strategy Reviews Aren’t Good Enough. Biden’s Pentagon Should Take a Page from Software Firms,” Defense One, March 22, 2021; Matthew Beinart, “Pentagon Needs New Acquisition Authorities To Stay Ahead In AI Tech Race, Commission Officials Say,” Defense Daily, March 12, 2021; Joe Gould, “Pentagon Processes ‘Antithetical’ to AI Development, Former Google CEO Warns,” C4ISRNet, March 12, 2021; Bill Greenwalt, “Competing in Time: How DoD Is Losing The Innovation Race To China, Despite Reforms, the Pentagon and Congress Have Failed to Break Out of a Cold War, CentralPlanning Model That’s Stifled Innovation.,” Breaking Defense, March 9, 2021; Joe Gould, “Pentagon’s Dated Budget Process Too Slow to Beat China, New Report Says,” Defense News, February 25, 2021; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Experts Tell Congress How To Turn Innovation Into Reality,” Breaking Defense, February 23, 2021; Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “The Pentagon Needs Budget Agility to Compete with China,” Defense One, February 12, 2021; Nate Ashton, “Urgently Needed: Tech-Savvy Defense Leaders,” Defense News, February 10, 2020; William Greenwalt and Dan Patt, Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable Resource Allocation, Hudson Institute, February 2021, 64 pp.<<<FOOTNOTE 74 ENDS>>> A January 2020 GAO report on weapon system reliability in defense acquisition, however, states

DOD has taken steps to accelerate weapon system development, and decision-making authority has been delegated to the military services. In an environment emphasizing speed, without senior leadership focus on a broader range of key reliability practices, DOD runs the risk of delivering less reliable systems than promised to the warfighter and spending more than anticipated on rework and maintenance of major weapon systems. 75

DOD officials and other observers argue that to facilitate greater innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, U.S. defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs will need to be adjusted to place a greater emphasis on innovation and speed as measures of merit in defense acquisition policy, alongside more traditional measures of merit such as minimizing cost growth, schedule delays, and problems in testing. As a consequence, they argue, defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs should place more emphasis on time as a risk factor and feature more experimentation, risk-taking, and tolerance of failure during development, with a lack of failures in testing potentially being viewed in some cases not as an indication of success, but of inadequate innovation or speed of development.76 <<<FOOTNOTE 76 BEGINS>>> 76 See, for example, Tate Nurkin, “To Catch China and Russia in Hypersonic Race, US Must Embrace Risk Now,” Breaking Defense, February 9, 2022; Corey Dickstein, “Vice Chairman Nominee Says US Military Must Adapt New Tech Faster to Compete with China, Russia,” Stars and Stripes, December 8, 2021; Sam LaGrone, “Eliminating ‘Risk Aversion’ Key to Weapons Development, Says Vice Chair Nominee Grady,” USNI News, December 8, 2021; Bryan Clark, “Pentagon And Congress Risk Bungling Drive To Modernize U.S. Military,” Forbes, July 8, 2020; John Grady, “Officials: U.S. Must Move Faster in Testing and Fielding Hypersonics, 5G Networks,” USNI News, June 30, 2020; Michèle A. Flournoy and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Breaking the Logjam: How the Pentagon Can Build Trust with Congress,” Defense News, April 1, 2020; Ankit Panda, “Getting Critical Technologies Into Defense Applications,” National Interest, February 1, 2020; Ankit Panda, “Critical Technologies and Great Power Competition,” Diplomat, January 29, 2020; Michael Rubin, “The Simple Reason Why America Could Lose the Next Cold War to Russia or China,” National Interest, January 14, 2020; George Franz and Scott Bachand, “China and Russia Beware: How the Pentagon Can Win the Tech Arms Race,” National Interest, November 29, 2019; Scott Maucione, “Special Report: Failure Is an Option for DoD’s Experimental Agency, But How Much?” Federal News Week, October 30, 2019; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Stop Wasting Time So We Can Beat China: DoD R&D Boss, Griffin,” Breaking Defense, August 9, 2018. <<<FOOTNOTE 76 ENDS>>>

Mobilization Capabilities for Extended-Length Conflict

The renewal of great power competition has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense on U.S. mobilization capabilities for an extended-length conflict.77 The term mobilization is often used to refer specifically to preparations for activating U.S. military reserve force personnel and inducting additional people into the Armed Forces. In this report, it is used more broadly, to refer to various activities, including those relating to the ability of the industrial base to support U.S. military operations in a larger-scale, extended-length conflict against China or Russia. Under this broader definition, mobilization capabilities include but are not limited to capabilities for

inducting and training additional military personnel to expand the size of the force or replace personnel who are killed or wounded;

producing new weapons and supplies to replace those expended in the earlier stages of a conflict, and delivering those weapons and supplies to distantly deployed U.S. forces in a timely manner;

repairing battle damage to ships, aircraft, and vehicles;

replacing satellites or other support assets that are lost in combat; and

manufacturing spare parts and consumable items.

