2AC---Polarization Turn
Polarization makes congressional oversight ineffective
Friedrichs and Tama 3/11/22 [Gordon Friedrichs, postdoctoral researcher at the Chair for Multi-Level Governance at the Department of Political Science at Freiburg University AND Jordan Tama, Provost Assoc Professor at School of International Service at American University; March 11, 2022; DOA: 6/23/22; “Polarization and US foreign policy: key debates and new findings” ; Lowell-ES]
Domestic polarization not only affects the policymaking process but also the way policies become implemented. Scholars of US foreign policy have shown that over time, the highly contentious forces of domestic politics in some policy areas, such as international economics, have incentivized the president to rely more heavily on other instruments, such as military deployments and defense procurement (Milner and Tingley 2015). Others have shown that partisan incentives have reduced presi- dents’ use of force abroad and influenced how presidents carry out military operations (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Kriner 2010). Meanwhile, others have found that greater prospects for legislative success incline the president to engage in more high-risk military interventions and fewer humanitarian interventions (Marshall and Prins 2016). In addition, studies on presidential use of executive agreements suggest that domestic polarization inclines presidents to advance their agenda unilaterally (Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007; Amirfar and Singh 2018).
Polarization also influences the effectiveness of US foreign policy execution. As some scholars have argued, polarization has limited the rally-around-the-flag effect in response to external security threats (Myrick 2021). In addition, political and material costs for the execution of certain partisan foreign policies and visions of international order have increased in times of domestic polarization (Bafumi and Parent 2012; Kreps et al. 2018). As a consequence of the widening gap domestically for a cohesive strategy, the executive branch is more incentivized to politicize US foreign policy through wedge-issues to weaken political opposition (Snyder et al. 2009). This, in turn, has contributed to a polarization of US relationships with allies and partners (Drezner 2018).