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The DoS oversees the plan.
Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]
DOS has long had oversight over SC/SA programs in order to define, synchronize, and deconflict U.S. strategic objectives. This is because Congress has consistently authorized, expected, and in many cases, mandated DOS to provide this oversight role.
There is an overlap between DOS and DOD when it comes to arms trades, training, and military alliances. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates helped popularize the term “shared responsibility” regarding SC/SA as it refers to the joint responsibility between DOD and DOS in supporting U.S. foreign SC/SA programs, relationships overseas, and national security interests.89 According to ADP 1, the DOD’s role is to deter enemies, counter threats, and fight and win the nation’s wars. The DOS is responsible for foreign policy and U.S. diplomatic relations. DOS’s role in the shared responsibility of SC/SA programs is to calculate and measure associated trade-offs between short-term limited scope program objectives and long-term national interests. Some have described DOS as having veto power over some DOD developed plans, even when they are DOD directed authorities. 90
Again, Secretary Gates’s shared responsibility concept is not new. While the legal framework for SC/SA programs has evolved over time, the general roles of responsibility in which DOD implements and administers the security programs, while DOS performs the key oversight functions, has stayed constant. For the fifteen years following WWII, the U.S. Government followed the principle that military assistance necessitated “civilian leadership, influence, and oversight” over military assistance programs under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949). 91
The 2017 NDAA solves oversight.
Anderson and Dalton 19 [Dr. James Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities. Prior to his current appointment in the Department of Defense, Dr. Anderson served for three years as the vice president for academic affairs at the Marine Corps University. His previous positions include dean of Academics and deputy director at the Marine Corps War College, director of the program in Advanced Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, and director of Middle East policy in the International Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Anderson earned his doctorate in international relations and master of arts in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University; Melissa Dalton, the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance"; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Published: 4-25-2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance-0; KL]
Security cooperation is often behind the news we read at night but rarely the frontline story. Luckily we’re also blessed with another influential group that cares deeply about security cooperation – the Congress. In FY ’17 Congress undertook the largest, most sweeping, and most substantial reforms to security cooperation in our nation’s history. The FY ’17 NDAA consolidated dozens of authorities into a narrow band of activities in Chapter 16. It set up requirements for human rights vetting, institutional capacity building, and assessment monitoring and evaluation.
With lots of work in the trenches by both DOD and Congress, this all hit at once, and it was welcome. Implementing an ambitious vision remains a challenge, particularly for those activities that were funded out of service accounts or regional initiatives. Many security cooperation activities were not being looked at holistically across the spectrum. Programs were siloed and oversight sometimes limited.
Congress believed that the entire system needed oversight from a single executor with visibility across all the authorities and all the different pots of money. This is how we got the Title 10, Chapter 16, Section 382 in the U.S. Code. The notion that the secretary’s designee, the undersecretary of defense for policy – my immediate boss – shall have, quote, “the responsibility for the oversight of strategic policy guidance and the responsibility of overall resource allocation for security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense.” End quote.
This is where we are trying to go with security cooperation: a holistic DOD-wide enterprise with visibility across the spectrum of security cooperation activities, administered with policy oversight, and aligned tightly to strategy.
How we define security cooperation is changing as well. At one point security cooperation meant – basically meant train and equip programs. We’re moving away from that. Security cooperation enterprise now encompasses everything from equipment, to training, to conventional arms sales, to exercises with both high-end and developing partners.
Meanwhile, we are prioritizing interoperability and making arms sales quicker and more efficient. In the last 10 years the department has reduced the average time to process foreign military sales by 30 percent. And I know our colleagues at DSCA are working hard to streamline things even more.
We are also trying to move off of year-to-year planning. My office has been involved in a push over the last two years to align security cooperation planning with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle as well as the global force management cycle, planning two years out from the current fiscal year.
Further, we are trying to look at security cooperation programs as more life-cycle events, planning five years out from conception, evaluating them annually, and ensuring that security cooperation activities are built with specific achievable, measurable objectives in mind. We’re also looking at how to make our investments sustainable and effective. A big part of this revolves around institutional capacity building using our experience as a department to help partners develop their defense ministry apparatus. We are still working on the best ways to do this, but this is critical to our mission. Merely transferring equipment or providing training is insufficient if the partner military lacks the professional and bureaucratic apparatus to effectively absorb and employ their capabilities.
One tool that has helped us cover down and provide engagement in this field has been our regional centers. We have five of them. The George C. Marshall Center in Germany is just one example. Last week they held an important and timely conference on Ukrainian defense reform efforts. Engagements such as these are valuable, and they’re not very expensive. The regional centers provide an excellent example of how small investments can yield high returns over time.
The state partnership program has also proved a cost-effective, small-footprint tool for supporting security cooperation goals of the geographic combatant commands and our diplomatic community. Over the last 24 years, we have established 73 partnerships with 79 countries across all six geographic commands. These partnerships have brought diplomatic and military engagement via the national guard elements resulting in individual, professional, and institutional contacts and relationships, enhancing influence and trust on a worldwide basis.