Some observers have expressed concern about the adequacy of U.S. mobilization capabilities, particularly since this was not a major defense-planning concern during the 20 to 25 years of the post-Cold War era, and have recommended various actions to improve those capabilities. 78 <<<FOOTNOTE 78 BEGINS>>> 78 See, for example, Maiya Clark, “Revitalizing the National Defense Stockpile for an Era of Great-Power Competition,” Heritage Foundation, January 4, 2022; Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, “Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War With China, A Conflict Would Be Long and Messy,” Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2021; Seth Cropsey and Harry Halem, “The U.S. Is Wholly Unequipped to Resupply Forces in a Great-Power Conflict,” Defense News, October 21, 2021; Marcus Weisgerber, “Digital Engineering Could Speed Wartime Arms Production,” Defense One, June 8, 2021; Government Accountability Office, Navy Ships[:] Timely Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Develop Capabilities for Battle Damage Repair, GAO-21-246, June 2021, 46 pp.; Tristan Abbey, “America’s Stockpiles Are Hardly Strategic,” Defense One, February 9, 2021; Mark Cancian and Adam Saxton, “US War Surge Production Too Slow, CSIS Finds,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2021; Robert “Jake” Bebber, “State of War, State of Mind: Reconsidering Mobilization in the Information Age, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), January 11, 2021 (drawn from Robert “Jake” Bebber, “State of War, State of Mind: Reconsidering Mobilization in the Information Age,” Journal of Political Risk, October 20, 2020); Mark F. Cancian, Adam Saxton, Owen Helman, Lee Ann Bryan, and Nidal Morrison, Industrial Mobilization: Assessing Surge Capabilities, Wartime Risk, and System Brittleness, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 2021, 57 pp.; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is the World’s Biggest Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge advantage’ in a Long Fight with the US, Experts Say,” Business Insider, September 8, 2020; Marcus Weisgerber, “US Shipyards Lack Needed Repair Capacity, Admiral Says,” Defense One, August 27, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Lack of U.S. Warship Repair Capacity Worrying Navy,” USNI News, August 26, 2020; Paul McLeary, “Navy Plans For Wartime Ship Surge; Looks To Small Commercial Yards,” Breaking Defense, August 25, 2020; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Preparing for the next Big War,” War on the Rocks, January 26, 2016; Robert Haddick, “Competitive Mobilization: How Would We Fare Against China?” War on the Rocks, March 15, 2016; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Mirages of War: Six Illusions from Our Recent Conflicts,” War on the Rocks, April 11, 2017; Mark Cancian, “Long Wars and Industrial Mobilization,” War on the Rocks, August 8, 2017; Joseph Whitlock, “The Army’s Mobilization Problem,” U.S. Army War College War Room, October 13, 2017; Alan L. Gropman, “America Needs to Prepare for a Great Power War,” National Interest, February 7, 2018; Elsa B. Kania and Emma Moore, “The US Is Unprepared to Mobilize for Great Power Conflict,” Defense One, July 21, 2019. See also William Greenwalt, Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies, Atlantic Council, April 2019, 58 pp. <<<FOOTNOTE 78 ENDS>>> On April 24, 2019, the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, a commission created by the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016),79 held two hearings on U.S. mobilization needs and how to meet them.80 DOD officials are now focusing more on actions to improve U.S. mobilization capabilities.81 A February 2, 2022, press report stated:

If a war against a major adversary breaks out, it’s going to require the military to resupply troops at a pace it hasn’t seen in a long time, Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost, head of U.S. Transportation Command, said on Wednesday [February 2].

And to keep up with that frenetic tempo, TRANSCOM is going to have to use machine learning and artificial intelligence to streamline its logistics operations, Van Ovost said in an online conversation hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“We can’t afford to sift through reams and reams of data” in a major war, Van Ovost said. “We really do need to apply machine learning and artificial intelligence to turn that data into knowledge, for which we can make decisions. Creating that decision advantage is going to give us that time and space and options for senior leaders to come up with different options to reduce risk, to increase effectiveness.”

Van Ovost said American allies and partners, as well as its potential competitors, are already making fast progress in these areas, and the U.S. must do the same at all levels to be more effective and efficient....

Van Ovost expressed interest in recent work studying the feasibility of using rockets to rapidly move large cargo loads anywhere in the world. TRANSCOM has signed research agreements with companies such as SpaceX and xArc to see how the technology might work, including cargo loading and determining flight frequency.82

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