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Opening Word document…

2AC---Oversight Fails---OCOs

Congressional oversight over OCOs legally fails

Lorber 13 [Eric Lorber, Principal, Cyber, Risk & Regulatory; “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?”; 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961 2013; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell-ES]

The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at most eight).235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.

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