Perm do both – the post/transhumanist reading of her work is wrong and gets coopted by the same cybernetic systems we are describing – Haraway agrees!
Haraway & Gane 06 [Dona Haraway & Nicholas Gane, 12-01-2006, “When We have Never Been Human, What Is to Be Done?: Interview with Donna Haraway,”, <<Donna is a Professor in the History of Consciousness Department & Feminist Studies Department at the University of California>>, Theory, Culture & Society]\\pairie
NG: One thing I find fascinating about the ‘Manifesto’ is its complex mix of feminism and cybernetics. It is stated, for example, that ‘Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic’ (Haraway, 1991a: 212). This is a radical extension of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver’s famous Mathematical Theory of Communication (1949), in which information is defined in statistical terms. In an interview conducted in 1999 you said that you were familiar with the work of Norbert Wiener at the point of writing the ‘Manifesto’ (Haraway, 2004: 324), but were Shannon and Weaver also key points of reference? And what of cybernetics more generally – is this a field which continues to influence your work? DH: Yes, Shannon and Weaver were there. I had read them and the Macy conferences were there more generally. My dissertation adviser was Evelyn Hutchinson (1903–91), who was a really wonderful man: a theoretical ecologist, mathematician, biologist, natural historian, studier of Italian medieval manuscripts – a polymath of his generation, English by origin (see Hutchinson, 1979). I fled to his lab from developmental biology and its molecular incarnations because all my cells were dying in the lab – partly! But mainly because I was intellectually unhappy and I finally had to get it that biology for me was a cultural-material practice. I needed to locate biology in its intersection with many other communities of practice, made up of entangled humans and others, living and not. Evelyn Hutchinson’s lab made that possible. In his lab we read things like Simone Weil, Shannon and Weaver, and Virginia Woolf – those were the ‘biology’ texts that we read as part of his lab group. It was not a biology lab group in the narrow sense. It was a ‘what’s interesting the world’ lab group. And a lot of people that came out of Evelyn’s lab – like Robert MacArthur (1930–72) – [were] really important biologists. MacArthur’s colleague-ship with E.O. Wilson on island biogeography (MacArthur and Wilson, 2001 [1967]) is really important. MacArthur was a major cybernetic theorist in animal behaviour and a fabulous ornithologist. 138 Theory, Culture & Society 23(7–8) Downloaded from tcs.sagepub.com at University of Waikato Library on June 8, 2014 Anyway, a lot of people came out of Evelyn’s lab deeply interested in various aspects of cybernetics, including me. But how could you not be interested in that stuff in those years? The quote you just read is not so much what I want to be the case but my sitting down and looking at what seemed to me to be an imperative that knowledge projects these days constitute their objects of attention in the Foucauldian sense – as discourse constitutes it own objects of attention. This is not a relativist position. This is not about things being merely constructed in a relative sense. This is about those objects that we non-optionally are. Our systems are probabilistic information entities. It is not that this is the only thing that we or anyone else is. It is not an exhaustive description but it is a non-optional constitution of objects, of knowledge in operation. It is not about having an implant, it is not about liking it. This is not some kind of blissed-out technobunny joy in information. It is a statement that we had better get it – this is a worlding operation. Never the only worlding operation going on, but one that we had better inhabit as more than a victim. We had better get it that domination is not the only thing going on here. We had better get it that this is a zone where we had better be the movers and the shakers, or we will be just victims. So inhabiting the cyborg is what this manifesto is about. The cyborg is a figuration but it is also an obligatory worlding – that inhabiting it you can’t not get it – that it’s a military project, a late capitalist project in deep collaboration with new forms of imperial war – McNamara’s electronic battlefield is of course a major parent of cyborg worlds – also the Bell telephone company. And much more than that – cyborgs open radical possibilities at the same time. This is like Bruno Latour, but I give more space to the critic in the basement than Bruno Latour. I have more sympathy with critical theory than Bruno does – much more. And I’m much more willing to live with indigestible intellectual and political heritages. I need to hold on to impossible heritages more than I suspect Bruno wants to. Our kinds of creativity take different directions but they’re allied. So yes, Shannon and Weaver are in there big time. Cybernetics is in there in various forms. Gregory Bateson is in there too, and through Bateson’s lineage the second/third order of cybernetic worlds that Katherine Hayles analyses (see Hayles, 1999). I’m sympathetic to certain kinds of cybernetic efforts to think through autopoiesis. Lynn Margulis is also in there with the whole Gaia hypothesis of the world, including her symbiogenesis stuff. I am nonetheless deeply resistant to systems theories of all kinds, including so-called third-order cybernetics and the autopoiesis and structural coupling approaches. I’m not really happy there, but I remember that there is much more than Norbert Wiener in cybernetics. NG: There seems to have been a general resurgence of interest in cybernetics as debates over the ‘posthuman’ have come to the fore (for example in Hayles, 1999). The subtitle of your 1992 essay ‘Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) Gane & Haraway – Interview with Donna Haraway 139 Downloaded from tcs.sagepub.com at University of Waikato Library on June 8, 2014 I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others’ is ‘The Human in a Post-humanist Landscape’ (in Haraway, 2004: 47–61). What do you take this term ‘posthuman’ to mean? Is it a concept that you continue to find useful? DH: I’ve stopped using it. I did use it for a while, including in the ‘Manifesto’. I think it’s a bit impossible not to use it sometimes, but I’m trying not to use it. Kate Hayles writes this smart, wonderful book How We Became Posthuman. She locates herself in that book at the right interface – the place where people meet IT apparatuses, where worlds get reconstructed as information. I am in strong alliance with her insistence in that book, namely getting at the materialities of information. Not letting anyone think for a minute that this is immateriality rather than getting at its specific materialities. That I’m with, that sense of ‘how we became posthumanist’. Still, human/posthuman is much too easily appropriated by the blissed-out, ‘Let’s all be posthumanists and find our next teleological evolutionary stage in some kind of transhumanist technoenhancement.’ Posthumanism is too easily appropriated to those kinds of projects for my taste. Lots of people doing posthumanist thinking, though, don’t do it that way. The reason I go to companion species is to get away from posthumanism.