Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Drones topic education good

Adam Smith 22. Adam Smith is a PhD Candidate with the Humans Technology Law Centre and the Australian Centre for Health Law Research located at the School of Law, Queensland University of Technology. Adam researches the boundaries between humans and technology. LAW, Technology, and Humans. “Drones as Techno-legal Assemblages”. https://lthj.qut.edu.au/article/view/2333

Paul Kahn has argued that drone war ‘no longer looks like war’.115 Kahn’s conception of what war looks like involves sovereign states engaging in combat with their regular armed forces using methods that involve mutual risk.116 Since drone wars are not waged against other territorially bound sovereign states, or against a group resembling armed forces, and without mutual risk, Kahn places drone wars in a zone of exception that is neither regulated by normal law nor ordered by the laws of war. 117 However, drone wars as asymmetrical conflicts against non-sovereign groups are not a ‘new form of violence’.118 Rather, as Samuel Moyn observes, they are a successor to colonial warfare.119 Taking a broader perspective heeds the call of Deleuze, for whom ‘the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one component’.120 What separates drone wars from prior conflicts is not, Moyn argues, the technology itself, or who uses it against whom, but rather the place of the law.121 Before 1977, he notes, the laws of war did not apply to insurgents, while today they are ‘highly legalized’.122 Drones are part of a larger trajectory in which the laws of war apply to more subjects, in more spaces, rather than fewer.

Ioannis Kalpouzos notes that lawyers are involved ‘in decision making at different levels and stages of the targeting process’.123 Military lawyers based at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center are part of a plethora of individuals who watch the drone and provide advice.124 These lawyers are called on to dispense immediate advice: ‘target prosecutions must be completed in a matter of minutes.’125 They also provide policies and ‘provide training products so aircrews and (joint terminal attack controllers) are prepared to operate rapidly’.126 The place of lawyers in the drone assemblage highlights what David Kennedy calls the ‘war-generative functions of law’: the military ‘turns to law to discipline the troops, to justify, excuse, and privilege battlefield violence, to build the institutional and logistical framework from which to launch the spear’.127 In 2011, a single drone required up to 185 personnel to operate128 across different bases and continents—an operation that resembles the complexity of an aircraft carrier, ‘requiring a complex and entrenched culture of standard practices and shared experiences, of rules and discipline’.129 Drone operations are so specialised that they are producing new forms of legal expertise.130

This insertion of the law into the kill chain encloses what might otherwise be extrajudicial killing in a cloak of lawfulness. Giorgio Agamben notes that the law includes ‘what is simultaneously pushed outside’,131 and others acknowledge this expanding character of the law to cover more subjects and things that are outside itself.132 The vision of legal experts doing ondemand technical work to grease the wheels of the kill chain also echoes Carl Schmitt’s image of the state as a technical machine.133 The state, on this conception, is analogous to a sophisticated machine in which all parts work according to order. This was required of the state, for Schmitt, to guard against the state of nature.134 To succeed, the state needs to be an efficient instrument that can exercise the utmost control, which requires it to be neutral of all norms and technically perfect.135 The drone assemblage, tangled with legalities, reflects this picture of the law as pervasive, technical, efficient and neutral. However, for Schmitt, the technical machine only encompassed the state and ordered its interior, not its exterior.136 Law’s expanding trajectory indicates that its technical pervasiveness goes beyond what Schmitt imagined.

The pervasive, expanding, technical character of the law reveals law as technology. Technology, too, has been viewed by some as all-pervasive, even reaching mythical status.137 For Martin Heidegger, the essence of technology is a way of understanding the world as something to be calculated, ordered and manipulated.138 This technological worldview sees everything as ‘readyto-hand’,139 everything as some tool for using to achieve some purpose. All things, in this view, become merely some resource that can be replaced and exchanged.140 The paradigm example, for Heidegger, is modern industrialised technology, which draws all resources into supply chains to further the aims of economic efficiency.141 Law, too, is ‘ready-to-hand’, a set of rules to achieve whatever purpose most efficiently.142 But law itself is also technological, as a worldview that sees everything as a resource to be ordered to further the aim of technical efficiency. Heidegger calls this pervasive technological worldview ‘enframing’.143 Thinking of law as technology emphasises the pervasiveness of law, that it results in a closed hermeneutic that purports, like technology, to be able to order everything, to govern everything, and this pervasiveness is also at work through the drone. We can see the expansion of the laws of war to technically govern the subjects of drone strikes in the development of targeted killing.

However, this one form of control forms part of a greater collective of control assemblages. Kalpouzos144 identifies it as part of what Marianna Valverde and Michael Mopas call ‘targeted governance’—‘linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, knowledge-driven, “evidence-based” policy’.145 This links targeted killing to ideas of law and control. Law as efficient and calculative is woven into the kill chain to make assessments of proportionality and distinction on demand. Control as targeted echoes the mechanisms of the society of control, converting individuals into the dividuals of signatures and patterns of life. This form of legalised killing developed in the 1990s before the armed drone existed, indicating it is part of a broader trajectory of law, though the drone became the cypher for the law of war’s new justification of lethal forms of control.146

The development of targeted killing follows the trajectory of colonial warfare that flows through the drone. Kahn and other scholars are preoccupied with anxiety over the ‘vanishing battlefield’,147 the transformation of war that ‘no longer looks like war’,148 the creation of a space of exception where neither peacetime law nor the laws of war apply. This preoccupation is influenced by a ‘territorialist epistemology’.149 This perspective privileges the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the imagined idea that international law is built to facilitate interactions between sovereign states of equal standing.150 It fails to recognise the ‘differentiated sovereignty’ that developed in international law to suppress and manage the non-European world.151 The use of drones in war maps onto ‘imperial cartographies’, revealing this form of legitimised violence as a continuation of the imperial logic of international law.152 Campbell Munro notes that drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia do not occur across the entire territory of these states, but are localised to areas on the ‘imperial periphery’, regions of historically contested sovereign borders that are administered as less than sovereign.153 According to Munro, the legitimation of violence in drone wars continues at least three lines of imperial legal reasoning.154 One sees the Eurocentric laws of war as applying only between sovereign states, which the colonial other was not: ‘[t]o characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the laws of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject.’155 This logic continues in the concept of targeted killing, which allows the subject of drone strikes to be a legitimate target, but does not offer them legal protection. Another line of imperial legal reasoning sees the reinscription of ‘differentiated and layered sovereignties’ insofar as the areas targeted coincide with the imperial periphery.156 The third line of reasoning sees mechanised war equated with legitimate war, as embodied in the technoscientific practices of the drone.157

The three extensions of imperial legal reasoning mentioned above characterise a necropolitical space of legal ambiguity. Achille Mbembe writes that in the colony, ‘ “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end” ’.158 This is due, he insists, to ‘the creation of a European juridical order’ in which states are equal and cannot rule outside their own borders.159 This turnsthe colony, outside European state borders, into a zone of indistinction, where states need not follow any law of equality, including the laws of war.160 Laws do make their way into the colony, but are premised on the idea that the colony is not sovereign, so the laws are imposed by its European occupier, and on the idea that the people are not fully legal subjects, so they may belong to others as slaves but have no rights themselves.161 Thus, the colony is an ambiguously lawful place where a colonising power combines laws and unlawfulness to dominate the racially distinguished ‘others’. This necropolitical logic is at work in drone wars, in the way that targets are racially distinguished, legally killable but not legally protected, and managed under a regime of differentiated sovereignty. The entire collective of apparatuses of which the drone is a part makes drone wars spaces of legal ambiguity. Thus, the US continues to follow the necropolitical logic of colonial expansion to justify its killing.

The laws of war, considered from the standpoint of enframing, order and are ordered by the imperial logic of international law. Within this picture, the drone is a cypher for the laws of war as part of a collective of assemblages of control. Far from representing a break from old forms of warfare with their imagined European chivalrous legality, drones continue the project of colonial warfare by legitimising violence using the law. The extension of legality to the subjects of drone strikes is another mechanism in the technical machine that is the law of progress, order, efficiency and neutrality. The ambiguous (non-) distinction between targets, the legal ambiguity of differentiated sovereignty and targeted killing, and the blurring of the boundary between peace and war are individual aspects of collective assemblages of control that are part of a continuum of the law, not a radical break from it. This picture of the inescapability of the law echoes so many dystopian visions, including Deleuze’s and Guattari’s vision of a universal computer that tracks every movement and may decide at any moment not to allow someone access to parts of the city.162 They issued a warning about the societies of control, insisting that their mechanisms amount to the ‘coils of a serpent’.163 The drone assemblage is one of them.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.